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In this thesis, I explore the link between narrative technique and ethical reading in the fiction 
of Ian McEwan. Specifically, I use narratological concepts to examine the way in which 
McEwan encourages an ethical approach to reading: one which does not seek to “interpret” 
via hermeneutic systems, but rather reads with an attitude of humility and openness. 
Furthermore, I explain how McEwan thematises the acts of reading and writing in order to 
investigate the ethical tensions present in the production and receipt of narratives, literary or 
otherwise. Finally, I discuss the moral dramas that McEwan stages throughout his fiction, 
suggesting a connection between his characters’ epistemic outlooks—the way they “read” the 
world—and their ethical conduct. I analyse these features of McEwan’s work through a 
number of close readings of his texts, including his first short story collection, First Love, 
Last Rites (1975), and his novels The Cement Garden (1978); Saturday (2005); Solar (2010); 
Enduring Love (1997); and Atonement (2001). Ultimately, I argue that McEwan’s fiction 
advocates for, and lends itself to, ethical reading: a practice which, while potentially 
unsettling and destabilising, rejuvenates our old modes of thinking about literature, and, 
indeed, the world around us.   
 




Ian McEwan’s Enduring Love opens with a startling account of a man falling to his death 
from a hot air balloon suspended hundreds of feet in the air. The narrator, Joe Rose, who had 
let go of one of the balloon’s ropes during the preceding rescue attempt, tells the reader that 
he has ‘never seen such a terrible thing as that falling man’ (16). As is typical of McEwan, 
moral questions come into sharp focus almost immediately, lending the text its initial 
narrative momentum. Later, Joe recounts the thoughts he had when gazing at the man’s dead 
body: 
[t]he skeletal structure had collapsed internally to produce a head on a thickened stick. 
And seeing that, I became aware that what I had taken for calmness was absence. 
There was no one there. The quietness was that of the inanimate, and I understood 
again, because I had seen dead bodies before, why a pre-scientific age would have 
needed to invent the soul. (23, italics in original) 
Joe, though seeing the body for the first time, finds the sight eerily familiar. He understands 
again, as though he had since forgotten, the explanatory power possessed by the concept of 
the soul. He “reads” the dead body with both his senses and an in-built cultural script, bearing 
witness to McEwan’s statement that ‘literature flourishes along the channels of [an] unspoken 
agreement between readers and writers, offering a mental map whose north and south are the 
specific and the general’ (“Literature, Science, and Human Nature” 6). In other words, 
literature presents us with a range of novel phenomena—images; cultural contexts; moral 
dramas—that somehow also strike us as familiar. McEwan’s vision calls to mind that 
supplied by Derek Attridge in The Singularity of Literature. Attempting to account for the 
‘singular’ experience of reading literature, Attridge proposes that 
[s]ingularity exists, or rather occurs, in the experience of the reader… understood not 
as a psychological subject… but as the repository of what I have termed an 
idioculture, an individual version of the cultural ensemble by which he or she has 
been fashioned as a subject with assumptions, predispositions, and expectations. 
(Singularity 67). 
Attridge envisions readers bringing their own cards to the table—consciously or otherwise— 
when reading literary works, generating an encounter that he properly calls ‘singular’ 
(Singularity 63). For both Attridge and McEwan, then, reading facilitates what David Foster 
Wallace calls ‘an exchange between consciousnesses’ (“David Foster Wallace” 00:04:30– 
00:04:40), and the effects of this exchange depend on the materials available to both reader 
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and writer. Though not identical, McEwan’s “mental map” and Attridge’s “cultural 
ensemble” capture the sense of interplay in the reader-writer relationship, where elements of 
mutual understanding blend with novel elements that are calculated to unseat or reframe the 
reader’s presuppositions. McEwan’s fiction displays an acute awareness of the way in which 
these elements operate: one which is particularly attuned to their ethical dimensions. 
Consequently, it calls upon the reader to engage in the process of ethical reading. 
It is somewhat difficult to define the term “ethical reading”, due both to its 
philosophical connotations and its many uses in critical literature. I employ the term broadly 
to invoke two distinct concepts: firstly, the type of reading which discerns and evaluates the 
ethical (or “moral”) tensions at play in any given text; secondly, the type of reading that 
resists the temptation to use a pre-conceived hermeneutic lens, and thus shows a ‘willingness 
to have the grounds of one’s thinking recast and renewed’ (Attridge Singularity 128). While 
these concepts differ in their emphases, I see them as equally fruitful approaches to 
McEwan’s work, and, while it may be difficult to synthesise them, it seems perfectly 
acceptable to imagine them working simultaneously: along parallel lines of enquiry, so to 
speak. To simplify matters, we might refer to the first concept as “reading ethics” and the 
second as “ethical reading”. McEwan’s fiction provides fertile soil for each of these 
approaches, weaving in dense moral dramas with an unsettling tendency to ‘[play] havoc with 
the preconceived’ (K. Ryan 5). He asks his readers to read in a way that ‘hesitates and 
suspends judgement’ (Walker 32), while also encouraging them to make an ethical 
commitment during the process of reading the text. In both cases, he calls for some form of 
ethical development or response from the reader, even if said response is, in Attridge’s terms, 
entirely singular.     
In addition to a focus on ethical reading, this thesis employs a narratological lens, 
which, as I will show, dovetails with the ethical aspects of literature. Indeed, Adam Zachary 
Newton goes so far as to argue that ‘a narrative is ethics in the sense of the mediating and 
authorial role each take up towards another’s story’ (48). Further, as James Meffan and Kim 
Worthington note, ‘[narratology] enables… an informed discussion about [the] crucial 
relationship between the text and the effects that are claimed for it with some descriptive 
precision and force’ (121). Following this line of thinking, my analysis uses narratological 
concepts to draw out the relationship between narrative and the dual senses of “ethical 
reading” described above. McEwan’s fiction often interrogates the act of storytelling; it is no 
surprise that Atonement, arguably the apex of McEwan’s literary career, centres on the effects 
of narrative on both the narrator and narrated. Narratives do not simply emerge from the 
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ether; they assume a relationship between the teller and the told, each of whom possess their 
own ‘partisan understandings and desires’ (Worthington Self as Narrative 15). Inevitably, 
this gives rise to questions of authorship, particularly in the case of first-person narrators, 
where the ‘disparity of understanding’ between author, narrator and audience becomes a 
central issue (Phelan et al. Nature of Narrative 240). This thesis is frequently concerned with 
the reliability of McEwan’s narrators, their methods of communication, and the degree to 
which they are aware of their own role as narrator. I aim to show how these questions inform 
our ethical judgements, and the way in which McEwan’s use of narrative techniques often 
complicate, rather than clarify, such judgements. 
In order to demonstrate the connection between narrative and ethics in McEwan’s 
fiction, my approach favours close reading over theoretical analysis. My rationale for this 
approach emerges from McEwan’s aforementioned emphasis on the reader-writer 
relationship, particularly the ‘decoding process’ (Shen 82) employed by all readers, who use 
as their guide the ‘mental map’ described by McEwan (“Literature, Science and Human 
Nature” 6). Extensive theoretical discussions about applied ethics or structuralist narratology 
are beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, the crux of my argument rests on the interplay 
between narrative and ethics when considered in the context of the reading experience. The 
questions arising from this dynamic need not be restricted to academic discussion. We might 
even say they have universal relevance; McEwan, for instance, characterises the novel as ‘a 
rarefied version of what we all do all the time: reading each other’ (“Ian McEwan Interview” 
00:01:30–00:01:45). In other words, we are always “decoding”, in a “singular” way, those 
around us. Seen in this light, narrative fiction takes on a certain ethical urgency, and the best 
way to demonstrate this is to take part in the reading process itself.  
In Chapter One, I analyse how McEwan uses narrative techniques to facilitate ethical 
reading in his short story collection, First Love, Last Rites (1975), and his debut novel, The 
Cement Garden (1978). Despite the apparently amoral tone of these texts, they show that 
McEwan engaged the ethical qualities of reading from the beginning of his career. Firstly, I 
outline the ways in which a narratological lens can contribute to an ethical reading of 
McEwan’s texts by giving us an understanding of how they operate. I then introduce and 
define some key narratological terms, including Wayne Booth’s concept of the implied 
author, or “IA”, and the related device of the unreliable narrator. This device, I argue, allows 
McEwan to employ narrators who are ethically and / or psychologically deficient. 
Furthermore, I argue that McEwan’s early texts subvert and satirise certain discursive 
practices. His narrators remain naïve to the fact that they are trapped within such practices, 
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and this produces another kind of unreliability on a meta-textual level. McEwan’s ironic 
invocation of these discursive modes functions as a criticism of reductive hermeneutic tools 
and encourages an ethical reading that avoids such tools. Moreover, I argue that the 
characters themselves are, to an extent, “readers”, whose devotion to certain modes of 
understanding the world affects their inter-personal ethics, often in a perverse or negative 
way. These strands of argument inform my close reading of three short stories—
“Conversation With a Cupboard Man”, “Homemade”, and “Solid Geometry”—and The 
Cement Garden. These texts foreshadow features of McEwan’s later fiction: the connection 
between epistemic beliefs and ethical conduct; the subversive nature of intertextual 
references; and the ethical qualities of the narrative act. I conclude the chapter by briefly 
examining McEwan’s statements about his own reading habits, arguing that his early 
writing—which often refashions or responds to other writers he admires—evidences his own 
practice of ethical reading. 
In my second chapter, I discuss McEwan’s narrative approach to Saturday (2005) and 
Solar (2010): novels which address contemporary social and political concerns. Though 
McEwan abandons first-person narration in these novels, he experiments with narrative 
distance to affect the audience’s reading of his two main characters, Henry Perowne and 
Michael Beard. Perowne and Beard do not resemble the misfits and psychopaths of 
McEwan’s early fiction. Instead, they are gifted bourgeois professionals, both experts in their 
chosen fields (neurosurgery and physics, respectively). This does not insulate them against 
their own folly, however, and the first half of this chapter highlights their (often 
unsatisfactory) approaches to interpersonal ethics. In each case, their interpersonal encounters 
take place in tense socio-political contexts, and my analysis aims to show these contexts 
affect Perowne’s and Beard’s ethical responses. In the second half of the chapter, I examine 
the ways in which McEwan thematises ethical reading in each text. Specifically, I argue that 
Perowne’s and Beard’s epistemic prejudices affect how they read literature, and that their 
desire to “understand” literary texts forecloses any opportunity to read ethically. Furthermore, 
in the case of Saturday, I propose that two of the supporting characters—Daisy and Baxter—
both display an ability to read ethically, albeit in very different contexts. Finally, I turn to the 
critical reception of the novels, particularly among those critics who believed McEwan did 
not live up to his ethical duties as an author. I conclude that McEwan challenges the reader to 
ponder the issues he raises, but also maintain that his use of flawed protagonists complicates 
any didactic intentions. 
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In my final chapter, I focus on Enduring Love (1997) and Atonement (2001), which 
employ metafictional narrative techniques. Specifically, I analyse how McEwan’s 
metafictional techniques do not distance the reader but bring them in to closer ethical 
relationship with the novel’s characters. Firstly, I examine the degree to which Briony 
(Atonement) and Joe (Enduring Love) constitute “surrogate authors” who are aware of their 
role in narrating events. I also inspect how their literary and epistemic outlooks—in other 
words, their modes of reading—influence their narrative approaches, and the ways in which 
they attempt to convey themselves to their readers. Secondly, I discuss how Briony and Joe, 
as surrogate authors, represent other key characters in the story: Robbie Turner (Atonement) 
and Jed Parry (Enduring Love). I explore how their attempts to (de)mythologise these 
characters constitute a kind of ethics of representation, driven in large part by their own 
relationships to the characters. Lastly, I interrogate the metafictional elements of the texts, 
examining how they draw readers towards ethical judgements. Furthermore, I argue that, 
while McEwan’s narrative technique problematises any straightforward reading of the texts, 
he encourages a commitment to an “ethical realism”. I conclude by arguing that Enduring 
Love and Atonement constitute McEwan’s most explicit attempt to foster an ethical 
readership: one that does not abandon itself to relativism or overlay the text with hermeneutic 
systems, but instead reads with a deep humility, and an understanding of the complexities of 
the narrative process. 
My concluding section, in addition to identifying opportunities for further research, 
aims to place McEwan’s fiction in the context of our current cultural climate. I argue that 
McEwan’s fiction, though not overtly didactic, guides us towards a way of reading that 
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For those writing critical studies of McEwan, it has become conventional to begin with a 
shopping list of broken taboos in his early fiction. To take one example, Jack Slay Jr. does 
not get beyond the first paragraph of the introduction to his full-length study before 
mentioning ‘incestuous siblings, heart-broken gorillas, sadomasochistic lovers [and] corpse 
dismemberers’ (1). Such catalogues are not limited to critics; McEwan himself, in his 
introduction to the fortieth anniversary edition of First Love, Last Rites, provides a more 
detailed version, attributing his early writing to a ‘savage, dark impulse’: ‘sibling incest, 
cross-dressing, a rat that torments young lovers… child abuse and murder, [and] a man who 
keeps a penis in a jar and uses esoteric geometry to obliterate his wife’ (x).1 In a sense, 
McEwan’s naked desire to shock should not surprise us: young writers often feel the itch of 
sensationalism, and he was part of a literary generation who ‘[presented] mordant, even 
vicious, views of modern society’ (Slay 3). McEwan’s origins, however, become intriguing 
when viewed in light of his later career. Following his ‘ethical turn of the 1980’s’ (Wells Ian 
McEwan 15), McEwan forged a different path, and, with historical novels such as The 
Innocent (1990) and Black Dogs (1992), broke the shackles of his enfant terrible reputation. 
By the time he published Atonement in 2001, he was a firm fixture in the pantheon of British 
literary celebrities. Hence the second common factor in the critical literature on McEwan: an 
interrogation of ‘the extent to which the [early] stories foreshadow the achievements of his 
mature fiction’ (Head 31). The dominant view, first proffered by Kiernan Ryan and later 
echoed by Dominic Head (7) and Lynn Wells (Ian McEwan 12), ‘rejects the temptation to 
reduce [McEwan’s] development to an exemplary tale of moral maturation or artistic 
depletion’, while acknowledging his growth in social and political consciousness (K. Ryan 
4). Given McEwan’s admiration for Darwin’s theory of evolution,2 it is perhaps appropriate 
that this “theory” of his artistic development combines continuity and change. 
Nevertheless, McEwan’s early texts present significant challenges to the critic, 
particularly the way in which they deal with questions of ethics. Stripped of their form and 
structure, the bare plots of First Love, Last Rites have little to recommend them. Indeed, 
 
1 Please note the x in parentheses here is a Roman Numeral, not a placeholder. 
2 See, for example, McEwan’s essay “Literature, Science and Human Nature” (pp. 5-19) in The Literary 
Animal: Evolution and the Nature of Narrative. 
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Slay’s list above seems more at home in the world of tabloid journalism than it does in 
literary fiction. Some critics, perhaps understandably, find the dispassionate moral stance of 
McEwan’s early fiction troubling. David Malcolm, for example, asserts that many of 
McEwan’s early stories ‘lack any moral center at all’ (44). Interestingly, in the case of the 
particularly disturbing “Butterflies”, he adds that ‘it is the reader who brings moral attitudes 
to the story, for they are absent in the text itself’ (43). In essence, Malcolm is correct, but his 
tone betrays an assumption that an author should guide their reader to a single—and morally 
reassuring—understanding of the text. McEwan’s choice to hand his stories over to the reader 
without giving them any moral signposts may in fact encourage what Derek Attridge calls a 
‘responsible response’: 
a responsible response to an inventive work of art… is one that brings it into being 
anew by allowing it, in a performance of its singularity for me, for my place and time, 
to refigure the ways in which I, and my culture, think and feel. This may mean being 
willing to take on trust that it has something valuable to say when it appears obscure 
or objectionable, at least until several readings—and perhaps conversations or 
research—make an informed and just response possible. (Singularity 125, my italics) 
Though Attridge uses a dense critical vocabulary here, he captures an important point. What 
Malcolm describes as McEwan’s ‘extreme moral relativism’ (15) may in fact serve a 
purpose: to invite the reader to “respond responsibly”. Most readers, even critical readers, 
may not reach the high bar set by Attridge, but McEwan’s early fiction invites them to defer 
judgement and conduct a closer inspection of the text. Kiernan Ryan echoes this point when 
he characterises McEwan’s writing as ‘adventures in the art of unease, the art of playing 
havoc with the preconceived’ (5). Ryan wrote these words in 1994, but they could apply just 
as easily to McEwan’s later work, which also aims to disabuse readers of their 
“preconceptions”. Though the later novels engage with ethical questions in a more explicit 
manner, they possess a similarly complex narrative architecture, denying the reader the 
comfort of obvious conclusions. 
This chapter will elaborate on how this dynamic works in McEwan’s early fiction, 
particularly the way in which it invites—and rewards—responsible reading. I aim to explicate 
the narrative tactics that McEwan uses in order to complicate his narrators’ reliability and 
show how these raise important ethical questions. When we concentrate on McEwan’s 
aesthetic decisions, rather than recoil from the depravity we see on the page before us, the 
texts reveal their ethical complexity. The importance of this endeavour, I argue, is less about 
uncovering McEwan’s “true” intentions—though they remain important—than participating 
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in the decoding process itself, for it is the process that precedes ethical development. 
McEwan’s texts call us to open ourselves up in this way and, by doing so, reject the typical 
stance of his narrators, whose passions trap them in recursive patterns of solipsism, grief, and 
fantasy. To read First Love, Last Rites and The Cement Garden is to engage in a series of 
strange encounters which, while confronting, encourage a habit of responsible reading.  
 
The Value of Narratology and Questions of Reliability 
 
Narratological theory provides one useful path towards a responsible reading. Though 
Attridge warns us against stifling texts with rigid hermeneutics, he endorses careful readings, 
as well as ‘conversations and research’ as the means by which readers ‘make an informed and 
just response possible’ (Singularity 125). Furthermore, an analysis that centres on form rather 
than content may be particularly useful. In her essay Against Interpretation, Susan Sontag 
laments the focus on content at the expense of form, calling for ‘a poetics of the novel’ (12). 
While an overtly formalist narratology has the potential to “over-interpret” art, narratology 
can also bear witness to the formal machinery that lends narrative art its aesthetic weight. I do 
not intend to engage in a ‘reactionary [and] stifling’ (Sontag 7) reading of McEwan’s texts, 
but rather show that the nerve-wracking nature of McEwan’s writing lies less in the “what” 
than it does the “how”. Taboo narratives possess little power on their own; indeed, given the 
popularity of tabloid journalism, they in some instances provide a perverse sort of comfort. 
The critical lens of narratology has the potential to make McEwan’s art ‘more, rather than 
less, real to us’ (Sontag 14); his narrative’s formal characteristics give them the ‘capacity to 
make us nervous’ (Sontag 8). In other words, a narratological analysis sharpens, rather than 
blunts, the texts. Such a reading does not attempt to mitigate the text’s shock value; instead, it 
works towards an understanding of how these texts operate on readers.  
One way that narratological theory can achieve this is to interrogate questions of 
authorship: how, as readers, do we stand in relation to the author, and they to us? This is a 
perennial concern in McEwan’s fiction, though the way in which he deals with the issue 
varies. The distance between the third-person narrator and his characters becomes the main 
concern of Saturday and Solar, whereas Atonement and Enduring Love present characters 
who self-consciously author their texts. Accordingly, the nature of authorship will be an 
especially important point of discussion throughout this thesis. The texts I have chosen for 
this chapter all feature first-person narrators whose reliability remains in question. A few 
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theoretical concepts may help us here. The first is Wayne Booth’s notion of the “implied 
author” (or “IA”) as distinguished from the “flesh-and-blood person” (or “FBP’). Booth 
writes that our sense of the IA includes ‘the intuitive apprehension of a completed artistic 
whole; the chief value to which [the] implied author is committed, regardless of what party 
his creator [i.e. the FBP] belongs to in real life, is that which is expressed by the total form’ 
(Rhetoric 75-76). The IA therefore changes from text to text, even when created by the same 
FBP. Booth’s definition of the unreliable narrator—he was the first critic to formally define 
the term—leans heavily on the concept of the IA. Referring to his analyses of primary texts in 
The Rhetoric of Fiction, he writes: ‘I have called a narrator reliable when he speaks for or 
acts in accordance with the norms of the work (which is to say, the implied author’s norms) 
and unreliable when he does not’ (158-159, italics in original). While this provides a useful 
starting point, Booth’s definition of the implied author—and, consequently, of the unreliable 
narrator—has come under attack. Angsar Nunning, for example, labels the concept ‘elusive 
and opaque’ and (34) and points to Booth’s neglect of the role played by readers, who bring 
to the text their own ‘referential frameworks’, including, for example, their cultural and 
ethical presuppositions (47-48). Nevertheless, Nunning maintains we cannot dispense with 
the implied author’s role because it is they who ‘[furnish] the text and the narrator with a 
wide range of explicit signals and inference invitations in order to draw readers’ attention to a 
narrator’s unreliability’ (56). That is to say, the implied author does not simply “exist” in the 
text results from a collaboration between the reader and the flesh-and-blood author who 
writes the text. This collaboration forms the basis of unreliable narration, as the reader detects 
a gap between the rhetorical purposes of the agreed-upon implied author and those of the 
narrator. Greta Olson argues that Booth’s and Nunning’s definitions share many similarities 
but makes the following distinction: ‘Booth’s model gives authority to an implied author 
whose norms form the basis from which questions of reliability can be addressed, whereas 
Nunning’s model assumes the limited validity of subjective reader response’ (99). I do not 
wish here to unravel the question of how much “authority” we delegate to the readers in 
decoding the IA’s “signals”, only to establish the importance of a gap between the norms of 
the IA and the narrator when establishing any narrator’s unreliability. 
Yet we also need to acknowledge that different types of unreliability exist, and that 
Booth’s definition, while a good starting point, does not fully explicate each of these types. 
Olson, for example, makes an explicit distinction between fallible and untrustworthy 
narrators. Fallible narrators, according to Olson, ‘do not reliably report on narrative events 
because they are mistaken about their judgements of perceptions or are biased [sic]’ (101). In 
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contrast, untrustworthy narrators are ‘dispositionally unreliable… [t]he inconsistencies [they] 
demonstrate appear to be caused by ingrained behavioural traits or some current self-interest’ 
(102). William Riggan employs a more specific—albeit fluid—taxonomy, identifying four 
types of unreliable narrators: ‘the pícaro, the clown, the madman, and the naïf (16, italics in 
original). Though imperfect, the distinctions employed by Olson and Riggan are important, as 
they influence the types of judgements readers make about the narrator. It is also worth 
noting that, under Riggan’s taxonomy, the narrator is a ‘naïf… not fully aware of many of the 
implications in his narrative’ (179). In other words, being the IA’s creation, the narrator may 
remain unaware of the various discourses in which he is implicated; this variant of naïveté 
plays an important role in many of the following stories. The ironic gap between the implied 
author and the narrator unifies the above categories, and this gap gives authors the 
opportunity to ‘make effects of various kinds’ (Phelan et al. Nature 240). McEwan3 employs 
a variety of unreliable narrators, prompting us to consider this ironic gap and arrive at an 
ethical response; or, in Attridge’s words, to ‘[bring the text] into being’ (Singularity 125). 
 
‘I Have to Pretend’: “Conversation With a Cupboard Man” 
 
I begin my analysis with “Conversation With a Cupboard Man” because the gap between the 
unreliable narrator and McEwan seems reasonably straightforward.  The story consists solely 
of a monologue in which an unnamed recluse recounts his life story to a social worker. 
Essentially, the narrative is a revolving door of traumatic experiences. The narrator’s 
widowed mother treats him as an infant up to the age of seventeen, going so far as to 
construct an adult-sized highchair and keep him on a perpetual diet of baby food. When she 
enters a relationship with a man, she starts mistreating the narrator, and eventually puts him 
into a remedial home. His subsequent attempts to adjust to adult life fail, partly due to an 
abusive employer who repeatedly locks him inside an industrial oven. After three months in 
prison for shoplifting, he takes up residence in an attic and conceals himself in a cupboard. In 
the story’s final lines, he expresses a desire to return to infancy, but acknowledges that this 
desire will never be fulfilled. 
The (limited) critical literature on “Conversation With a Cupboard Man” offers 
various interpretations that aim to make sense of the narrative’s events. Kiernan Ryan calls 
 
3 For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the IA as ‘McEwan’ throughout this chapter unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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the story ‘the hidden emotional history of many men, grotesquely caricatured as the 
confession of a madman’ (8). Although the text can support such a conclusion, reducing the 
narrator to a caricature effaces his complexity. Jack Slay’s conclusion that the narrator falls 
victim to ‘the cruelty of… society’ (23) seems equally simplistic. In my view, McEwan steers 
us away from such hasty judgements: the narrator appears equal parts vicious and pathetic, 
and though we may impute some blame to him for his dire circumstances, his ugly 
background makes this stance somewhat uncomfortable. Indeed, the ethical value of the story 
emerges from this tension, as McEwan encourages his readers to suspend their judgement. 
McEwan frames the story as a close personal encounter: the first word uttered by the narrator 
is ‘[y]ou’ (106). The rest of the first sentence implies that the narratee has asked the narrator a 
question: ‘[y]ou ask me what I said when I saw this girl’ (106). By using this narrative tactic, 
McEwan thrusts the narratee into the role of the ‘social worker’ (106) charged (presumably) 
with the task of assessing the narrator. In a sense, this “assessment” consists of discerning the 
narrator’s reliability. McEwan offers no direct guidance to his readers: the task is theirs. He 
does, however, leave subtle clues. The narrator’s attitude towards his mother, for example, 
shifts frequently: so much so that it is difficult to deduce his true feelings towards her. He 
first describes her as ‘twisted up’ (107), and when we read his account of her conduct, it is 
easy to sympathise with this view. She feeds him with baby food, never takes him outside the 
house, and, when the narrator outgrows his cot, she ‘[buys him] a crib bed from a hospital 
auction’ (107). As the narrator recounts these events, his language sharpens to the point 
where he labels his mother ‘insane’ and a ‘bitch’ (107). Yet, in the very next paragraph, he 
concedes, ‘she was a good woman, really’ (108). Later in the story, McEwan creates more 
subtle inconsistencies to reinforce the point. The narrator describes his fellow employees in a 
hotel kitchen as ‘black and ugly’ (115), and when his boss locks him in the oven he abhors 
the ‘thick black scum on the walls’, which smells like ‘rotten cats’ (116). The darkness of his 
cupboard, however, soothes him and brings him a semblance of peace (125). McEwan, then, 
calls into question the narrator’s reliability, not because he [i.e. the narrator] sets out to 
deceive the narratee but because he appears unable to discern his own psychic conflicts. The 
narrator’s constant inconsistencies allow us to classify him as a madman under Riggan’s 
taxonomy; his account is ‘patently unreliable [and] his testimony and opinions can by no 
means be accepted at face value’ (Riggan 109). McEwan’s narrative decisions complicate the 
reader’s response, asking them to consider the extent to which naïveté or madness mitigate 
ethical responsibility. 
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Freudian theorists may render the text sensible by drawing connections between the 
narrator’s subconscious ambivalence towards both his mother and the womblike darkness of 
the cupboard. The narrator, however, shows a degree of self-awareness with respect to this 
issue. He speculates that his ‘problems started [because] his father died before he was born’ 
(106). Furthermore, when his mother demands that he call her new boyfriend ‘Father’, he has 
a fit, and draws an explicit connection between the two events (111). As his monologue 
proceeds, the narrator shows an acute awareness of his desire for regression. His painful 
experience in the oven, he realises, concealed ‘a deeper pleasure of feeling safe’ (124). 
Eventually he admits, unabashed, that he envies the ‘babies [he sees] in the street being 
bundled and carried about by their mothers’ (125). He shows, therefore, a tacit awareness of 
Freudian discourse without identifying it as such. The narratee—cast in the role of a social 
worker, no less—may perceive that the narrator’s malady fits the classic pattern of the 
Oedipal complex, desiring a return to his mother’s breast and directing ‘[his] first murderous 
wish against [his] father’ (Freud 262), or, in this case, his new paternal figure. The narrator 
therefore betrays the kind of naïveté described by Riggan; McEwan traps him inside a 
Freudian discourse, setting up a secret understanding between McEwan and his reader. By 
making this reading so obvious, however, McEwan also satirises it, thus mocking any 
attempts at a straightforward Freudian reading. Instead, McEwan demands that we engage in 
a deeper reading: one which does not reduce the narrator to a cog in the Oedipal machine but 
instead considers the other “complexities” of his character.  
We see this attitude at work at other points in the story where McEwan elicits our 
sympathy for the narrator by weaving in ironies that he fails to perceive, establishing a kind 
of metafictional irony in which the narrator’s speech functions as literary device for McEwan. 
These textual signals often feature wordplay or metaphor intended solely for the reader. As if 
we were in any doubt about the McEwan’s intentions, he has the narrator tell us that he 
cannot ‘read or write’: skills he once had but has ‘forgotten’ (111). McEwan thus primes us 
to “read” where the narrator cannot. The scenes at the remedial home exemplify this narrative 
tactic particularly well. The supervisors at the home train the narrator ‘to repair watches and 
clocks’ (111) so that he can ‘stand by himself and earn a living’ (111). He confesses, 
however, that he has never been able to employ those skills (112). Metonymic resonances 
abound here: the narrator has no ability to turn back time, to “repair” his life. He never quite 
picks up on this symbolic connection, even though the final lines contain a strong echo (126). 
McEwan exposes the narrator’s naïveté once again when the narrator recounts his 
relationship with Mr Smith who is ‘in charge of the [remedial] home’ (112). Mr Smith 
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attempts to compensate for the deficiencies in the narrator’s education, leading the narrator to 
regard him as benevolent and ‘special’ (112). Dark ambiguities emerge, however, when Mr 
Smith ‘make[s] [the narrator] dance for him’ in his room: an occurrence that soon becomes a 
bi-weekly routine. Even Mr Smith’s name, which the narrator dismisses as ordinary (112), 
carries rich associations with the activity of moulding or sculpting for one’s own ends. 
McEwan’s subtle wordplay occurs in other parts of the story, too, such as when the narrator 
fantasises about ‘old times in Staines’ (126), unintentionally conflating the name of his 
hometown with the mess and muck of infancy. These continual discrepancies between 
McEwan and his narrator reward an attentive reading, but they also garner an emotional 
response. The narrator’s solipsism, which we might otherwise view as self-indulgent, instead 
evokes pity. Though the narrator’s status as a literary creation gives McEwan the opportunity 
to toy with language, the metafictional elements do not erode the narrator’s “human” aspect 
but combine with it in an attempt to elicit the reader’s sympathy. Again, McEwan’s aesthetic 
signals do not console us with easy answers but raise ethical ambiguities that we must 
confront ourselves. 
McEwan also complicates the narrator’s own ethical encounters, underscoring his 
tragic shortcomings in his relationships with others. Lynn Wells notes that the work of 
Emmanuel Levinas can function as a useful platform for assessing such encounters in 
McEwan’s fiction (Ian McEwan 14-16). She does not, however, apply it to the texts written 
before McEwan’s aforementioned ‘ethical turn’ (Wells Ian McEwan 15). Yet Levinas’ 
insistence on the primacy of the face-to-face encounter as the ‘ground of ethics’ (Bergo, 
Section 2.3) bears closely on the narrator’s experiences in “Conversation With a Cupboard 
Man”. Firstly, as Kiernan Ryan points out, the narrator—along with many other narrators in 
First Love, Last Rites—shows a ‘reluctance… to be named’ (11). The narrator is literally 
“faceless”, and though he repeatedly references his decaying body, which he regards as ‘thin 
and bloodless’ (110), he never offers a specific description of his face. Furthermore, he 
expresses a desire to avoid encounters with others, attributing the genesis of his problems to 
such encounters. As he puts it, he ‘was not unhappy till [he] found out what other people 
thought about him’ (108). This aversion to the scrutiny of others, however, sits in tension 
with a chronic desire to be acknowledged. After his mother’s new partner moves in, both he 
and the narrator’s (previously doting) mother starve him of eye contact: ‘[o]ne morning I 
came down[stairs] and found my mother’s boyfriend having breakfast in his dressing-gown. 
He didn’t even look at me when I came into the kitchen. When I looked at my mother she just 
pretended to be busy at the sink’ (110). The narrator’s attempts to establish reciprocal contact 
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are thus rebuffed twice, including by a person with whom he once shared a stifling intimacy. 
This denial of face-to-face contact, of ethical grounding, reverberates throughout his life in 
significant ways. McEwan laces the narrative with references to faces and looking, most 
notably when the narrator confers upon his employer a derisive sobriquet: ‘Pus-face’ (115). 
Rather than being ‘at peace with… absolute alterity’ (Levinas 197), the narrator finds Pus-
face repulsive (115). Pus-face’s physical grotesquery colours the narrator’s perception of him 
to such a degree that an ethical encounter becomes impossible, and the narrator reacts to Pus-
face’s sadistic treatment by pouring boiling cooking oil into his lap (117). Using this episode, 
McEwan both confirms the paucity of the narrator’s ethical grounding and issues a challenge 
to the reader to transcend the narrator’s ethical limits by remaining open to our own ethical 
encounter with the narrator in spite of his physical and moral deficiencies. 
One character within the text who does fulfil this task is Deafy, a man who the 
narrator meets in prison while serving his three-month sentence for shoplifting. Deafy is both 
‘deaf and dumb’ (123) and therefore has nothing to offer the narrator but his face, which he 
adjusts to produce an appropriate reaction to the expressions on the narrator’s own face (124). 
Free from the complications of language, the two men each experience ‘[the] absolute 
nakedness of a face (Levinas, quoted in Wells Ian McEwan 15); they simply ‘[smile] at each 
other, [doing] nothing else (123). This sustained face-to-face intimacy satisfies the narrator so 
much that he tells us—in yet another instance of unintentional irony—that he ‘didn’t speak to 
many people [in prison] apart from Deafy’ (124). His wish to eradicate the mediation of 
language carries with it a few potential meanings. Firstly, there is an obvious connection to 
the pre-linguistic state of infancy: earlier in the story he confesses he prefers ‘gurgling’ to 
talking (108). Yet it also exposes the need to look beyond language, or at least beyond the 
surface of language, to engage in a true ethical encounter with the Other, providing further 
proof that the form of any given narrative is as important as its content. 
“Conversation with a Cupboard Man” derives its ethical value not by any guidance 
from the text itself, but by McEwan’s signals to the reader. Indeed, taken at face value, the 
story appears steeped in despair. The narrator’s trials offer him no redemption or even relief 
and, as noted above, the final lines show him resigned to his fate (126). The universe he 
inhabits seems chaotic and amoral, riddled with tragedy and trauma; the shop-worn narrative 
of triumph over adversity has no place here. Furthermore, McEwan’s aesthetic choice to 
satirise the standard Oedipal narrative forecloses a simple Freudian reading. While the text 
stages some encounters that display a hopeful vision of interpersonal ethics—such as the 
narrator’s encounter with Deafy—the narrator remains largely unmoored from any ethical 
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framework, hamstrung by both his madness and naïveté.  Nevertheless, the narrator, in light 
of his experiences, is, to a degree, sympathetic. These unresolved tensions and ambiguities 
leave the reader to do the difficult work of generating their own ethical response. 
 
By the Book: “Homemade” 
In “Homemade”, a perverse coming-of-age story, another unnamed character chronicles his 
relationship with an older adolescent, Raymond, who takes him through a series of initiations. 
Though Raymond introduces him to—among other things—drug use, masturbation, and 
shoplifting, the narrator proves more adept at each of these activities. As time goes on, he 
grows increasingly anxious to lose his virginity. Unwilling to wait until Raymond introduces 
him to a girl, he decides to rape his ten-year-old sister, Connie. At the end of the story, he 
reflects shamelessly on the significance of the rape, identifying it as the point he ‘made it into 
the adult world’ (52).  
As one might assume upon reading the plot summary, “Homemade” eschews any sort 
of moral anchor. On the contrary, the narrator appears to delight in his transgressions, 
viewing the older generation’s values with amused contempt. This attitude manifests clearly 
when he uses Connie’s favourite game, ‘Mummies and Daddies’ (45) as a means to coerce 
her into sex. He tells us that it is ‘a game… which [he] would rather be burned at the stake for 
than have [his] friends see [him] play it’ (45). As he plays the game, he is ‘plunged into a 
microcosm of the dreary, everyday, ponderous banalities’ of the adult world: ‘I went to work 
and came back, I went to the shops and came back, I posted a letter and came back’ (46). The 
language signals the narrator’s disdain for any form of diligence or routine, evidenced early 
in the story when he mocks his father and uncles who, stuck in their menial jobs ‘[make] a 
virtue of this lifetime’s grovel, [and prize] themselves for never missing a day in the inferno’ 
(37). As Eluned Summers-Bremner observes, the narrator ‘regards [his older relatives] as 
hopelessly innocent and earnest, like the young’ (14). The four cardinal virtues of Catholic 
tradition—chastity, temperance, fortitude, and justice—are anathema to the narrator; he 
regards them as an outmoded moral schema maintained by deluded adults for their own peace 
of mind. Even if we forego the religious vocabulary, few readers would dispute that the 
narrator abandons moral norms in favour of self-gratification. David Malcolm’s 
aforementioned accusation that McEwan’s early stories ‘lack any moral center at all’ (44) 
was surely made with stories like “Homemade” in mind. Perhaps even more concerning is the 
apparent lack of distance between McEwan and the narrator in this story. The narrator lacks 
Chapter One: Strange Encounters  16 
 
the degree of ignorance or naïveté we might attribute to the narrator of “Conversation with a 
Cupboard Man”. Indeed, the whole story gains its momentum from his journey from naïve 
adolescent to inhabitant of the ‘adult word’ (52). Narrating in the past tense at a temporal 
distance from actual events—he implies he has completed ‘art college’ (36)—he shows an 
acute awareness of his debauchery coupled with a complete lack of remorse. Unlike the 
Cupboard Man, he uses a witty and complex diction. He describes, for example, the sexually 
suggestive bending and unbending of Raymond’s finger as a ‘bewildering digital allegory’ 
(28). Furthermore, McEwan blesses the narrator with a sense of irony that the Cupboard Man 
never possessed (27). In other words, McEwan does not play jokes behind the narrator’s back 
but appears to play the part of co-conspirator. With this in mind, “Homemade” does indeed 
begin to look like a case of lascivious indulgence on McEwan’s part. 
Despite this, “Homemade” provides a vital critique of the ethics of reading. The 
narrator hardly constitutes a moral exemplar, but he does raise important ethical questions for 
the reader, the chief of which is: to what degree does his narrative style affect our contempt 
for him? McEwan uses this question to provoke his readers and force them to evaluate how 
they engage with the text as literature: a process which Attridge labels ‘performance’ 
(Singularity 95). In an interview, McEwan (the FBP), disclosed that, when writing 
“Homemade”, he emulated the narrative styles of Henry Miller and Norman Mailer (McEwan 
“Points of Departure” 14). Yet McEwan was no starstruck tributary; he ‘enjoyed’ Miller and 
Mailer but also regarded them as ‘totally bogus’ and ‘wanted to send them up’ (“Points of 
Departure” 14). We might therefore view “Homemade” as a parody of a certain literary 
discourse which seeks to employ language to obfuscate, or even celebrate, a first-person 
narrator’s depravity. Perhaps the archetypal example here would be Humbert Humbert, the 
narrator of Vladimir Nabakov’s Lolita, who, though morally bankrupt, is ‘devastatingly 
eloquent’ (Choi).  By incarnating his own version of this type of narrator, McEwan 
thematises this ethical dilemma, and asks readers how they will respond to it.  
Objectively speaking, the narrator is a reprehensible character who shatters multiple 
taboos with unrepentant glee. Nevertheless, he writes with an almost irresistible wit and 
intelligence, which works to his advantage, for the story is ‘brought into being by [his] 
language’ (Attridge Singularity 96). The narrator’s sadism and dark humour often have a 
symbiotic effect. When he attends Raymond’s cross-country events, he enjoys the runners’ 
‘racked, contorted faces’ (39), and nurses them to health at the finish line to indulge a ‘gay 
fascination’, calling himself ‘a real Florence Nightingale’ (40). Such humorous riffs pervade 
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the entire narrative. In one instance, he reminisces about his conversations with various 
workmen in his local café, unleashing a stream of lewd jokes: 
we listened to who and how the dustmen fucked, how the Co-op milkmen fitted it in, 
what the coalmen could hump, what the carpet-fitter could lay, what the builders 
could erect, what the meter man could inspect, what the bread man could deliver, the 
gas man sniff out, the plumber plumb, the electrician connect, the doctor inject, the 
lawyer solicit, the furniture man install – and so on, in an unreal complex of timeworn 
puns and innuendo, formulas, slogans, folklore and bravado. I listened without 
understanding… (35) 
The verbal gymnastics are entertaining, and the sheer number of one-liners indicates both the 
narrator’s belief in their comic power and awareness of their absurdity. Yet the narrator 
understands nothing initially, apart from the fact that the workmen’s bawdy humour 
constitutes a kind of language or mode of discourse. The conversations lead him to develop a 
kind of referential storehouse, taking the opportunity to ‘file away anecdotes [to] use’ in the 
future (35). It is only after his rape of Connie—his ‘one fuck’ (36)—that the language begins 
to acquire substantive meaning. Indeed, he informs the reader that, in retrospect, the 
conversations provided him with ‘a complete education which… earned him the reputation of 
being the juvenile connoisseur of coitus to whom dozens of males—and fortunately females, 
too—came to seek advice’ (35-36). He thus moves from student of the “unreal complex” to 
master of it, dispersing the coveted knowledge and strange shibboleths to others (36). Armed 
with his new vocabulary, he successfully hypnotises his sexually inexperienced peers through 
the art of storytelling and deploys a similar method of deceit when relating his story to the 
reader. His narrative becomes one of initiation and conquest, representing—to him at least— 
the moment when the workmen’s language begins to acquire meaning. Indeed, when he rapes 
Connie, he views it as a moment of triumph, a performance: 
I felt proud, proud to be fucking, even if it were only Connie, my ten-year-old sister, 
even if it had been a crippled mountain goat I would have been proud to be lying there 
in that manly position, proud in advance of being able to say ‘I have fucked’, of 
belonging intimately and irrevocably to that superior half of humanity who had 
known coitus, and fertilized the world with it. (51) 
The narrator celebrates his transition from naïf to picaresque rogue, encouraging the reader to 
view him as a kind of depraved antihero. His linguistic style aims to efface the evil of the act 
through language, and therefore soften the reader’s disgust. The irony, of course, springs 
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from the fact that he himself was dazzled by the language of the workmen; he merely 
recapitulates the process, continuing the cycle. 
The extent to which the narrator’s style works, however, will depend on the reader 
and whether they, in Wayne Booth’s words, ‘[agree] to join the dance’ (The Company We 
Keep 333). Indeed, the narrator’s style may have the opposite effect; after enduring such a 
stark moral transgression, the reader might recoil from the idea that he has joined any such 
dance. Whatever the case may be, we need only consider our reaction to the story if it was 
narrated by Connie, or even Raymond, to realise the extent of the narrator's control. We read 
the story on the narrator’s terms; as Adam Zachary Newton remarks, ‘narrators dictate 
conditions and, in doing so, reify their authority’ (58). The narrator’s unreliability comes not 
from a lack of understanding but from an attempt to manipulate the reader. The ethical 
aspects of reading are at the forefront of McEwan’s concerns here. The reader must decide 
how to relate to the narrator’s vicious sense of humour and flagrant amorality, and reflect on 
whether he has fallen victim to the narrator’s discourse in the same way he has fallen victim 
to the workmen’s.  
Furthering this point, the narrator’s constant use of intertextual references critiques 
the supposed connection between reading and moral development. The narrator alludes to 
many texts we might characterise as “canonical” in order to substitute himself for some of 
literature’s iconic figures. His relationship with Raymond is a particularly rich ground for 
such metaphors. He refers to Raymond as his ‘Mephistopheles, a clumsy Virgil to [his] 
Dante, showing [him] the way to a Paradiso where [Raymond] himself could not tread’ (32). 
This transgressive mix of the Faustus myth and The Divine Comedy shows that the narrator 
understands the depths of his own corruption but nonetheless regards his various initiations as 
steps on his path to a form of heavenly glory. Moreover, it depersonalises Raymond, 
transforming him into an archetype rather than an Other who deserves ethical consideration. 
The narrator’s appropriation of these texts for his own narrative purpose casts doubt on any 
proposed link between “high art” and moral integrity. On the contrary, his reading habits 
seem only to provide him with a groundwork for his vices, such as when he supplements his 
lessons in the café with ‘a quick reading of the more interesting parts of Havelock Ellis and 
Henry Miller’ (35). The narrator does develop an ethic, but it is the ethic of the libertine, or 
even the sociopath. McEwan’s rhetoric here seems to echo that of Harold Bloom, who 
concedes that it is ‘probably true’ that ‘reading good books is bad for the character’ (The 
Western Canon 16). Though we must take care with such broad generalisations, Bloom’s 
statement is certainly true in the case of the narrator, who takes a solipsistic and utilitarian 
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approach to reading. He subjugates every canonical text for his own purpose, turning them 
into frivolous allegories. We might even read him as a parody of hermeneutic systems which, 
when employed to excess, can also appropriate texts in this way. “Homemade” argues that 
the act of reading does not consist solely of the transmission of information—moral or 
otherwise—from active writer to passive reader, but a process by which both writer and 
reader are vulnerable to manipulation by the other. McEwan calls us to notice the effects of 
reading, not so much to arm ourselves against influence but to convince us that reading is a 
dynamic, dialogic act. 
 
Murder by Numbers: “Solid Geometry” 
 
“Solid Geometry” follows an unnamed narrator obsessed by his great-grandfather’s 
voluminous diaries, which appear detailed enough to compete with Samuel Pepys’ turgid 
musings. His obsession causes him to neglect his wife, Maisie, who has given up work and 
turned to New Age practices to assuage her psychological distress. The narrator discovers 
within the diaries some notes by his grandfather, an ‘amateur mathematician’ (20) who 
claims to have mastered geometric techniques which allow him to create ‘a plane without a 
surface’ (14). Meanwhile, Maisie grows so frustrated with the narrator’s curt manner and lack 
of compassion that she destroys his cherished heirloom: a penis kept in a jar of formaldehyde, 
which his great-grandfather won in an auction. In retaliation, the narrator masters the 
geometric techniques left behind by his great-grandfather to murder his wife by “folding” her 
into oblivion. 
Though “Solid Geometry” functions best as a comic tale, the satire within still has 
something to say about ethics. Significantly, it is McEwan’s first attempt to thematise C.P. 
Snow’s theory of the ‘Two Cultures’, with 
[l]iterary intellectuals at one pole—at the other scientists, and as the most 
representative, the physical scientists. Between the two a gulf of mutual 
incomprehension—sometimes… hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of 
understanding. They have a curious distorted image of each other. Their attitudes are 
so different that, even on the level of emotion, they can't find much common ground. 
(4) 
It is fitting that the narrator of “Solid Geometry” favours a form of mathematical purity; 
Snow came of age during the birth of logical positivism, a philosophical approach best 
exemplified by a coterie of intellectuals known as the Vienna Circle. This group, which 
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included such pioneers as Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘found traditional logic 
an unsatisfactory tool for the rigorous construction of mathematics’ and developed systems 
that ‘[led] to a degree of clarity and rigor… unattainable within ordinary language’ (Kraft 
13). “Solid Geometry” both honours and parodies this epistemic system, a pattern that lays 
the groundwork for more nuanced analyses in McEwan’s later fiction. The Two Cultures 
debate features prominently in McEwan’s novels, including Saturday, Solar and Enduring 
Love, each of which I will discuss during the next two chapters. McEwan often employs the 
debate to draw a connection between epistemology and ethics, highlighting how certain 
epistemic systems influence the way we “read” literary texts, the world and each other.4 
Departing from the morbid realism that characterises the other stories in First Love, 
Last Rites, McEwan designs a world where recondite mathematical knowledge can achieve 
the impossible. In doing so, he both celebrates the elegance of advanced mathematics—
geometry in particular—and condemns those who let such pursuits rule their lives. As in 
“Homemade”, we find that intellectual prowess, when detached from a moral compass, does 
not necessarily translate to ethical conduct. The narrator’s deep obsession with his great-
grandfather’s diary leads him to forego interpersonal relationships. Maisie is the only other 
person he talks to, and he regards her as cloying and irritating. Though she frequently 
attempts to establish emotional and sexual intimacy with him, he brushes her off every time. 
At one point, he breaks off a conversation with her to contemplate his great-grandfather’s 
views on sex, telling the reader that ‘[his] great-grandfather produced mathematical evidence 
that the maximum number of [sexual] positions cannot exceed the prime number seventeen’ 
(5). His great-grandfather, however, had little sexual experience himself (5), and this once 
again demonstrates the narrator’s habit of privileging the abstract over the concrete. His 
impatience with Maisie’s interruptions is so severe that it manifests as domestic violence; 
after she assaults him with a shoe, he lies in wait outside the bedroom in order to retaliate, 
hitting her ‘neatly and squarely on the top of her head’ (6). In this case, the geometrical 
language with which he describes the blow shows that his worldview—as well as the 
language that accompanies it—is suffused with the principles of mathematics. Furthermore, 
the narrator shows little awareness of his own faults. Whereas the narrator of “Homemade” 
acknowledges—and celebrates—his own capacity for evil, the narrator of “Solid Geometry” 
has faith in the virtue of his obsession. He chooses to shift the blame to Maisie, telling the 
 
4 This modus operandi develops organically from McEwan’s aforementioned critiques of literary hermeneutics, 
which, at base, aim to render any given text understandable. 
Chapter One: Strange Encounters  21 
 
reader ‘she [is] very jealous… of [his] great grandfather’s forty-five volume diary, and of 
[his] purpose and energy in editing it’ (4). The narrator’s view that Maisie cannot justify her 
jealousy shows the extent to which he has alienated himself from her. To use Riggan’s 
schema again, the narrator typifies the ‘madman’; his worldview ‘[reflects] his own twisted 
impressions… [and] neurotic obsessions’ (178), and this compromises his reliability. In light 
of this, McEwan presents the reader with the narrator’s idea that his dedication to his great-
grandfather’s diary has some sort of noble purpose, prompting the reader to consider the 
consequences of the narrator’s fixation. McEwan once again interrogates the act of reading; 
the diaries influence the narrator to such a degree that he invests his own identity in that of 
his great-grandfather. Consequently, the narrator provides a mirror image of the narrator of 
“Homemade”. Each narrator operates within a popular mode of discourse—one literary, one 
mathematical—that McEwan satirises in order to expose their ethical shortcomings. 
Significantly, McEwan does not reject these modes of discourse outright, but merely exposes 
the dangers of extreme devotion to them.   
The friction in the story comes not only from the narrator’s strange attachment to the 
diaries, but also from his constant derision of Maisie’s epistemological systems, which he 
views with naked contempt. We learn through the narrator’s dialogue with Maisie that she 
has given up work in order to indulge her interest in New Age philosophies (10). The narrator 
delivers his unvarnished opinion on her pursuits, dismissing them as ‘sentimental 
Buddhism… junk shop mysticism, hoss-stick therapy, [and] magazine astrology’ (10). 
Maisie, on the other hand, regards the narrator as ‘narrow [and] predictable’ (7). Using these 
exchanges, McEwan builds tension between the narrator and Maisie, as they ground 
themselves in two opposing epistemic systems: the elegant, detached world of theoretical 
mathematics and the muddy waters of esoteric philosophy. On the surface, McEwan seems to 
endorse the narrator’s views; some of the most humorous lines arise when the narrator 
needles Maisie about her beliefs. When she makes the astonishing claim that ‘a man locked in 
a cell with only Tarot cards would have access to all knowledge’, the narrator asks 
sardonically whether that same man could ‘work out the street plan of Valparaiso’ (6). Yet 
the eventual murder / disappearing act seems to vindicate Maisie’s views. In a way, she does 
her own “reading”, not just of tarot cards but also psychic phenomena. She recalls, for 
example, a nightmare in which she is ‘in a plane flying over a desert’ and cannot ‘find a 
space’ to land (4, my italics). The geometric vocabulary here is not accidental: the nightmare 
turns out to be prescient. Furthermore, during one of their arguments, she tells the narrator 
she can ‘feel [herself] being screwed up like a piece of paper’ (10). By the end of the story, 
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Maisie’s studies in ‘the occult’ (4)—literally “hidden knowledge”—appear to have serviced 
her with premonitions, but the narrator remains oblivious to this (or does not wish to 
acknowledge it). These not-so-subtle hints indicate McEwan’s desire to generate sympathy 
for Maisie, who, despite what the narrator may think, has her own access to privileged 
information. 
McEwan also uses the narrator’s hatred of Maisie’s epistemological stance to ironic 
effect. The mathematical principles that the narrator discovers in his grandfather’s diaries are 
just as murky and obscure as any of Maisie’s interests. When reading the diaries, the narrator 
comes across a transcription of the words of “M”, one of his great-grandfather’s close 
companions. M informs the narrator’s great-grandfather that he has ‘[come] into the 
possession of certain documents which… undermine the whole canon of our physical laws’ 
(12). M also relates the story—supposedly apocryphal—of when the geometric principles 
contained in the documents were first proved. The story concerns a mathematician named 
David Hunter, who, at an academic conference, uses special folding techniques to make a 
piece of paper disappear from sight, thereby creating a ‘plane without a surface’ (14). 
Hunter’s fellow academics regard it as a ‘worthless conjuror’s trick’ (17), but Hunter goes on 
to repeat the process using a human person, with whom he achieves the same result (19). 
Though M writes off the story as a ‘fantastic [tale]’ (19), the narrator’s great-grandfather 
demands the documents from M. This “fantastic tale” excites the narrator, a supposed 
rationalist, so much that he spends all day and night studying his great-grandfather’s 
notebooks and annotations in order to master the process itself. One would think that, if the 
narrator were as rational as he thought he was, he too would have dismissed the notes as 
pseudoscience. Indeed, the language his great-grandfather uses throughout the notebooks has 
a distinctive New-Age edge to it; his first breakthrough comes when he discovers—or 
perhaps realises—that ‘[d]imensionality is a function of consciousness’ (20). Such imprecise 
musings would seem better suited to Maisie than the narrator, but within this particular 
context the narrator finds them profound. Indeed, his great-grandfather’s notes on geometry 
form an apt analogue of Maisie’s tarot cards: each of them function as “texts” which provide 
a source of coveted knowledge unattainable in empirical realm and, in doing so, obsess their 
reader. McEwan’s careful parallel structure shows that both characters are guilty of indulging 
their own private fantasies, fleeing the harsh limitations of the observable world in search of 
an answer to their problems. McEwan privileges the narrator’s point of view, and, in doing 
so, exposes his [i.e. the narrator’s] hypocrisy. 
Chapter One: Strange Encounters  23 
 
The narrator’s decision to murder Maisie highlights the extent to which his devotion 
to his great-grandfather has eroded his ethical awareness. Frustrated with the narrator’s 
continual lack of affection, Maisie shatters the jar that contains an unusual relic once 
belonging to his great-grandfather: ‘the penis of Captain Nicholls who died in Horsemonger 
jail in 1873’ (1). After Maisie exits the room, the narrator mourns the penis with a bizarre 
mental eulogy, reflecting on ‘all the places it had been’ (16). This elegiac process continues 
when he provides the penis—which he now refers to as ‘him’—with a ritual burial ‘under the 
geraniums’ (17). The episode has a humorous tone, but also signals explicitly the point at 
which the narrator’s obsession becomes pathological; he forms a ‘sudden resolution’ (23) to 
kill Maisie using geometric techniques obtained from his great-grandfather’s diaries. He 
exploits Maisie’s residual affection for him by giving her the impression he wants to re-
establish sexual intimacy (23-24) and goes on to provide a dispassionate account of the 
murder (25-26). Immersed fully in the language of geometry, he loses the ability to relate 
ethically to Maisie as an Other; instead, she becomes an object: an aggregate of angles, 
vectors, and surfaces. As he folds Maisie in on herself, he admires ‘the positioning of her 
limbs’ which to him express ‘the nobility of the human form’ (26). The narrator’s flat affect 
shows that he has lost his ability to relate to the world in any language other than that of 
geometry. McEwan invites his readers to wonder what will come of the narrator after 
Maisie’s disappearance. Trapped within the suffocating world of his great-grandfather’s 
diaries, he may in fact “disappear” himself, fully assimilated within the image of his great-
grandfather. The narrator may be a superb logician, but the rules of geometry—and an 
equally rigid sense of patrilineal destiny—render him ethically bankrupt. His approach to 
reading demonstrates Wayne Booth’s point that ‘[e]very act of the imagination… can 
colonize the mind’ (The Company We Keep 298). “Solid Geometry” warns us that, if we 
surrender our critical faculties when reading, our minds too are open to such “colonisation”. 
This, in turn, has the potential to poison our capacity for ethical discernment. 
 
Innocence and Experience: The Cement Garden 
 
The Cement Garden, McEwan’s first novel, tells the story of four children: Julie (aged 
seventeen); Jack (aged fourteen, then fifteen), who narrates the story; Sue (aged thirteen) and 
Tom (aged six) who are left to fend for themselves after the death of their parents. Their 
father dies in the first chapter during the process of covering the family garden with cement. 
Later, their mother dies of an unnamed illness. The children, afraid that social services will 
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separate them, use the remainder of the cement to bury her in a trunk, which they keep in the 
house’s cellar. Each of the children react to the deaths in different ways: Jack becomes idle, 
moody, and obsessed with masturbation; Sue spends most of her time reading; Tom regresses 
into an infantile state; and Julie starts dating Derek, a snooker player a few years older than 
her. As the cement in the children’s makeshift tomb starts to crack, Derek becomes 
increasingly suspicious. After catching Julie and Jack in an act of incest, Derek smashes their 
mother’s makeshift tomb and calls the police, whose arrival McEwan suggests implicitly on 
the novel’s final page. 
In similar fashion to “Conversation With a Cupboard Man”, McEwan imbues The 
Cement Garden with Freudian dynamics without necessarily endorsing Freud’s theoretical 
vision. The text dramatises psychic conflicts, secrets, and dreams, and seems to invite a 
Freudian hermeneutic approach. The first chapter of The Cement Garden, for example, 
introduces us to the stern patriarch of the family—simply called ‘Father’—and provides an 
account of his death. Jack confesses in the first line his sense that he contributed in some way 
to Father’s heart attack (3). As in “Conversation with a Cupboard” man, McEwan evokes 
Oedipal dynamics, with the unnamed Father constituting a paternal archetype. Such Freudian 
elements resonate throughout the chapter—and the rest of the novel—and it is worth pausing 
briefly here to consider the significance of this theoretical framework. Once again McEwan 
employs aforementioned Oedipal dynamics in an overwrought—or, as David Malcolm would 
have it, ‘parodic’ (60)—fashion, but, in this instance, McEwan’s point runs deeper. As Philip 
Armstrong notes, the Oedipal complex itself is ‘a hypothesis requiring verification by art’ 
(21); Freud turned to myth—not empiricism—to explain the phenomena he observed in his 
clinic. Arguably, this cross-pollination of art and medicine demonstrates a form of 
responsible reading: one which ‘strives to convert the other into the same, [and] strives also 
to allow the same to be modified by the other’ (Attridge Singularity 124). In this sense, it 
makes little sense to view Freud as ‘a system-maker whose theories can be useful to an 
applied literary criticism’ (Meisel 1). Instead, he is best understood as ‘a theoretician and… 
practitioner of [literature] in exact and specific ways (Meisel 1). For example, Freud’s 
reading of Hamlet, now so familiar to us, challenged the ‘prevailing’ critical orthodoxy 
among his literary contemporaries (Freud 265). Harold Bloom goes as far as to say ‘[t]here is 
no “true” or “correct” reading of Freud because Freud is so strong a writer that he contains 
every available mode of interpretation’ (“Poetic Sublime” 212, italics in original). Thus, to 
read The Cement Garden with a Freudian “system” in mind is not only reductive but runs 
contrary to the spirit of Freud’s theoretical approach, and may even suggest a shallow, 
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extractive reading of Freud’s thinking itself. An ethical reading, while acknowledging the 
Freudian elements of the text, will not reduce it to an Oedipal drama. 
With this in mind, let us turn to the first chapter of The Cement Garden, which 
focuses largely on the relationship between Father and the rest of the family, particularly 
Jack, and uses the titular image as a thematic lynch pin. The finer details of Jack’s 
relationship with Father call for close examination. Jack resents Father, who he deems ‘a 
frail, irascible, obsessive man’ (3), though he also possesses a latent desire to emulate him; he 
delights in his Father’s laconic interactions with the cement delivery men, for example (3-4). 
McEwan thus establishes Jack’s point-of-view throughout the narrative: subversive and 
detached, but self-conscious and burdened by the fact he has not achieved full adulthood. The 
subversive element of Jack’s point of view emerges once again when he exposes Father’s 
obsession with the family garden. ‘Constructed rather than cultivated’ (9), the garden is an 
anti-Eden: a manmade attempt to create a ‘special world’ (10) complete with a ‘dancing Pan’ 
(9) as its central idol. Father thus becomes an artist-figure whose obsession with form warps 
his sense of ethics. Indeed, Father’s admiration for his garden borders on deranged: he erects 
‘a lawn the size a of a card table… on a pile of rocks’ and calls it ‘the hanging garden’ (9). 
The garden also seems more important to him than his family, whom he humiliates routinely 
with ‘stage-managed’ jokes (10). When Jack and Julie make their own joke about the garden 
at the dinner table, it stings Father so much that he stops working on it (11-12). Subsequently, 
Father decides to cover the garden with cement, laying the groundwork for the events that 
follow.  
Though Attridge warns us not to lean too heavily on allegorical approaches to texts 
(Ethics of Reading 39), it is hard to disagree with Christina Byrnes’ argument5 that the 
cement ‘is the ruling symbol of the father’s stifling rigidity’ (128) which hampers his 
children’s growth. Yet the titular garden carries more than symbolic value; its paradoxical 
nature initiates the reader into the strange world of the story, which is simultaneously realistic 
and bizarre. A similar tension exists in the relationship between Jack and Father. Oedipal 
elements come to the fore, but McEwan does not present them in a straightforward manner. 
Jack torments Father, who he knows has a heart condition, by refusing to ‘take the strain’ 
while they lift the cement bags. While laying the cement, however, Jack feels that they have 
achieved a private father-and-son understanding: ‘[f]or once I felt at ease with him’ (13). This 
 
5 The view that the cement functions as symbol here is commonplace amongst critics, but Byrnes’ articulation 
here is particularly elegant. 
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inconsistency becomes typical of Jack, and he soon changes course once again, abandoning 
his task in order to masturbate in the upstairs bathroom (13-14). When Father falls head first 
in the cement and dies, Jack does not grieve with his siblings but ‘[smoothes] away [Father’s] 
impression in the soft, fresh concrete’ (15). McEwan hardly references the garden—or, for 
that matter, Father—beyond the first chapter. Instead, Father haunts the narrative by his 
absence, lending credence to the argument that narrative is ‘most importantly about 
“expectation” and “memory”: reading the end in the beginning and the beginning in the end’ 
(Cobley 19). These factors are particularly important for an ethical reading of The Cement 
Garden, whose main characters also grapple with expectation and memory as they adjust to 
their new circumstances. 
After Father’s death, the family unit begins to splinter, and Jack becomes frustrated 
when the secret knowledge and intimacy he once shared with his sisters, particularly Julie, 
begins to evaporate. McEwan does not attribute this explicitly to Father’s death but, through 
Jack’s eyes, illustrates a subliminal grief process and a loss of innocence. In the first chapter, 
before Father’s death, Jack, Julie and Sue play a game in which Jack and Julie examine Sue’s 
naked body ‘like a specimen from outer space’ (6). As they do so, Jack and Julie ‘[look] at 
each other knowingly, knowing nothing’ (6). Again, McEwan formulates a paradox—this 
time explicit—to portray an uneasy mingling of intense intimacy and fundamental innocence, 
or at least naïveté. A few chapters later, however, the games have come to an end: 
[they] ceased not long after Father died. Sue became reluctant. Perhaps she had 
learned something at school and was ashamed of herself for letting us do things to her. 
I was never certain because it was not something we could talk about. And Julie was 
more remote now. She… had all kinds of secrets. (27) 
This passage reveals that the children have attained a new sense of self-consciousness. The 
incest taboo has been re-established and, much like Father’s death, becomes a narrative 
undercurrent which exists as ‘expectation’ and ‘memory’ (Cobley 19). Jack also experiences 
heightened self-consciousness on a more personal level. He spends a lot of his time looking at 
himself in the mirror, ‘[staring] at his own image till it [begins] to dissociate itself and 
paralyse [him] with its look (18).  This individuation process ripples through the family, and 
as the children enter their own private worlds, McEwan exposes Jack’s limits as first-person 
narrator. The conspicuous silence referred to in the quote above forces him to speculate about 
Julie’s inner life. Julie chooses to distance herself from Jack and the other siblings. She 
refuses to walk with him to school and ‘[prefers] not be seen with him’ (18). Moreover, Julie 
tells her siblings that ‘her mind [is] empty’ even though she ‘often [appears] deep in thought’ 
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(20). McEwan invites the reader to discern Julie’s possible thoughts: they cannot know for 
sure whether she is experiencing hidden grief, the standard adolescent desire to set herself 
apart from the family, or a tangled combination of these two emotions. Once again, the reader 
must grapple with doubt, with uncertainty, even though they might believe the conclusion is 
obvious. Jack’s narrative point of view limits our access to the rest of his family, 
complicating the reader’s ethical stance towards these characters. 
This leads to further questions about Jack as a narrator: how much does the reader 
know about him? Though McEwan conveys the whole novel through Jack’s eyes, he allows 
little room for introspection. Whether we can conceive of him as a “real person” is debatable. 
David Malcolm argues—quite convincingly in my view—that Jack’s reliability and mimetic 
integrity are questionable (46-51). Malcolm points to Jack’s inconsistent style, with its 
unusual stylistic blend of simple and complex vocabulary (49), as well as his preference for 
the ‘abstract and impersonal’ (47) at the expense of ‘revealed emotion’ (48). These factors set 
him apart from the archetypal naïf as described by Riggan, whose account tends to be ‘direct 
and simple in style’, and ‘ingenuous in language and phrasing’ (179). Complicating matters 
further is the extent to which Jack involves himself in the narrative action. He often plays the 
role of the observer, and some scenes depict him doing nothing but watching. For example, 
instead of joining his family at the breakfast table he watches them eat while ‘[tossing] an 
apple in his hand’ (18). Similarly, when his sisters cry following their mother’s death, Jack 
watches, unable to ‘abandon himself’ (55). In other situations, however, he seems to abandon 
himself entirely, such as when he ‘[drifts] through the house, from one room to another’ (77), 
losing all sense of spatial awareness. McEwan thus denies the reader ‘the psychic vividness 
of prolonged and deep inside views’ (Booth Rhetoric, 378), instead opting for an 
impressionistic style that makes it difficult to find an anchor in Jack’s consciousness. 
Some aspects of Jack’s character, however, do have a mimetic—and naïve—quality. 
Almost all of these aspects relate to his status as an adolescent male. As evidenced by his 
challenges to his father, the fact that Jack is on the cusp of adulthood—or, more accurately, 
manhood—informs his point of view when narrating. Most of the moments where Jack 
immerses himself fully in the narrative action involve a threat to, or assertion of, his 
masculinity. When Tom informs Jack that he has an ‘enemy’ at school’ (44) Jack seizes on 
the opportunity to play the role of protector, physically assaulting the bully and threatening to 
‘rip his legs off’ (45). In yet another ironic reversal, a friend of Tom’s ‘enemy’ thrashes Tom 
at school the next day, nullifying Jack’s actions (45). Furthermore, the assault leaves Tom 
curious about girlhood; he tells Sue ‘you don’t get hit when you’re a girl’ (47). Jack, who 
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often appears invested in Tom’s masculine identity, becomes angry when Sue and Julie 
discuss the possibility of dressing Tom as a girl, and Julie presses him on the issue: 
Julie spoke quietly. ‘You think girls look, idiotic, daft, stupid…’ 
‘No,’ [Jack] said indignantly. 
‘You think it’s humiliating to look like a girl, because you think it’s humiliating to be 
a girl.’ (48, italics in original) 
Julie’s diagnosis proves accurate late in the novel when Jack is bullied by Derek and his 
friends at the snooker hall. After Derek upstages him with taunts, Jack attempts to hold in his 
tears in order to ‘show [Derek and his friends] that [crying] was the last thing [he is] going to 
do’ (114). When he tries to stare Derek down, however, he finds himself emasculated as a 
single tear ‘[rolls] out’ (114). Jack possesses a typically adolescent masculine identity: a 
brittle bravado masks an essential vulnerability. It is in this sense that Jack is naïve; he has 
not been initiated into the adult world. Whether these traits humanise him enough to generate 
‘sentimental empathy’ (Malcolm 51) will depend largely on the reader, but the awkward 
friction between his detached, phantasmic, intermittently articulate narration and his acute 
adolescent insecurity complicates this judgement.6 
By rendering Julie inscrutable to Jack, and Jack (mostly) inscrutable to the reader, 
McEwan underscores a broader point: the family is unknown by—and, accordingly, 
unknowable to—the outside world. McEwan structures the narrative in such a way that the 
family’s physical and psychological worlds seem to shrink in on themselves: a process that 
culminates in the act of incest between Jack and Julie. As Dominic Head notes, the 
‘dysfunctional elements of the family are carefully traced’ (47); McEwan weaves the 
children’s isolation into their very genetics. Jack discloses that his father and mother had no 
siblings, nor ‘any real friends outside the family’ (19). The house itself forms something of a 
fortress; even Tom’s friends, who play with him outside, cannot enter (19). Furthermore, the 
family are isolated geographically; the house ‘[stands] on empty land where stinging nettles 
[are] growing round torn corrugated tin’ (19). The children’s primary contact with the outside 
world comes through school, and it is significant that the ‘the last day of summer term’ 
coincides with their mother’s death (52). The death, along with her burial (64-67), marks a 
new stage in the family’s physical and social exile; the tomb becomes ‘everyone’s secret’ 
(94). Yet when a ‘hairline crack’ appears in the tomb (93), the relationship between the 
 
6 Compare, for example, Malcolm’s reading in which all characters in The Cement Garden are ‘not people but 
only simulacra’ (51) with Jack Slay Jr’s more straightforward psycho-social interpretation (35-50).  
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children starts to fracture too. When Julie starts to spend nights out with Derek, she only tells 
Sue—not Jack—about what happens, leading Jack to speculate—perhaps wishfully—that Sue 
might be diarising the conversations ‘without Julie knowing’ (107). Similarly, after Jack 
argues with Julie and Sue, they start to ‘[begin] a conversation… designed to exclude him’ 
(120). McEwan’s constant shifts between moods of unity and division create a narrative 
tension—a sense of expectation—which resolves itself only during the last two chapters, 
when Derek grows suspicious of the tomb. Bound by the secret of their mother’s death, the 
family refuses Derek entry to their community, telling half-baked, transparent lies about the 
tomb’s purpose (131). This fine balance between inclusion and exclusion also reflects the 
reading experience. Unlike Derek, we have privileged knowledge of the tomb, yet we still 
feel the constraints imposed by Jack’s narration—a deliberate aesthetic choice by McEwan— 
leaving us without ethical guidance, but instead inviting us to speculate about the other 
characters, drawing us towards the novel’s narrative terminus. 
The children’s deception—and the novel itself—ends with an erotic episode fraught 
with Freudian overtones. Jack awakes from a recursive dream to the crying of Tom, who, 
having regressed to infancy, lies in a cot in Julie’s bedroom (140-142). Julie spots the naked 
Jack leaning over the cot and speaks to him in a mock-maternal parlance, calling him a 
‘sweet little thing’ (145). Uninhibited, they engage in foreplay, and Julie ‘[pushes her breast] 
towards [Jack’s] lips’ (148); Derek bursts in on this scene and calls their behaviour ‘sick’ 
before leaving to call the police (149). The incest taboo erected by the children’s self-
consciousness dissolves again, and the family unit turns inwards, now confined to the 
claustrophobic prism of Julie’s bedroom. Though the episode may seem like a 
straightforward recapitulation of the Oedipal drama, McEwan injects many ambiguities. 
Despite the play acting, Jack and Julie are brother and sister, and an alternate reading might 
see both Julie and Jack as parental surrogates, with the nuclear family structure not violated 
but re-established. Jack even complicates Tom’s return to infancy when he perceives Tom as 
‘a tiny, wise old man’ who possesses secret knowledge of Julie (144). Furthermore, it is only 
after the Oedipal tensions dissolve that the children grieve their mother in earnest, sharing 
their memories (151-152). McEwan leaves the reader with the provocative suggestion that the 
restaging of the Oedipal drama was a necessary part of the grieving process. In a sense, the 
children stand redeemed, restored to a prelapsarian state of intimacy and understanding. If 
nothing else, this represents a singular response to Freudian discourse on McEwan’s part. 
Yet, almost as if he is acknowledging the transgressive nature of his response, McEwan 
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infringes on the children’s newfound bliss with the ‘revolving blue light’ (152) of the police, 
who have come to restore another kind of order.  
The abrupt arrival of the police, coupled with the novel’s final words—‘wasn’t that a 
lovely sleep?’ (152)—suggests the children have exited a dream state, and one of the most 
striking aspects of The Cement Garden is the way McEwan crafts an apparently fantastical 
world through the raw material of the ordinary. As David James, commenting on another 
McEwan novel, The Child in Time, notes, ‘realism’s sudden swerves into phantasmagoria’ 
constitute a compelling narrative ‘artifice’ (194). In The Cement Garden, realist elements do 
not so much “swerve” into phantasmagoria as co-exist with it. Part of this synergy rests on 
McEwan’s use of temporal ambiguity. David Malcolm observes the novel’s relative lack of 
specific temporal markers (54-55) and Eluned Summers-Bremner argues that the presence or 
absence of certain cultural artefacts—the family’s lack of a television, for example—makes it 
difficult to discern the decade in which the story takes place (23). The characters themselves 
acknowledge this sense of timelessness in the novel’s climactic scene: Julie tells Jack that 
‘[e]verything seems still and fixed’ and Jack replies that ‘[w]hole weeks go by without [him] 
noticing’ (148). Closely related to this motif of timelessness is that of sleep and dreams.7 The 
word “sleep” and its derivatives appear thirty-nine times in The Cement Garden8 and Jack in 
particular spends a lot of time sleeping. In one notable instance, Jack feels he has lost control 
of his centre of consciousness entirely: ‘[i]t was dark and cold when I woke up… I had a 
confused memory of lying in the prefab. Was I still there? I had no idea how I came to be 
lying naked on a bare mattress. Someone was crying. Was it me?’ (140). Eventually, he 
comes to realise he had not in fact woken up but was in an intermediate dream state (141). By 
deploying the concept of recursive dreaming, McEwan casts a layer of doubt over the “real” 
events of the novel—or at least the way in which Jack perceives them—without abandoning 
completely the realist framework of the narrative. At other times, McEwan takes concrete 
objects and filters them through Jack’s eyes in order to give them a supernatural or uncanny 
element. When he looks at his house from ‘across the road’, for example, he perceives it as 
the ‘face of someone concentrating, trying to remember’ (19). This pareidoliac moment not 
only blends the realms of reality and fantasy but allows McEwan to generate imagery through 
the eyes of the narrator, whose child-like (mis)perception has both mimetic and thematic 
 
7 So much so that the back cover Vintage Edition of The Cement Garden quotes only one word from John 
Updike’s review in the New Yorker: ‘Hypnotic’.  
8 By way of comparison, First Love, Last Rites and The Comfort of Strangers, each of which are of similar 
length to The Cement Garden, each contain only twenty-five uses of such words. 
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qualities. References to Jack’s frequent masturbation (77) achieve a similar effect: it is a 
common, even banal, adolescent routine which involves an escape into fantasy. Ultimately, 
The Cement Garden straddles the border between the real and unreal, exploiting Jack’s 
phenomenological dispositions to complicate the reader’s interpretation of the novel’s events. 
Ambiguity such as this lies at the heart of The Cement Garden, reflecting McEwan’s 
aim to generate a singular response from the reader. It is difficult to pin down what the novel 
is about: grief, adolescence, sexuality, masculinity, the nuclear family, urban decay, and self-
perception all present themselves as possible answers. Yet the novel’s strength lies in the fact 
that it is not about any of these themes but instead asks us to consider them when making an 
ethical response. Our task as ethical readers, Derek Attridge argues, is ‘to respond to [the 
text’s] singularity, to avoid reducing it to the familiar and the utilitarian even while 
attempting to comprehend it by relating it to these’ (Singularity 130). Attridge’s quote seems 
particularly applicable to the way McEwan parodies, subverts and re-imagines Freud’s vision 
of the nuclear family. McEwan invokes no moral judgement or interpretive creed but instead 
draws our attention to the novel’s aesthetics, the way they work on us and challenge our 
approach to the themes that he engages. Even the most fundamental aspects of the text, such 
as character and plot, remain shrouded in ambiguity. Consequently, McEwan discourages a 
systematic or allegorical reading of The Cement Garden: the text, in its singularity, calls for a 
singular response. 
 
Voices on Loan: McEwan Behind the Text 
 
Having spent the majority of this chapter discussing McEwan’s role as implied author, I wish 
to digress briefly to discuss McEwan-the-FBP (flesh-and-blood person) as he was at the time 
of writing the stories. As discussed above, the FBP is Booth’s label for the author as they 
exist outside the text (as opposed to the implied author, who manifests within the text itself). 
In his early interviews, McEwan freely confesses to borrowing certain voices and narrative 
styles from other authors; he understood implicitly that it is important for writers to read 
widely and ethically. Both “Conversation with a Cupboard Man” and “Homemade” were 
attempts at ‘pastiche’ (“Points of Departure” 14). For “Conversation with a Cupboard Man” 
McEwan drew on the voice of Frederick Clegg, the narrator of John Fowles’ The Collector, 
characterised by McEwan as a ‘wheedling, self-pitying lower middle-class voice’ (“Points of 
Departure” 15). Furthermore, as noted above, “Homemade” drew direct inspiration from the 
narrative styles of Henry Miller and Norman Mailer while also subverting them (“Points of 
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Departure” 14). McEwan’s early work, then, both acknowledges and subverts his literary 
forebears. Furthermore, McEwan draws on thematic elements of previous texts. He 
acknowledged that William Golding’s Lord of the Flies was a thematic precursor to The 
Cement Garden, for example (Slay 37). McEwan fits Attridge’s model of an ethical reader: 
one who ‘[does] justice to [the previous texts’] singularity and inventiveness by the creation 
of a text of equal singularity and inventiveness’ (Ethics of Reading 36). As a reader, McEwan 
holds himself to a high ethical standard, and expects his own readers to do the same. 
Consequently, he denies the reader any interpretive guidance, especially in the moral sphere. 
He confirms this in a 1979 interview with Christopher Ricks, where he says that ‘[he hopes] 
to avoid any programmatic moral manipulation’ (“Adolescence” 25). He uses the final scene 
of The Cement Garden as an example, pointing out that ‘there is no authorial voice that will 
tell you that incest is a bad show, don’t do it, but… neither does it recommend that everyone 
should try, and therefore liberate themselves (“Adolescence” 25). This is not to say that 
McEwan’s entire attitude is amoral; indeed, as we shall see, his later texts have a greater 
sense of moral urgency. Rather, his early texts place the moral burden squarely on the reader, 
who must decode the text to come to their own conclusions. The reader may well decide that 





McEwan’s early fiction calls for the reader to respond responsibly. Instead of providing us 
with didactic screeds or moral fables, McEwan instead invites a close reading of his work: 
one that focuses on its structural and aesthetic effects. By employing the convention of 
unreliable narration, McEwan complicates—and sometimes undercuts—the dominant 
“voice” of the text.  In doing so, he gives some sense of the texts’ ‘total form’ (Booth 
Rhetoric 76). We can, however, only press toward this total form—which is never fully 
discoverable—if we read ethically, suspending any pre-conceived interpretive framework to 
allow the text to work on us: or, in Attridge’s terms, to focus not on what the texts ‘mean but 
what they do’ (Ethics of Reading 37, italics in original).10 McEwan’s own history of ethical 
 
9 This is not necessarily an unethical response, even according to Attridge’s model: it only becomes so when it 
is part of a kneejerk reaction to the lack of moral guidance in the text. 
10 In this passage Attridge is referencing metaphors rather than whole texts, but I think the point applies all the 
same. 
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reading provides us with an excellent example to follow. We cannot all respond by writing 
creative texts like McEwan; indeed, this may be far beyond our capability. Yet we can 
acknowledge the fluidity of the literature we read, and treat the texts as inexhaustible, always 
in motion, always reconfigured by cultural context. If McEwan’s early work does contain 
some sort of moral warning, it is a caution against under- or over-reading, of careless or 
overzealous responses, neither of which does justice to the text—or, indeed, the person—
before us. McEwan’s narrators all “read” in some way, but their reading habits reveal flaws: 
the Cupboard Man, hampered by his traumatic upbringing, cannot comprehend the adult 
world; the narrator of “Homemade” reads in service of his debauchery; the narrator of “Solid 
Geometry” traps himself in the language of pure mathematics; Jack, trapped in a dreamlike 
haze, struggles to comprehend the changes taking place around him. We may not place 
ourselves on par with McEwan’s narrators, but we too face our own limitations as readers, 
springing from interpretive biases, aesthetic tastes, political leanings, and so on. To read 
ethically is to acknowledge this, and respond to the ‘[the] call, the [challenge], the 
[obligation]’ (Attridge Singularity 131) presented by the literary work itself. The “call” of 
McEwan’s early texts may be very challenging; nevertheless, they lie in wait, ready to reward 
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Speaking in general terms, we might call McEwan’s Saturday and Solar “issue novels”: 
novels which address contemporary socio-political concerns. Though McEwan’s earlier 
writing engages with the political—The Child in Time (1987) took place in a Thatcherite 
dystopia, for example—Saturday and Solar evidence a new kind of political ambition in 
McEwan’s writing, insofar as they deal with issues of global significance. Human frailty and 
fallibility remain McEwan’s primary foci, but post-9/11 anxiety (Saturday) and climate 
change (Solar) linger, spectre-like, in the background. The claustrophobic settings of his 
early fiction give way to an equally threatening sense of late-capitalist disorientation; the ‘art 
of unease’ (K. Ryan 5) endures. He channels his narrative through the minds of two main 
characters who, unlike the outcasts of First Love, Last Rites and The Cement Garden, reside 
in the upper echelons of society. Both are successful— almost absurdly so—in their chosen 
careers: Henry Perowne (Saturday) is an experienced, highly-skilled consultant 
neurosurgeon; Michael Beard (Solar) is a Nobel-Prize winning physicist. Yet, like the 
characters in McEwan’s early work, they remain prone to errors of perception and judgement. 
McEwan chooses to emphasise this with a different narrative approach. Rather than 
withholding authorial judgement, McEwan uses a fluid, free-indirect style in which the 
narrator’s voice remains close to the main characters’ minds but maintains enough distance to 
highlight their shortcomings to ironic effect. This style also allows McEwan to explore, 
through the eyes of the main characters, the topics at hand. McEwan devotes substantial 
portions of Saturday and Solar to social and political commentary. This should hardly 
surprise us; as Anne Rowe and Sara Upstone argue, McEwan, particularly since the turn of 
the millennium, has ‘support[ed] the re-emergence of the author as public intellectual’ (59). 
The extent to which his own views leak into those of his main characters, particularly in 
Saturday, is subject to much critical analysis, as are the ideological implications of these 
views. I hope to show that neither text fully endorses the views of either of their main 
characters, even though those characters express themselves in strident and (at times) 
convincing ways. 
This move toward a quasi-didactic style generates difficult questions when in light of 
Attridge’s model of ethical reading. Specifically, the idea of fiction as instructive seems to 
work against the grain of Attridge’s model, by which to read responsibly ‘is to read… 
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without placing over it a grid of possible uses, as historical evidence, moral lesson, path to 
truth, political inspiration, or personal encouragement’ (Singularity 129). In a similar vein, 
Adam Zachary Newton, observes that ‘[traditional] [e]thical criticism… unproblematically 
translates literary discourse into moral recourse’ (9). Saturday and Solar do concern 
themselves with applied ethics, i.e. the ethical sense that drives moral (or immoral) conduct. 
They also dive headlong into socio-political discourse. This need not, however, foreclose the 
type of ethical reading for which Attridge advocates. For one, the reader bears responsibility 
for ‘[bringing] the work into being… in a singular performance’ (Attridge Ethics of Reading 
9). More importantly, though—and this is the point I maintain throughout this thesis—
McEwan’s work provides a particularly fertile ground for ethical reading, and this is 
especially true of the texts which possess didactic characteristics. Underneath the didactic 
passages of Saturday and Solar runs a current of uncertainty: a dual sense that “solutions” to 
social, political, and environmental ills are at once possible and impossible. For, much like 
works of literature, the socio-political narratives that swirl around post-9/11 anxiety and 
climate change are ethically complex. They call for a response; they ‘[make] demands’ 
(Attridge Singularity 123). And, as Perowne and Beard discover, neither can be understood 
through a single epistemological lens. Though Saturday and Solar contain didactic elements, 
to read them as political screeds would be to engage in the same kind of reductionism that 
both novels call into question. 
This “questioning” differs from the type used in the texts discussed in Chapter One. 
McEwan employs a third-person narrative style in both Saturday and Solar. Consequently, 
the ironic gap between the implied author and the first-person narrator shrinks, though it is 
unwise to conflate entirely the implied author and the third-person narrators in these texts. 
Though they often overlap, the following discussion still holds to a difference between the 
implied author and the third-person narrator, even though such distinctions remain 
controversial even among experienced narrative theorists (Palmer 17). McEwan’s narrative 
approach in Saturday and Solar consists, in large part, of tracking his main characters’ 
thought processes, especially the way in which they respond to the various situations they 
encounter. This results in a synthesis of the cognitive and rhetorical approaches to narrative, 
which, as James Phelan remarks, ‘are ultimately compatible because they share an interest in 
how authors use the tools of narrative representation and communication to provide 
audiences with rewarding reading experiences’ (“Interpretive Disagreement” 320, my italics). 
The implied author, whom I will again refer to as ‘McEwan’ for the sake of simplicity, leaves 
it to the reader to decide where his sympathies lie. This provides a rich ground for ethical 
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reading as the reader, influenced by her own cultural ‘materials’ (Attridge Singularity 124), 
grapples with what the text, as Attridge would have it, ‘do[es]’ (Ethics of Reading 37, italics 
in original). Again, this chapter will consist of my attempt to read responsibly and do justice 
to the novels. 
Finally, exploring the intricacies of his characters’ mental processes assists McEwan 
to achieve his rhetorical purposes which he links, once again, to questions of ethics. Perowne, 
overwhelmed by the chaos of cosmopolitan London, experiences a kind of ethical paralysis. 
He deliberates over ethical questions throughout Saturday—this, in large part, lends the novel 
its narrative momentum—but their complexity frustrates his attempts to resolve them. Beard, 
on the other hand, makes little attempt to relate ethically to the Other, instead leveraging 
circumstances to his advantage in any way possible. Furthermore, Beard’s moral bankruptcy 
runs parallel to his professional decline, as he lives off the largesse of government grants and 
lecture invitations rather than producing new work. Though Perowne and Beard subscribe to 
materialism,11 McEwan shows, through a series of crucial interpersonal encounters, that 
while materialism can co-exist with, or even inform, ethical conduct, it does not provide 
sufficient ground for a complete interpersonal ethics. Additionally, McEwan once again 
thematises the process of reading—specifically, reading literature—to show that neither 
Beard nor Perowne are ethical readers under Attridge’s model. Both texts possess intertextual 
elements that subvert or reinforce their main characters’ attitudes. In Perowne’s case, he 
witnesses first hand literature’s singular power. Beard, on the other hand, rejects literary art 
entirely, and, in the end, stands condemned by this ignorance. McEwan, then, brings both 
interpersonal ethics and the ethics of reading into focus, and makes some tentative links 
between the two. 
 
Degrees of Separation 
 
In the opening scene of Saturday, McEwan investigates the way in which Henry Perowne 
experiences consciousness. This, in turn, allows McEwan to establish the novel’s primary 
point of focalisation: Perowne’s mind. McEwan unwraps this focal point with meta-fictional 
phrasing: ‘standing there in the darkness, [it is as if Perowne] has materialised out of nothing, 
fully formed, unencumbered’ (3). Perowne has “come into being” as McEwan’s narrative 
vehicle, and, almost as if aware of his own fictitiousness, ‘suspects at once he’s dreaming or 
 
11 I use the word “materialism” here in the metaphysical, not economic, sense. 
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sleepwalking’ (3). McEwan further emphasises the precarious, contingent nature of conscious 
experience when Henry looks out his bedroom window and witnesses a bright, flaming object 
floating through the London night sky (13). Placing some distance between himself and 
Perowne, McEwan tells the reader that ‘[Perowne] doesn’t immediately understand what he 
sees, though he thinks he does’ (13). First perceiving the object as a meteor, then, after 
reassessing its distance, a comet, Perowne remembers ‘[watching] Hale-Bopp with [his wife] 
Rosalind and [his] children from a grassy hillock in the Lake District’ and considers waking 
the still-sleeping Rosalind so she may witness the momentous event (14). This rich conscious 
experience, however, takes place within ‘three or four seconds’ and dissipates quickly when 
Perowne realises that the object is a (dangerously) low-flying aircraft (14). The passage 
exemplifies what Hannah Courtney calls ‘slowed scene’ (183, italics in original): a case in 
which ‘clear and continuous action markers tell us that the character’s thought processes… 
occur in a moving, timed scene, yet these thoughts are detailed in a very similar way to that 
of traditional, indeterminately timed character consciousness’ (183). McEwan applies this 
technique in such a way that Perowne’s consciousness becomes both the mechanism which 
translates external phenomena and a subject in its own right. Sebastian Groes acknowledges 
this complexity when he remarks that ‘the attentive reader should be unsure of how to 
precisely interpret the relationship between Perowne and his narrator’ (104, my italics). A 
concrete example of this complexity occurs in a subsequent passage where the narrator 
employs free indirect style: ‘[i]f Perowne were inclined to religious feeling… he could play 
with the idea that he’s been summoned’ by ‘an external intelligence which wants to show or 
tell him something of significance’ (17). It is hard to discern here where McEwan’s voice 
ends and Perowne’s thoughts begin. While Perowne “plays with the idea”, McEwan also does 
so by pointing to the narrative contrivance of Perowne’s serendipitous encounter with the 
flying object. McEwan’s reference to an “external intelligence” may even be a sly declaration 
of his own narrative presence. Yet McEwan’s use of present tense gives the passage—and 
indeed the whole novel—an immediacy that further complicates the level of distance between 
him and Perowne. The nature of consciousness preoccupies Perowne throughout the novel, 
and McEwan exploits this character trait to employ a fluid, ambiguous narrative style. 
In Solar, McEwan takes a different stance. Though he still favours a free-indirect 
style, and thus retains strong links to the thoughts of the central character—Michael Beard in 
this case—he affords himself more licence to intrude upon the narrative and asserts a stronger 
narratorial presence. The opening lines of Solar offer a fine microcosm of McEwan’s 
narrative technique throughout the novel. McEwan writes that Beard ‘belonged to that class 
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of men—vaguely unprepossessing, often bald, short, fat, clever, who were unaccountably 
attractive to certain beautiful women. Or he believed he was, and thinking seemed to make it 
so’ (3). In the first sentence, McEwan offers a vivid description of Beard that the reader—
given McEwan has supplied no information to the contrary—has no clear reason to doubt. 
Yet the second sentence undercuts the final clause of the first, exposing Beard as somewhat 
self-deceiving. Beard’s thoughts, unlike Perowne’s, require a greater degree of commentary 
from McEwan because Beard lacks Perowne’s facility—or perhaps his willingness—to 
analyse his thinking in a detached and sophisticated way; indeed, late in the novel the narrator 
describes Beard as ‘a solipsist at heart’ (169). Moreover, McEwan amplifies this effect by 
inserting the word ‘seemed’ into the last clause of the second sentence, and, by invoking 
Hamlet’s contention that ‘there is nothing / either good or bad, but thinking makes it so’ 
(Shakespeare Ham. 2.2.257-258), adds an extra layer of artifice to remind us of his narrative 
presence. These sentences set the satirical tone that dominates Solar, suggesting implicitly 
that McEwan intends to operate on two different registers: one in which he conveys Beard’s 
conscious thoughts, another in which he exposes their folly. This draws Solar closer to 
McEwan’s early fiction; the narrative technique differs, but the main character still betrays 
his own faults frequently.  
The primary difference between Saturday and Solar, then, is the way in which 
McEwan’s narrator relates to his main character. Generally speaking, in the former, he sits 
within the main character’s consciousness; in the latter, he stands above it. This dichotomy is 
somewhat reductive, and neither text functions exclusively in the way I have described. 
Nevertheless, I believe the rough distinction provides us with a good starting point from 




Early in Saturday’s narrative, Perowne converses with his son, Theo, about his experience at 
the window. Theo, whose ‘worldview accommodates a hunch that somehow everything is 
connected’, implies that the timing of Perowne’s sudden waking was more than sheer 
‘coincidence’ (29-30): the very interpretation Perowne had rejected while he stood at the 
window. Perowne rebuffs the idea. Theo, perhaps sensing Perowne’s pattern of thought, asks, 
‘[y]ou reckon it’s terrorists?' (31). Soon after, his question becomes more specific: ‘you think 
it’s jihadists…?’ (33). This question plunges Perowne into a long mental deliberation about 
the nature of Islam, particularly the ‘Radical Islamists’ desire for a ‘perfect [i.e Islamic] 
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society on earth’ (34). He struggles to commit to an answer: ‘I don’t know what to think… 
[i]t’s too late to think. Let’s wait for the news.’ (34). He disappears into thought once more 
and recalls an ‘aphorism’ that Theo coined recently: ‘the bigger you think, the crappier it 
gets’ (34). Theo’s rationale is simple:  
When we go on about the big things, the political situation, global warming, world 
poverty, it all looks really terrible, with nothing getting better, nothing to look forward 
to. But when I think small, closer in – you know, a girl I’ve just met, or this song 
we’re going to do with Chas [Theo’s bandmate], or snowboarding next month, then it 
looks great. So this is going to be my motto – think small. (34-35) 
Commenting on this passage, Richard Rorty notes that, to an extent, “thinking small” is a 
‘temptation’ that we all contend with in our current cultural moment, arguing that Saturday 
warns against succumbing to this temptation (92). Perowne also “thinks small”, though not in 
the way Theo does. Instead, he “thinks small” in terms of physical scale, subscribing to the 
seductive tenets of biological materialism. Due in large part to his vocation, he is a 
‘professional reductionist’ (272) whose understanding of himself and others starts at a 
‘molecular level’ (5). Chemistry, not sociology, provides the epistemic framework by which 
he understands the world. Consequently, when Perowne turns to what Theo calls ‘the big 
things’ (34), he struggles to make sense of them, leading to ethical paralysis: a lack of 
conviction about how to relate to a fast-changing, politically fractious world.  
A later passage captures these tendencies succinctly. As Perowne walks from his 
house to the garage that houses his brand-new Mercedes, he catches the eye of a street-
sweeper, and briefly ‘feels himself bound to the other man’ (74). This encounter causes him 
to reflect on the cruel, seemingly random nature of the stratified social order: 
[h]ow restful it must once have been… to be prosperous and believe that an all-
knowing supernatural force had allotted people to their stations in life. And not see 
how the belief served your own prosperity – a form of anosognosia, a useful 
psychiatric term for a lack of awareness about one’s own condition. Now we think we 
do see, how do things stand? After the ruinous experiments of the lately deceased 
century, after so much vile behaviour, so many deaths, a queasy agnosticism has 
settled around these matters of justice and redistributed wealth. No more big ideas. 
The world must improve, if at all, by tiny steps. People mostly take an existential 
view – having to sweep the streets for a living looks like simple bad luck. It’s not a 
visionary age. The streets need to be clean. Let the unlucky enlist. (74, my italics) 
Chapter Two: The Limits of Genius  40 
 
Perowne begins by pointing to the religious beliefs of a bygone age and pathologising them, 
reducing a cultural phenomenon to a psychiatric condition. Next, he invokes the totalitarian 
regimes of the twentieth century to foreclose the dreams of political reform, instead 
advocating piecemeal change: a Darwinian process. This leaves him with the aforementioned 
ethical paralysis, or “queasy agnosticism”. Thom Dancer argues that Perowne’s subscription 
to the grand narrative of Darwinian evolution—his desire to ‘think big’ in Dancer’s words—
provides him with ‘a source of emotional comfort’ (215). Looked at another way, however, 
Perowne’s fondness for Darwinism functions as an excuse not to think big. Elizabeth 
Kowaleski Wallace seems to echo this view, arguing that ‘Perowne’s rare moments of social 
awareness are less acknowledgements than rationalizations’ (472). While Wallace perceives 
‘no obvious critical distance’ between Perowne and McEwan (470), the passage contains 
hints that this may not be the case. In Perowne’s view, social stratification is not the result of 
a complex cocktail of power structures but simply a case of “luck”: a strange choice of word 
for the self-described materialist. Furthermore, Perowne’s devotion to Darwin leads to a kind 
of quasi-fatalism: a view that acquires disturbing implications as Saturday’s narrative 
progresses. Perowne’s rationalisations, therefore, possess a certain ironic edge. 
Perowne’s outlook is doubly fascinating when placed in the context of contemporary 
debates about free will, materialism, and moral responsibility. Modern understandings of 
neuroscience have cast much doubt on the concept of free will, primarily because those 
arguing against its existence ‘[assume] that free will… requires an immaterial soul or non-
physical mind’ (Nahmias). Some neuroscientific experiments, such as those carried out by 
Benjamin Libet in the 1980s, have aimed to demonstrate the degree to which ‘[t]he brain 
decides to intitiate… [certain actions] before there is any reportable subjective awareness that 
such a decision has taken place’ (quoted in Mele 84). Consequently, we end up with the idea 
that our decisions manifest our current brain chemistry, and are not, therefore, free (Mele 84). 
The view seems to appeal to Perowne, who believes that people’s circumstances in life come 
‘down to invisible folds and kinks of character, written in code, at the level of molecules’, 
none of which can be rectified, he believes, by social interventions (272). As Nicholas 
Rescher points out, however, the ‘crux of free will is not the absence of causal determination 
but, rather, its presence via the determinacy of our self-managed thought’ (91, my italics). 
Perowne often embraces this compatibilism in practice—he attributes moral agency to 
Saddam Hussein’s regime, for example (72-73) — yet he remains obsessed by ‘biological 
determinism’, especially in its ‘purest form’: that is, at the level of neuropathology (93). This 
point is worth keeping in mind during Perowne’s key inter-personal encounters throughout 
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the novel. His belief in the equivalence between materialism and determinism often manifests 
in such encounters, leading him to relate to others—particularly those with diminished 
cognition—as ‘little biological engines’ (13), depersonalising them in the process.        
In terms of Perowne’s own cognitive functioning, the extended passage quoted above 
demonstrates how the free indirect technique can frame conscious processes in what we 
might call an “artificial” way, as well as the consequences of doing so. The structure of 
Perowne’s thoughts is highly stylised: it is unlikely that his internal speech—to the extent that 
we can conceive of thought as a verbal process—would take this form. Indeed, in an ironic 
move from McEwan, Perowne himself doubts that his own thought processes could be 
rendered in an articulate fashion, instead characterising them as ‘mentalese… a matrix of 
shifting patterns, consolidating and compressing meaning in fractions of a second’ (81). With 
this in mind, the phrasing of the passage above seems too neat, the word choices too precise: 
the description of the preceding century as ‘lately deceased’ for example, seems intended to 
achieve a rhetorical effect rather than an accurate rendering of Perowne’s thought. As Alan 
Palmer observes, free indirect speech can ‘solve the formal problem of how to present latent 
states of mind in an immediate, forceful and active way’ (73). McEwan’s technique not only 
serves as a way to plunge into Perowne’s ‘latent states of mind’ but also establishes his 
authorial presence outside Perowne’s consciousness. Consequently, the passage gains a 
certain rhetorical currency, as McEwan laments over the problem of ethical exhaustion at a 
time where “visionary” ideas are viewed with suspicion.12 These two ideas might seem 
contradictory, but only if we believe that Perowne and the narrator are fully bound to each 
other. Yet as I have argued above—with the support of Sebastian Groes—the relationship 
between the narrator and Perowne is more complicated than this. If anything, the passage 
prompts the reader to consider his relationship to Perowne: are Perowne’s “rationalisations” 
the mark of a selfish cynic, or a valid response to the problems facing liberal democracies? 
By operating on two narrative levels, McEwan interrogates the reader, calling for a response: 
one does not “escape” the passage without mulling over the questions that it raises. The 
ethical and rhetorical aspects of the passage above therefore share a symbiotic relationship 
and show the fruitfulness of free indirect speech as a narrative technique.  
Just as McEwan gives us the privilege of observing Perowne’s deep reservoir of 
conscious and subconscious thought, Perowne’s training as a neurosurgeon grants him 
 
12 Whether McEwan’s diagnosis still applies today is another matter. The looming climate crisis and the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic may provide fertile ground for so-called visionaries.  
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privileged understanding of the minds of others. There are, of course, limits to this mode of 
understanding, but Perowne’s insistence on “thinking small”—his commitment to a bio-
medical epistemology—holds firm regardless and provides him an unexpected advantage 
during his dispute with three urban thugs, one of whom, Baxter, acts as the leader. The 
confrontation occurs after a minor traffic accident, and McEwan prefaces the conflict with a 
passage which once more blends Perowne’s voice with a wry authorial agency: ‘[the 
situation] is pure artifice. Here are the cars, and here are the owners… [s]omeone is going to 
have to impose his will and win, and the other is going to give way’ (86). Perowne perceives 
the encounter as a zero-sum game; for him, a nuanced approach is impossible. After some 
pseudo-cordial dialogue, Baxter and his friends become physically aggressive. Perowne, 
however, observes in Baxter’s right hand ‘a fidgety restlessness implicating practically every 
muscle’ (90). Turning to ‘the intellectual game of diagnosis’, Perowne mentally converts 
Baxter’s symptoms to neurological parlance, noting that they are ‘suggestive of reduced 
levels of GABA among the appropriate binding sites on striatal neurons’ (91). This process 
forms only ‘a portion’ of Perowne’s thoughts as Baxter prepares to strike him (91). Baxter 
lands a serious blow, but with one remark—‘[your] father had it. Now you’ve got it too’ 
(94)—Perowne delivers a brutal counterattack, implying his (correct) belief that Baxter has 
Huntington’s disease (96).  
During this passage of action, McEwan’s narration deals almost exclusively with 
Perowne’s diagnostic reasoning. Given the fraught nature of the situation, it seems unlikely 
that this “portion” of Perowne’s thoughts would dominate his conscious mind. We might 
characterise these thoughts more plausibly as a substratum of the fight-or-flight response: an 
attempt to escape a violent situation at all costs. Yet McEwan gives narrative priority to this 
strand of thought instead of attempting a mimetic rendering of a mind stuck in a violent 
confrontation. Dominic Head (192) and James Wood (34-35), whose responses to Saturday 
are otherwise positive, regard this narrative method as somewhat clumsy; as Head remarks, 
‘Perowne’s diagnostic habits seem to crowd out less rational thought processes’ (192). The 
swathes of medical jargon do possess a certain jarring quality, but McEwan’s narratorial 
choices here draw attention to the ethical issues at the heart of the encounter. The antimimetic 
narrative priority given to Perowne’s “rational” thought processes rather forcefully 
underscores his preference for a materialist—and more, specifically, medical—
epistemological framework, but it also shows the ethical limitations of such a framework. As 
he ponders Baxter’s symptoms, Perowne laments the general sympathy towards social 
constructivism:  
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who will ever find a morality, an ethics down among the enzymes and amino acids 
when the general taste is for looking in the other direction? In her second year at 
Oxford, dazzled by some handsome fool of a teacher, Daisy [Perowne’s daughter] 
tried to convince her father that madness was a social construct, a wheeze by which 
the rich – he may have got this wrong – squeezed the poor. (92) 
Perowne fails to see the irony of this thought in light of his present situation. Huntington’s 
disease is by no means a social construct, but Perowne does choose to weaponise Baxter’s 
suffering to shift the power dynamics to his own advantage. Perowne’s continual recourse to 
the language of the supernatural, which he otherwise despises, conveys his acute awareness 
of these dynamics. Perowne likens himself to ‘a witch doctor delivering a curse’ (94), and, as 
he observes Baxter’s discomfort, reflects that ‘[w]hen you’re diseased it is unwise to abuse 
the shaman’ (95). His dismissal of Daisy’s ethical standpoint, while understandable in this 
high-tension conflict, is self-(pre)serving. Yet his wish for what we might call a molecular 
ethics remains fraught with problems too. In Perowne’s view, Baxter’s case is ‘beyond pity’ 
(98); his nervous system is in irreversible decline, his fate is fixed, and ‘[n]o one can help’ 
(98). “Thinking small” once more, Perowne essentially reduces Baxter to a possessor of a 
deficient brain, rather than a fully human subject.  
Whether the scenario justifies this mode of thinking remains a difficult question to 
answer, but Perowne’s visit to his mother, Lillian, who suffers from dementia, provides an 
interesting counterpoint. Like Baxter, Lillian suffers from a malfunctioning brain. Her 
condition leaves her unable to attach any meaning to Perowne’s visits (125). For this reason, 
Perowne regards the visits as ‘empty’ and compares them to ‘taking flowers to the graveyard 
– the business is with the past’ (125). The reference to time here is crucial. Though Perowne 
regards Lillian as ‘half [dead]’(165), his memories bind him to her. On his way to visiting 
Lillian, Perowne recalls a ‘treasured memory’ of his classmates watching in awe as Lillian 
swam lengths in the local pool with ‘supernatural’ speed and grace (157). During the visit, 
Perowne comes face-to-face with his mother’s artefacts, including ‘her remaining ornaments’ 
and a photograph featuring Lillian alongside Perowne’s father (161). The spectre of the past 
— a past Lillian cannot understand — haunts the entire visit. Yet the past holds no sway over 
Lillian; instead, ‘[e]verything belongs in the present’ (164). This forces Perowne to take up 
the role of an empty signifier: a sounding board who ‘[c]himes in from time to time’ (162). In 
his confrontation with Baxter, language—specifically, the language of diagnosis—provide 
Perowne with a preternatural sense of control. Despite his extensive knowledge of the 
neurological mechanisms that constitute his mother’s condition (162), language cannot help 
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Perowne connect with his mother; or, at least, he can only reflect his mother’s thoughts back 
to her in a vain attempt to steer her train of thought (165). This mirroring—an integral feature 
of empathy (Keen 4)—reveals that Perowne has assumed a different kind of ethical stance: 
one characterised by vulnerability rather than mastery. Lillian places a new set of ethical 
demands on Perowne, and he cannot meet, or mediate, these demands through language 
alone. Even his attempt to gift Lillian an orchid, itself a symbolic form of communication, 
makes no sense to her (161-162). These impediments frustrate and unsettle Perowne, not least 
because they remind him that he too will one day encounter ‘death and decline he cannot 
control’ (Simonsen 181). Nevertheless, Lillian disrupts Perowne’s tendency to “think small”; 
his memories do not allow him to reduce his mother to a ‘biological [engine]’ (13). Even 
though Perowne realises that she, on a biological level, has no idea who he is, he cannot 
shake off the sense that ‘he’s betraying her’ every time he leaves the nursing home (153). His 
bio-medical frame of reference does not suffice; instead, he must draw on the hazy, abstract 
concept of familial love—or, at the very least, duty—to relate to Lillian. 
 
The Fallen Scientist 
 
Such love is in short supply for Michael Beard, the central character of Solar. Childless and 
in the throes of a disintegrating marriage—his fifth in total—Beard’s personal life bears no 
resemblance to Perowne’s. Nor do the contrasts end there; while Perowne wakes up in an 
‘inexplicably elated’ state at the beginning of Saturday (3), McEwan describes ‘the Michael 
Beard of this time’ as ‘a man of narrowed mental condition, anhedonic, monothematic, 
stricken’ (3). Furthermore, while Perowne experiences an ‘effortless’ sexual intimacy with 
Rosalind (50), Beard’s wife, Patrice, cuckolds him with insouciant glee (4-5). Beard and 
Perowne’s professional lives also differ. Perowne dedicates long hours to his neurosurgical 
practice, approaching operations and paperwork with equal vigour (7-12). Beard, on the other 
hand, trades on his ‘celebrity’ status as a Nobel Laureate in order to generate an income (14), 
but ‘lacks the will, the material, [and] the spark’ to contribute anything new to his field (15). 
Despite these considerable differences, both men possess raw talent in the scientific domain. 
Ultimately, their contrasting fates derive from the way they harness this talent. While 
Perowne—at least in his professional life—cultivates his skills in the pursuit of healing the 
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sick,13 Beard exploits science—or, perhaps more accurately, scientific institutions—to his 
own personal advantage. Over the course of Solar’s narrative, this gives rise to a comic irony: 
the more Beard capitalises on his reputation as a pre-eminent scientist, the more his actual 
scientific expertise declines. With this in mind, I wish to develop the idea of Beard as a 
“fallen” scientist in order to frame his ethical decline.  
McEwan opens the final part of Solar’s three-part narrative with an account of 
Beard’s early life, which includes an extended episode detailing Beard’s seduction of Maisie, 
his first wife and fellow Oxford student. Unlike Beard, Maisie’s interests lie in the 
humanities; she ‘[has] a special interest in John Milton’ (199). In an attempt to impress her, 
Beard dedicates ‘one long week’ to reading Milton, during which he reads, among other 
texts, Paradise Lost, and finds ‘like many before him, [he prefers] Satan’s party to God’s’ 
(199). Though the narrator makes no further comment on Beard’s choice, the reference to 
Paradise Lost, and particularly to Milton’s Satan, provides an opportunity for intertextual 
analysis. I will return later to the question of Beard’s reading of Milton—particularly the 
ways in which it falls short of an ethical reading—but for now I will focus on the significance 
of Beard’s identification with Milton’s Satan. I do not claim an exact parallel between the 
two characters. Indeed, Beard shares his first name, Michael, with the archangel who, in the 
Christian tradition, cast Satan out of heaven, and one could perhaps argue that Beard wages a 
similar, albeit unsuccessful, war with his own worst impulses. Yet it seems significant that 
Paradise Lost is one of the few literary texts Beard reads (and enjoys). McEwan thus 
encourages a ‘staging of referentiality’ (Attridge Singularity 96), drawing the reader to 
consider the extent to which the two characters share common ground. Other critics have 
appraised Solar’s intertextual flourishes; Katrin Berndt concludes her analysis of the text with 
reference to the Maisie-Milton episode, though she casts her net somewhat wider than I 
intend to, incorporating Milton’s famous Sonnet 19 (97-99).14 Such differing approaches 
show how McEwan’s intertexual techniques provide rich potential for an ethical reading of 
Solar: one in which the reader may ‘[stage]… the fundamental processes whereby language 
works upon us and upon the world’ (Attridge Singularity 130). Paradise Lost offers us not 
only the words within the text but the possibilities of literary, historical, and theological 
discourse. Furthermore, the contract of understanding remains between McEwan and the 
reader. In contrast to the narrator of “Homemade”, Beard does not comprehend the extent of 
 
13 Perowne’s conflict with Baxter perhaps challenges this view, but his actions are nowhere near as persistent, or 
cynical, as Beard’s. 
14 Berndt erroneously cites the text as Sonnet 16. 
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his literary forebear, even if he views him as something of a kindred spirit. McEwan favours 
a multi-level narrative approach that allows him to play jokes behind Beard’s back.  
A few obvious links between Beard and Milton’s Satan emerge early in the novel. 
Like Satan, Beard is ‘great in Power, in favour, and pre-eminence’ (Milton 153). A Nobel 
Laureate, Beard gained fame in the 1970s by developing the Beard-Einstein Conflation, a 
theory about ‘the interaction of matter and electromagnetic radiation’ (283). Consequently, 
Beard stands among the scientific elite, ‘[coasting] from year to year’ on the back of guest 
lectures, media appearances, and other such engagements which require little of him (14). 
The new breed of physicists, however, threaten Beard’s pre-eminence. When Beard accepts 
an offer to head the National Centre for Renewable Energy, a new initiative of Tony Blair’s 
government, he finds he can no longer comprehend the scientific parlance used by his post-
doctoral research assistants. Indeed, the latest concepts in theoretical physics seem less 
important to him than his bestial appetites; when he hears his assistants talking about BLG 
(an acronym for the Bagger-Lambert-Gustavsson action) he initially believes they are talking 
about a ‘sandwich’ (21). He no longer possesses the same level of mastery over his epistemic 
domain, which perhaps accounts for the fact that his Nobel Prize does not provide him with 
the cachet he desires amongst his assistants, who do not ‘appear as much in awe of [him]… 
as he [thinks] they should’ (20). While his status in the scientific “Old Guard” holds strong—
he would not have been offered the position as head of the Centre otherwise—the younger 
generation of scientists poses an existential threat to his prestige, and the Luciferian pride that 
accompanies it. 
This threat takes a distilled form in Tom Aldous, a post-doctoral researcher at the 
Centre who believes fervently in the potential of solar energy. Aldous thinks little of Beard’s 
initial idea for an innovative renewable energy project—the ‘Wind turbine for Urban 
Domestic Use’ or ‘WUDU’ (23)—which becomes the focus of the Centre’s efforts. Instead, 
he proclaims the merits of ‘cutting edge artificial photosynthesis’ incessantly, irritating Beard 
in the process (28). Nor is Aldous’ advice to Beard restricted to the domain of science: 
There were novels Aldous wanted him to read – novels! – and developments in 
contemporary music he thought Beard should be aware of, and movies that were of 
particular relevance, documentaries about climate change which Aldous had seen at 
least twice but would happily see again if there was a chance of making the Chief 
[Beard] sit through them too. Aldous had a mind that was designed, through the 
medium of a Norfolk accent, to offer tireless advice, make recommendations, urge 
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changes, or express enthusiasm for some journey or holiday or book or vitamin, 
which itself was a form of exhortation. (28-29) 
Katrin Berndt uses this passage to assert that ‘the text ridicules Aldous’s [sic] evangelical 
sense of mission’ (93). While one may view the function of Beard’s focalisation in this way, 
the real target appears to be Beard’s resistance to Aldous’ innovative thinking. Crucially, 
Aldous does not endow theoretical physics with the same epistemic privilege that Beard does. 
He believes the arts are an integral part of tackling climate change, and the text implies that 
Aldous’ natural curiosity helps, not hinders, his ability as a scientist. Indeed, not long before 
the quoted passage, Beard admits to himself that Aldous is correct about the futility of 
WUDU but refuses to drop the project on the grounds it would constitute ‘a personal disaster’ 
(28). Beard’s Luciferian pride prevents him from employing an innovative approach to 
renewable energy, as it would constitute something of a submission; as Shou-Nan Hsu 
observes, he is ‘[obsessed] with his own reputation’ (331). To draw on Milton once again, 
Beard would rather ‘reign in hell, than serve in Heav’n’ (Milton 17), which becomes 
increasingly evident throughout the novel as Beard sinks further into decadence. Beard 
cannot, however, save himself from humiliation in his personal life for long, as he comes 
home from a conference in the Arctic to discover Aldous on the couch and quickly deduces 
that he has been sleeping with Patrice (83). Aldous thus takes the place of the “fallen” Beard, 
so much so that he even ‘[wears]… Beard’s dressing gown’ (83) after sleeping with Patrice.15 
Filled with envy, Beard attempts to intimidate Aldous by raising the spectre of Patrice’s other 
lover: a large, stocky builder named Rodney Tarpin who is responsible for renovating 
Beard’s house (86). Aldous, who has already succeeded in a physical altercation with Tarpin, 
calmly responds that Tarpin ‘doesn’t frighten [him]’ (86). Beard responds by threatening to 
fire Aldous from the Centre; in desperation, Aldous runs towards him and slips on a polar 
bear shaped rug, and the edge of the nearby coffee table ‘bluntly [penetrates] the nape of his 
neck’ (89). This accident provides the means for Beard to take revenge on Tarpin—he plants 
evidence from Tarpin’s toolbag at the scene of the crime (92)—but also to use the ideas on 
photosynthesis that Aldous had developed at the Centre. Thus, Beard acquires another aspect 
of the Luciferian archetype—the usurper16—and attempts to revive his career with ideas that 
are not his own. The narrator even provides an image of Beard ‘[w]rapped in scarlet robes, 
 
15 This makes for an interesting tableau in light of Aldous’ first name. Thomas derives from the Aramaic word 
for “twin”. Once again, whether intentionally or not, McEwan sets off a cascade of meaning with a minor detail. 
16 The theme of Satan attempting to usurp God’s throne runs throughout Paradise Lost, but is distilled nicely in 
Isaiah 14:12-13: ‘[Lucifer] said in [his] heart… “I will raise my throne above the stars of God”’ (New Revised 
Standard Version). 
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poised on his throne in the dead of night’ (188) as he considers how he might best employ the 
ideas he has derived from Aldous’ work. 
Though Beard manages to develop Aldous’ ideas, he remains a plagiarist, and 
McEwan emphasises this with two set pieces midway through the novel. While his plagiarism 
remains a secret to every other character until the novel’s denouement (269-271), he finds 
himself (falsely) accused of intentional plagiarism much earlier. As Beard attempts to relax 
on the train before giving a speech at any energy conference, a fellow passenger eats from a 
crisps packet which Beard believes belongs to him (121-125). In a brazen attempt at one-up-
manship, he retaliates by eating from the crisps packet himself before drinking his fellow 
passenger’s bottled water (126), only to find later that his crisps packet in still in his pocket 
and that he had therefore been stealing crisps (127). After Beard uses the anecdote during his 
speech at an energy conference, a lecturer in ‘urban studies and folklore’ (147) refuses to 
believe the incident with the crisps occurred, insisting instead that Beard drew on a well-
known stock narrative known as the ‘Unwitting Thief’ (157). Beard, offended by the 
suggestion, replies, ‘my experience belongs to me, not the collective bloody unconscious’ 
(158). His prickly manner in this exchange may reveal a latent guilty conscience. The most 
salient point here, however, is the irony that manifests in Beard’s stubborn insistence that his 
experience “belongs” to him, for Beard does not afford Aldous the same rights. The irony 
sharpens in light of the fact that much of Beard’s speech quotes Aldous almost verbatim, and 
without attribution, at various points (compare, for example, 27 and 154), and employs the 
same tropes and vernacular that Beard mocked and dismissed during his conversations with 
Aldous. During the speech, Beard extols the virtues of technological innovation, presenting it 
as key to fighting the effects of climate change (152-154). Reviewing Solar for the Guardian, 
Chris Tayler confessed he found the speech compelling (“Review”), and Rowe and Upstone 
suggest that the content of the speech reflects McEwan’s own views (70). In the context of 
the novel, however, Beard plagiarises most of the speech and, like Satan speaking to Eve in 
the garden, ‘gives a performance… which combines the arts of political oratory, theatre, and 
preaching’ (Edwards 26). McEwan therefore creates friction between him and his main 
character, implying that sound ideas may be marshalled for cynical purposes. 
Beard’s somewhat parasitic use of Aldous’ ideas is not the sole factor that renders him 
“fallen”; like Satan, he nurtures ‘proud imaginations’ (Milton 37) across both his personal 
and professional life. These fantastic escapes contrast with his imagined ideal scientist, who 
subscribes to a sober, rational epistemology; indeed, his love of theoretical physics springs 
from the notion that physics is ‘free of human taint [and describes] a world that would still 
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exist if men and women and all their sorrows did not’ (9). Similarly, during an expedition to 
the Arctic with a group of artists, he attacks a novelist’s suggestion that the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle may have ethical applications insofar as it casts doubt on ‘absolute 
judgements’ (76). For Beard, physics deserves an immunity from human violation. Yet in his 
mental life, Beard is a near-compulsive fantasist, and thus betrays the futility of his own 
‘objective’ principles. Two paragraphs after the narrator discloses Beard’s love for the 
objective paradigm of theoretical physics, Beard ‘[enacts] a scheme to make [Patrice] 
jealous’ (9) which involves an attempt to simulate a conversation by using a female voice on 
the television as his interlocutor. This futile attempt to capture Patrice’s attention springs 
from desperation, not reason, and McEwan underscores the irony at play by commenting that 
Beard’s plan ‘is the kind of logical plan only a madman might embrace’ (10, my italics).17 
The contrast between “logical” and “madman” indicates that Beard cannot separate his 
scientific practice from his passions. Furthermore, Beard himself believes that ‘reason and 
fantasy irrationally [merge]’ in the field of quantum mechanics (19). Traces of “human taint” 
contaminate the modern speculations of theoretical physics, and Beard, despite his belief to 
the contrary, seems aware of this fact. Beard’s fantasies intrude again during a brief 
encounter with a female customs officer, when he, despite being in a new relationship, 
fantasises about seducing her and comes close to asking her out to dinner (116). Having 
missed his opportunity, he laments his proclivity for ‘mental playlets, wholly infantile, that 
generally [lead] nowhere’ and ‘occasionally [bring] him trouble and only very rarely joy’ 
(116). He also acknowledges, however, that ‘similar daydreams… had long ago brought him 
to formulate his Conflation’ (116). In doing so, he rejects—though not consciously—the 
‘traditional assumption that the scientist must be a detached and wholly rational observer of 
nature’ (Haynes 6). We might even say that this ideal constitutes a more significant fantasy 
than Beard’s near-constant erotic longings. Departing from this “objective” ideal does not 
explain his “fallenness”, which springs instead from his habit of indulging his “proud 
imaginations” which spring in turn from his appetites for food and (especially) sex. The 
consequence is intellectual atrophy: he squanders his potential for fresh, original work. 
We might read Beard’s appropriation of Aldous’ work as an attempt to stave off this atrophy 
and once again dedicate himself to the working world of theoretical physics. Beard’s 
fantasies do not all revolve around food and sex, but these concupiscible appetites sit 
 
17 Admittedly, this comment may still constitute free-indirect discourse, but the point stands regardless; indeed, 
this may even add to the irony. 
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uneasily alongside Beard’s desire to negate them. His fantasies of self-improvement emerge 
periodically throughout the novel and form a large part of his embedded narrative. This term, 
coined by Marie-Laure Ryan, refers to  
the story-like constructs contained in the private worlds of characters. These 
constructs include not only the dreams, fictions, and fantasies conceived or told by 
characters, but any kind of representation concerning past or future states and events: 
plans, passive projections, desires, beliefs concerning the history of TAW [the actual 
world] and beliefs concerning the private representations of other characters. (156)  
Beard reconfigures his embedded narrative perpetually, with McEwan often signalling these 
adjustments by the use of the word “would”. For example, after accepting that he will have to 
divorce Patrice—but before the death of Aldous—the narrator, using free-indirect style 
renders Beard’s embedded narrative explicitly: ‘he would never go through this again… he 
would buy a small London flat, he would be responsible only for himself… and cure himself 
of [his] strange lifelong habit of marriage’ (52). These fantasies never materialise. By the end 
of the novel, he has attached himself to two women, one of whom has borne him a daughter 
whom he never intended to father. Furthermore, McEwan often uses Beard’s embedded 
narratives to comic effect; despite Beard’s ‘general resolutions and virtuous promises’ to 
avoid unhealthy food, his weight increases as the narrative progresses (cf. 73 and 118). In his 
attempts to diet, Beard is always ‘[defeated by] the present’; his projected future never arrives 
because he cannot forego instant gratification (118). The phrase echoes the plight of Lillian 
Perowne, for whom ‘everything belongs in the present’ (164). Unlike Lillian, however, Beard 
is responsible for his own suffering. The present “defeats” him because he wastes it 
recalibrating his visions of the future: a cycle which leads to ever-more elaborate fantasies. 
The dissonance between Beard’s intentions and actions might be read as McEwan’s satirical 
jab at first-world governments and institutions, who offer ‘supposedly good policy 
accompanied with caveats – talk of the need for transitional fuels such as gas or that a 
coalmine is fine’ (Jericho). Indeed, much like governments and multi-national institutions, 
Beard often incorporates the climate change narrative only when it becomes expedient to do 
so. Though not ‘wholly sceptical about climate change’ Beard loathes the ‘apocalyptic 
tendency’ of climate activists, whom he compares to ‘Christian millennial sects’, ‘Soviet 
Communists’, and ‘Nazis’ (15-16). At another point, he even refers to climate change as ‘a 
figment of the activist imagination’ (59). With the discovery of Aldous’ notes, Beard 
rearranges his embedded narrative to incorporate—or, less charitably, exploit—the climate 
change narrative, telling himself that ‘[c]ivilisation needed a safe new energy source and he 
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could be of use. He would be redeemed. Let there be light!’ (144). The explicit quotation of 
Genesis 1:3 here reveals Beard’s desire to reverse his fall—or, in his own words, to “be 
redeemed”. Indeed, he comes very close to doing so, utilising Aldous’ work to develop an 
artificial photosynthesis mechanism in New Mexico (213). As his redemption draws near, 
however, he endures his own personal apocalypse. Before the unveiling for the project, the 
Centre for Renewable Energy serves him with a lawsuit for ‘[t]heft of intellectual property’ 
(268). Beard’s redemption becomes Aldous’, and the last lines of the novel confirm his 
irreparable fallenness. Upon seeing his now four-year old daughter ‘[run] towards him’, 
Beard ‘[feels] in his heart an unfamiliar, swelling sensation, but [doubts] as he [opens] his 
arms to her that anyone would ever believe him now if he tried to pass it off as love’ (283). 
Deceit is no longer an option—even his body betrays him—and his life comes to an end. 
 
Reading the Readers 
 
Saturday and Solar interrogate the fragility of interpersonal ethics and their relationship with 
epistemological tensions or failures. As we have seen in Chapter One, both these domains 
bear on the ethics of reading. We must not, however, reduce ethical reading to the process of 
extracting moral lessons from the text. Literary texts can serve this function, but, as Adam 
Zachary Newton observes, ‘artworks… materially chasten a too hasty temptation to extract, 
or to be overwhelmed by, their “moral” value’ (66). Instead, it is best to understand ethical 
reading as a process of interplay in which the reader shows due respect to the text, thereby 
‘allowing it…to refigure the ways in which [the reader] and [their culture] think[s] and feel[s] 
(Attridge Singularity 125). A reading which views the text as purely functional—one which 
seeks to “master” the text—shows a lack of ethical responsibility. Both Beard and Perowne 
prefer the latter approach, and McEwan draws a strong connection between their epistemic 
prejudices and their failure to read ethically. The previous sections of this chapter have 
touched on the difficulties which attend interpersonal ethics, whether self-inflicted (in the 
case of Beard) or arising from the exhausting demands of postmodernity (in the case of 
Perowne). While reading ethically cannot resolve these difficulties, it provides a way to 
practice—and practise—encounters with an Other based not on hermeneutic violence but on 
dialogic exchange: ‘a constant interplay across the borders of self and other’ (Newton 48). 
Thus, the connection between interpersonal ethics and the ethics of reading lies not so much 
in moral instruction as in an ethical praxis which refuses ready-made conclusions. While 
Beard’s failure to read ethically foreshadows his descent into near-total solipsism, Perowne 
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has a vital encounter with literature during a moment of crisis. In Solar and Saturday, much 
like in his early stories, McEwan explores the consequences of his characters’ preferred 
“method” of reading. 
As noted above, the final third of Solar begins with a brief narrative detour through 
Beard’s childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood. Raised by an indulgent mother and 
emotionally distant father,18 the teenage Beard devotes a lot of time to solitary pursuits, 
including reading. Though the narrator offers few details about the texts with which the 
teenage Beard spends his time, we learn that his father gifted him ‘encyclopaedias… and 
books about military history, geology and the lives of great men’ (194). These genres serve 
the readers’ curiosity, but do not facilitate ethical reading. The reader extracts from, rather 
than interacts with, the text, performing a kind of ‘[r]eading that isn’t reading’ (Heddendorf 
263). Consequently, Beard develops an extractive method of reading, viewing texts in terms 
of what they can offer him. Paired with this method for reading is a love for constructing and 
repairing material objects, as evidenced by his father’s other gifts to him: ‘[m]eccano and 
chemistry sets, build-it-yourself wireless [and] model airplanes’ (194). As will become 
apparent, Beard goes on to view literature in much the same way; inert material which he, 
with enough effort, can master. These twin strands—the exploitation of literature and the 
mastery of it—combine in Beard’s seduction of Maisie. 
Beard turns to literature only after his first attempt to seduce Maisie is unsuccessful. 
After he asks her for a drink, she ‘[says] no, and [says] it immediately, before… he [finishes] 
his sentence’ (198). After ‘[researching] her’ he finds out she has ‘a special interest in John 
Milton (199). Beard uses literature as an instrument to pique Maisie’s interest in him and, in 
the course of doing so, does not read ethically. Before he even starts reading Milton, a ‘third 
year literature student… gives him an hour on Milton, what to read, what to think’ (199, my 
italics). Such intellectual pre-conditioning forecloses the possibility of ethical reading, for it 
straitjackets the text into a familiar framework. To turn to Attridge again: 
[c]reatively responding to the other, we have seen, involves the shifting of ingrained 
modes of understanding in order to take account of that which was systematically 
excluded by them. Attentiveness to what is outside the familiar requires effort, even if 
it is the effort of resisting effortful behavior, of emptying out the too full, excessively 
goal-oriented consciousness. (Singularity 123) 
 
18 There are echoes of “Conversation With a Cupboard Man”, particularly the connection between a doting 
mother and personal dysfunction later in life. 
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Beard does not depart from “ingrained modes of understanding” but seeks them out, reducing 
them to something akin to scientific formulae. After reading Milton’s seminal texts, he seeks 
authorities on the topic, reading ‘four essays he had been told were pivotal’ (199). When he 
finds the chance to speak to Maisie, he feigns a genuine interest in Milton and impresses 
Maisie with his range of knowledge, quoting famous lines and referring to well-known 
scholars on the subject (200). Consequently, he elicits ‘the first touch of warmth in her voice’ 
(200) and he later completes the seduction by gifting her a copy of ‘Areopagitica, bound in 
calf leather in 1738’ (201, italics in original), reducing literature to a kind of Romantic 
currency.19 Having succeeded, Beard congratulates himself on ‘a relentless, highly organised 
pursuit’ (201). The pursuit, of course, based on his preferred epistemology; he predicates his 
study of Milton on well-worn axioms, and exploits them to full effect, employing his “goal-
oriented consciousness”. He equates his understanding of Milton to a type of mastery: one 
that could fool any arts student: ‘[h]e suspected there was nothing that they talked about… 
that anyone with half a brain could fail to understand. He had read four of the best essays on 
Milton. He knew’ (202, italics in original). This assumption that literary texts can be “known” 
confers on them an essential nature, one with which readers can become familiar. As we have 
seen, to acknowledge the otherness of a text is part of what constitutes an ethical reading. 
Beard’s epistemology does not allow for this—indeed, he would probably find foreign the 
very concept of otherness—and he therefore falls short of an ethical reading. 
Beard, however, is not McEwan’s sole target in this episode; after all, he could not 
pull off such a convincing fraud if there was not a pseudo-scientific framework for him to 
exploit. Beard suspects a certain intellectual laziness (and arrogance) in Maisie and her fellow 
English literature students, reflecting that ‘he encountered nothing [in his seduction of 
Maisie] that could remotely be construed as an intellectual challenge, nothing on the scale of 
difficulty he encountered daily in his course’ (201). Maisie’s name seems to imply aimless 
wandering or confusion, and may also function as a reference to “Solid Geometry”,20 another 
text about the relationship between a socially maladjusted scientist who despises his wife’s 
epistemic framework. One gets the sense that Maisie and her colleagues are also the butt of 
McEwan’s joke, for they also anchor themselves in scholarly orthodoxies. This sardonic view 
of academics from the humanities and the social sciences—almost exclusively focalised 
through Beard—appears in other parts of the novel, such as when a social anthropologist 
 
19 Beard’s choice here is ironic, given the fact that his responses to Milton were pre-programmed sound bites 
rather than genuine free expression. 
20 It is worth noting that McEwan otherwise avoids nominal repetitions across his oeuvre.  
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sitting on a panel with Beard declares that ‘Huntington’s is… culturally inscribed’ (132). The 
satirical jabs imply that scholars from the humanities and social sciences are easily 
hoodwinked not because they possess no systematic knowledge, but because they misapply 
or overstretch such knowledge. Such a practice can prevent an ethical reading, for it 
prioritises hermeneutic frameworks which seek to render the text familiar to the reader. 
Ultimately, McEwan argues that ethical reading is difficult in an academic context due to the 
compulsion to twist texts into shape rather than to let them breathe, to respect their otherness, 
to ‘suspend all those carefully applied codes and conventions’ (Attridge Singularity 131). 
Solar shows that mastery of science or literary theory will not suffice for ethical reading; 
indeed, the more competent one becomes in these fields, the more difficult ethical reading 
becomes.  
We have to turn to Saturday to find an example of ethical reading; or, at least, reading 
not hamstrung by pre-ordained hermeneutic tools. This reading takes place in a moment of 
crisis, taking Perowne, whose view of literature is almost as negative as Beard’s, by surprise. 
Before exploring the climax of Saturday—a home invasion by Baxter and one of his 
accomplices—I wish to briefly examine Perowne’s view of literature. Like Beard, Perowne’s 
interest in literature springs from his desire to connect with a woman: in this case, his 
daughter Daisy. Perowne’s motives are not quite so cynical, for he has a genuine desire to 
‘understand’ literature, but this springs from intellectual pride (or shame); he fears his 
ambivalent attitude to literature indicates a ‘lack [of] seriousness’ (66). He hopes that Daisy 
will prove an effective conduit through which he might grasp literature’s appeal, and 
‘[counts] on her to refine his sensibilities’ (58), as he seeks out ‘what’s meant… by literary 
genius’ (66). Yet this belief that literature possesses a certain essence that he will be able to 
grasp if he applies enough effort, is, ironically, what prevents him from reading ethically. As 
with Beard, literature’s value lies in what he can extract from the text. After finishing 
Madame Bovary and Anna Karenina, Perowne reflects: 
[w]hat did he grasp, after all? That adultery is understandable but wrong, that 
nineteenth-century women had a hard time of it, that Moscow and the Russian 
countryside and provincial France were once just so. If, as Daisy said, the genius was 
in the detail, then he was unmoved. The details were apt and convincing enough, but 
surely not so very difficult to marshal… These books were the products of steady, 
workmanlike accumulation. (67) 
Perowne falls into the trap of converting narratives into moral / educational lessons. He also 
draws literature back into his epistemological framework; writing becomes something which 
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depends on disciplined, intellectual labour. Literature therefore constitutes a basic exchange 
between the writer / labourer and the reader / consumer. Given Perowne’s high regard for 
labour—he regards ‘work [as] the ultimate badge of health’ (24)—this should not surprise us. 
To see literature as capital forecloses the possibility of ethical reading, at least in the view of 
Attridge, who asserts that a responsible reading, ‘inevitably strives to convert the other into 
the same, [and] strives also to allow the same to be modified by the other’ (Singularity 124, 
my italics). Attridge’s point bears even closer on Perowne’s disdain for the magical realist 
authors; he asks, incredulously, ‘[w]hat were these authors of reputation doing—grown men 
and women of the twentieth century—granting supernatural powers to their characters?’ (67). 
The literary instinct to defamiliarise baffles him; he does not want the world to be 
‘reinvented’, but ‘explained’ (66). Ironically, Perowne soon finds himself on a collision 
course21 with the unfamiliar and struggles to master it when it arrives. 
Daisy, on the other hand, becomes familiar with the unfamiliar, albeit somewhat 
unwittingly, by undergoing a literary apprenticeship at the hands of her grandfather (and 
Perowne’s father-in-law) John Grammaticus, a renowned poet. In an extended analepsis, 
Perowne recalls Daisy’s maturation into a poet in her own right. Grammaticus ‘[believes] in 
children learning by rote and [is] prepared to pay up22… five pounds for every twenty lines 
memorised from the passages he [marks]’ (134). Though Grammaticus employs a rigid and 
authoritarian pedagogy, Daisy’s education provides her with a repository of literary reference 
points and contributes to her development as a poet. Much like McEwan himself, Daisy’s 
ability to draw on a wide range of texts improves her writing. Inevitably, her literary reservoir 
spills over and she starts to form her own original work; she wins the Newdigate Prize during 
her first year at Oxford University. J.M. Coetzee, writing of himself, asserts that he needs to 
write before fully grasping his own response to a text; before, in his words, they enter ‘the 
last twist of the burrow’ (199). Similarly, Daisy’s reading catalyses her writing: writing 
which enables an ethical response. Eventually, her success irks Grammaticus, who, in an 
unconscious tribute to the immense breadth of Daisy’s reading experience, attacks Daisy’s 
prize-winning poem on the grounds it is ‘not original’ (137). Even if Grammaticus’ desperate 
accusation holds water—McEwan implies this is not the case—it confirms Daisy’s ability to 
respond creatively and ethically. Perowne himself furthers the image of Daisy as an ethical 
reader by acknowledging tacitly the unique connection between poetry, with all its temporal 
 
21 We might say this “collision” is pre-figured with the flaming plane of the opening scene. 
22 This recapitulation of the literature-as-economic-exchange trope draws an unlikely connection between 
Grammaticus and Perowne; one might speculate that McEwan is hinting at a gendered phenomenon here. 
Chapter Two: The Limits of Genius  56 
 
intensity, and ethical reading: ‘to do its noticing and judging, poetry balances itself on the 
pinprick of the moment. Slowing down, stopping yourself completely, to read and understand 
a poem is like trying to acquire an old-fashioned skill like drystone walling or trout tickling’ 
(129). McEwan makes it clear that Daisy is an ethical reader, pregnant with creative 
potential.  
Daisy’s pregnancy becomes more than a metaphor in Saturday’s climactic scene. As 
the entire Perowne family reunites, Baxter, and his accomplice Nigel, shatter the domestic 
comfort the Perownes took for granted. In a sense, the home invasion episode ties together 
both strands of my discussion, as Perowne’s growing unease in post 9/11, late-capitalist 
London reaches its apotheosis. After Baxter makes his entrance, McEwan—somewhat 
labouring the point—comments, ‘[n]early all the elements of [Perowne’s] day are assembled; 
it only needs his mother, and Jay Strauss [his anaesthetist colleague] to appear with his 
squash racket’ (206). While many readings of the home invasion have focused on its 
allegorical aspect, with Baxter functioning as a stand-in for international terrorism or a more 
general threat (Wells Ian McEwan 20), the scene also thematises ethical reading in a radical 
way. As the assault begins, Perowne attributes Baxter’s behaviour to his genetic defects 
(210). He goes so far as to recall Jesus’ words to Satan during his temptation in the desert: ‘it 
is written’ (210, italics in original). Baxter’s decline has a kind of divine fiat from Perowne’s 
god: the merciless machine of natural selection. Yet, during Baxter’s campaign of terror, 
something unforeseen occurs. Baxter, holding a knife to Rosalind’s throat, demands that 
Daisy strip naked (217-218). Daisy’s naked body reveals her pregnancy, catching Baxter and 
Nigel off guard (219). Searching for a new course of action, Baxter sees a copy Daisy’s debut 
poetry collection, My Saucy Bark, and asks her to recite one of her poems. Grammaticus, 
sensing an opportunity, tells Daisy to ‘[d]o one [she] used to say for [him]; and Daisy “reads” 
Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach” (220). At Baxter’s demand, she repeats the reading (221). 
These twin readings totally upend the dynamics of the confrontation. 
Derek Attridge, writing of ‘responsibility for the other’ remarks that ‘it is not so much 
a feeling [the reader experiences] as a situation [in which the reader finds themselves]; it is 
what constitutes [the reader] as a literary reader’ (Singularity 126). In a moment of crisis, 
both Perowne and Baxter find themselves responsible for “Dover Beach”. The results are 
striking. Perowne has a different vision for each of Daisy’s readings. In the first, Daisy stands 
‘on a terrace over-looking a beach in summer moonlight’ with the father of her child, making 
a firm but slightly melancholic pledge of love (220-221). In the second, Baxter stands alone, 
and the ‘long, withdrawing roar’ of the sea ‘rings like a music curse’ (222). For a moment, 
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Perowne lives up to the ‘ethical demand’ of literature, ‘its staging of fundamental processes 
whereby language works upon us and upon the world’ (Attridge Singularity 130). Indeed, he 
realises during the second reading that he experienced auditory illusions during the first 
(222): a dual indication of both the power and fragility of language. Furthermore, the poem 
floats on the borderline between the familiar and the Other; still under the impression it is 
Daisy’s poem, Perowne believes that he ‘only half remembers [it]’ (220). Because of 
McEwan’s narrative approach, we have little access to Baxter’s mental processes, and we 
have to deduce it through dialogue. Baxter says little about the poem itself, saying only that 
‘[i]t’s beautiful’ and ‘[i]t makes [him] think about where he grew up’ (222). Instead, he 
becomes obsessed with the poem’s mere existence: ‘Baxter says eagerly, “How could you 
have thought of that? I mean, you just wrote it.” And then he says it again, several times over. 
“You wrote it!”’ (223). Though he is incorrect about its authorship, the poem mystifies 
Baxter, and stands testament to literature’s singularity. In other words, the poem’s ‘otherness 
[is]… uncannily familiar but prohibits appropriation and domestication’ (Attridge Singularity 
125). To Nigel’s frustration, Baxter instructs Daisy to get dressed and declares that he only 
intends to steal My Saucy Bark: ‘it’s all [he wants]’ (224). Though Baxter’s reversal of intent 
may leave the reader incredulous, it ‘makes perfect sense’ when viewed as a transcendent 
ethical encounter with literature (Bradley 29). Baxter’s fate may indeed be inevitable, but it is 
not written in the same sense that literature is written, and this gets to the heart of Perowne’s 
misunderstanding of literature. Indeed, almost as soon as the threat of rape and murder 
dissipates, Perowne reverts to type, attributing Baxter’s reaction to a ‘mood swing’ brought 
on by his Huntington’s disease (224). As Peggy Knapp notes, Perowne’s diagnosis here is 
correct, ‘but the occasion for [Baxter’s] abrupt loss of intent is, nonetheless, the power of 
“Dover Beach”’ (139). McEwan even permits a touch of uncharacteristic sentimentality 
toward the novel’s end, when the narrator remarks that ‘Baxter heard what Perowne never 
has, and probably never will’ (278). Despite his brief lesson in ethical reading, Perowne 
remains a ‘professional reductionist’ (272), taking comfort in his mastery of the human brain. 
Perowne finds himself in a position to employ these skills in response to an ethical 
dilemma. The home invasion comes to a violent end when Perowne, having lured Baxter 
upstairs with the promise of cutting-edge research on a cure for Huntington’s, joins forces 
with Theo to throw Baxter downstairs (227). The police attend the scene, and the paramedics 
take an unconscious Baxter away for treatment (228). Not long afterwards, Perowne receives 
a call from Jay Strauss, his anaesthetist, who has a patient awaiting surgery. When Strauss 
describes the patient, Perowne realises it is Baxter. (232). After a moment of hesitation, 
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Perowne agrees to perform the operation (233). On first view, Perowne’s decision to operate 
on Baxter seems heroic; he is, after all, attempting to save the life on the man who was on the 
verge of raping his daughter and killing his wife. McEwan, however, suggests that there 
remains a certain ethical ambivalence behind Perowne’s actions. He insists to Rosalind that 
he is ‘responsible’ (239), and McEwan reiterates this point near the novel’s conclusion (278). 
Indeed, at the moment when Baxter tumbles down the stairs, Perowne perceives ‘a sorrowful 
accusation of betrayal’ in Baxter’s eyes, and the narrator gives us a glimpse of Perowne’s 
conscience: 
[h]e, Henry Perowne, possesses so much…the handsome healthy son with the strong 
guitarist’s hands come to rescue him, the beautiful poet for a daughter, unattainable 
even in her nakedness, the famous father-in-law, the gifted, loving wife; and he has 
done nothing, given nothing to Baxter who has so little that is not wrecked by his 
defective gene, and who is soon to have even less. (227-228) 
The passage distils the difference in Perowne and Baxter’s fortunes with stark, haunting 
simplicity, and is perhaps the one place in the novel which treats Baxter as a wholly 
sympathetic figure. Perowne acknowledges that the successful surgery will provide no end to 
Baxter’s suffering; indeed, it will only ‘[commit Baxter] to his torture’ (278). Perowne, then, 
remains unsure whether he has forgiven Baxter, assuaged his own conscience, or committed a 
paradoxical moral transgression (278). This is to say nothing of the power dynamics at play; 
Tim Gauthier, for example, contends that Perowne engages in a cheap form of empathy 
where Baxter is a ‘figure of evil… or pity’ who ‘[Perowne] literally looks down and 
“operates” upon’ (25). Whether we agree with Gauthier or not, we cannot assess Perowne’s 
actions without taking these factors into account. Once again, Perowne finds himself haunted 
by the ethical complexity of his circumstances. Only at the very end of the novel does he get 
the chance to ‘[close] the shutters’ on the outside world and return to his previous state of 
domestic bliss with Rosalind at his side (279). Yet the preceding events leave us with the 
sense that such bliss provides only temporary relief from the ‘queasy agnosticism’ he 
experienced earlier (74). The threat of Baxter may be quelled, but new ethical quandaries will 






Chapter Two: The Limits of Genius  59 
 
Critical Reception and Authorial Responsibility 
 
Before concluding this chapter, I think it appropriate to briefly examine the critical reception 
of Saturday and Solar in light of the above discussion. Specifically, I wish to focus on the 
negative or ambivalent responses to the novels. Such responses raise some important 
questions about the ethical responsibilities of authors, particularly those who, like McEwan, 
engage regularly in public discourse. I do not intend to distinguish between “popular” and 
“scholarly” reactions to the two novels, but instead identify some common threads and 
respond to them. 
Upon its release, Saturday irritated a few critics who saw the novel as a naked 
defence, or even celebration, of Western liberal democracy and its beneficiaries. John 
Banville went as far as to say that Saturday ‘has the feel of a neoliberal polemic gone badly 
wrong’ (“A Day in the Life”). Elaine Hadley, taking a related though somewhat different 
stance, believes that Saturday betrays inadvertently ‘the present day ineffectiveness of 
liberalism’ (100), arguing that McEwan’s use of “Dover Beach” in the final confrontation is 
akin to ‘[offering] up duct tape plastic sheeting as a response to the unknown agents and 
unpredictable consequences of the new world order’ (97). Furthering the critics’ unease was 
the sense that Perowne ‘luxuriates’ in his privilege throughout the novel (Gauthier 9), and—
perhaps the most serious crime of all— that McEwan identifies with his protagonist a little 
closely; McEwan himself admitted in an interview that he ‘cannibalized his life for 
[Saturday]’ (“Zadie Smith” 121). None of these critiques completely lack validity, but each 
of them asserts implicitly that McEwan somehow abjured his ethical responsibility by 
valorising the status quo in the West, and that this tactic was at least partially motivated by 
self-interest. This charge assumes that the ethically and politically responsible artist will 
attack, not reinforce, bourgeois complacency. Perhaps anticipating this line of criticism, 
McEwan, through Perowne, offers a provocation: ‘for the professors in the academy… 
misery is more amenable to analysis: happiness is a harder nut to crack’ (78). Admittedly, the 
tone of Saturday sometimes slips into rhapsody; in the same passage, Perowne catalogues the 
commercial and technological marvels of the past century in scrupulous detail (77-78). As I 
have argued throughout the chapter, however, Perowne’s position is far from self-assured. 
His insecurity threatens to undermine his pro-Western chauvinism, and even the domestic 
security he cherishes is exposed as a convenient fiction. Moreover, McEwan has noted in 
interviews that the majority of his readers likely share Perowne’s unease about the collapse of 
this fiction (“Zadie Smith” 123). He offers his readers a mirror, challenging them to decide 
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whether they too luxuriate in their privilege. As James Wood notes, Saturday works best 
when it strikes a tone of ‘lyrical uncertainty’ (36); to dismiss the whole of the text as 
propaganda is to overlook this quality of the novel. 
In Solar, on the other hand, McEwan seems quite certain about one thing: humanity is 
ill-equipped, morally or otherwise, to deal with the climate crisis. As Astrid Bracke notes, 
McEwan intended Solar as allegory (54): a broad ‘investigation of human nature with some 
of the latitude thrown in by comedy’ (quoted in Brown). Walter Kirn of the New York Times 
argued that this narrative architecture rendered Solar impotent; he described it as ‘impeccable 
yet numbing’ and considered its final moments ‘overbearing and schematic’ (“Human 
Orbits”). Eco-critics, some of whom had high hopes for Solar, thought the novel revealed a 
lack of ambition on McEwan’s part. Richard Kerridge, for example, criticised the ‘fatalism’ 
inherent in McEwan’s suggestion that ‘that the outcome will not be influenced by emotional 
struggle and the efforts of conscience’ (159); similarly, Greg Garrard felt that McEwan’s 
comic tone was ill-suited to a climate change novel (180). Again, one gets the sense that these 
critics had particular expectations of McEwan, hoping he might ‘shape the discourse about 
climate change’ (Bracke 56). Like Saturday, however, Solar describes rather than prescribes. 
McEwan does not rule out effective solutions to the climate crisis, but rather has little faith in 
our effort to pursue them. Does this “fatalism” constitute a ducking of ethical responsibility? 
Perhaps. But McEwan’s modus operandi has never been a ‘moralizing’ one (Bracke 54). 
Furthermore, a decade on from Solar, McEwan’s diagnosis seems eerily apt given humanity’s 
response to the climate crisis, where a surfeit of noise masks a dangerous inertia. 
Conclusion 
 
In Saturday and Solar, McEwan engages with contemporary social and political issues while 
keeping ethics— both interpersonal ethics and the ethics of reading—in the foreground. As 
was the case in his early fiction, McEwan experiments with authorial distance to highlight his 
characters’ shortcomings, but also to capture the way in which the chaos present in their 
personal lives weighs on their psyches. Perowne, whose mental processes McEwan 
documents meticulously, attempts to comprehend the postmodern world through a materialist 
lens, but never quite wriggles free of his bourgeois guilt and unease. Beard’s fidelity to 
science falls victim to his appetites, and his identification with Milton’s Satan reveals his 
comic grandiosity while highlighting the depths to which he has plunged. McEwan places 
Perowne and Beard in a world thick with narratives both true and fictional, and they find 
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themselves unable to contain the threats that swirl around them. He thematises ethical reading 
in both texts, arguing against a purely functional reading of literature. Daisy’s rendition of 
“Dover Beach” provides an opportunity for Perowne to read ethically, but he soon falls back 
into old habits. Baxter, on the other hand, finds himself transfixed by “Dover Beach”, 
revealing literature’s singular power to ‘[present] itself as simultaneously familiar and other’ 
(Attridge Singularity 120). McEwan suggests that those who seek to master the world through 
a materialist lens may in fact impede ethical reading, and while critics may have expected a 
more strident social critique from Saturday and Solar, both novels show that such 
prescriptive attitudes can lead to intellectual hubris. The ethical import of the texts come not 
from grand solutions to political crises, but from McEwan’s acute sense of human frailty. 
While some might view Saturday and Solar as defeatist and cynical, they call for self-
examination from readers; they not only challenge the way in which we relate to others but 
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I have reserved Enduring Love and Atonement for the final chapter of this thesis because both 
novels engage explicitly the relationship between reading, writing and ethics. As I have 
argued, this relationship has always been at the heart of McEwan’s work; however, in the 
case of the aforementioned novels, McEwan embeds this relationship within their plots, and 
further explores the connection by employing metafictional narrative structures.23 The 
novels’ narrators, Joe Rose (Enduring Love) and Briony Tallis (Atonement) are both 
conscious of—and invested in—the way they craft their stories. Furthermore, they 
acknowledge that the process of storytelling involves many constraints, deconstructing the 
notion of an objective and omniscient narrative voice. This is particularly true of Atonement, 
in which Briony conceals her voice until the novel’s final pages. Joe, in contrast, confesses 
his own biases from the beginning of Enduring Love, and deploys different points of view to 
construct his narrative (though his choices, as we shall see, are not innocent). McEwan 
demonstrates that their personal narratives, while indispensable, are cursed almost by their 
nature, and prove a significant burden, albeit for different reasons. Literary narrative, which 
almost always involves the collision of characters’ personal narratives, proves even more 
fragile, and Briony’s provocative questions at the end of Atonement —‘[w]hat are novelists 
for?’ (370) and ‘what really happened[?]’ (371, italics in original)—acknowledge this tacitly. 
McEwan, as is typical, does not offer easy answers, but uses these questions to investigate 
broader themes of truth, interpretation (by both characters and readers), and the role of 
narrative in ethical conduct. These themes, in turn, bear on the interplay between ethics and 
aesthetics, both of which serve as vital philosophical domains in McEwan’s approach to 
literature. 
Though McEwan emphasises the fragility of narrative as both a psychological 
phenomenon and art form, he is not an epistemological relativist. Indeed, Michael Beard’s 
criticism of narrative theorists in Solar—that they ‘have a squiffy view of reality, believing 
all versions of it to be of equal value’ (147)—seems a fair reflection of McEwan’s own 
views. Enduring Love and Atonement do not demonstrate that all versions of narrative have 
 
23 McEwan’s oeuvre includes other novels of this nature—most notably Sweet Tooth (2012)—however, for 
reasons of limited space, I restrict my focus to Enduring Love and Atonement. 
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“equal value”, but rather claim that human fallibility means we can only approach the truth, 
and some people come closer than others to identifying it. In the case of Atonement, fallibility 
is probably too generous a term, as Briony’s narrative actively distorts the truth; in Enduring 
Love, Joe’s interpretation of (most) events proves correct, but his dogged pursuit of truth 
renders him obsessive and paranoid. Much like he does in Saturday and Solar, McEwan 
targets hubris, rather than the concept of so-called “capital T Truth”, in Enduring Love and 
Atonement. Furthermore, when it comes to his literary narratives, McEwan invites his readers 
to speculate about what is true within the world of the novel. Commenting on Enduring Love, 
he confesses: 
[t]here are all kinds of false trails in Enduring Love. I wanted the reader to toy with 
the idea that Joe might be going completely crazy, or maybe even that Joe was Jed. 
These are the games one plays… I wanted Clarissa to be wrong. I wanted the police to 
be wrong. I rather like these plots. (“Interview with Ian McEwan” [Noakes] 84). 
Such “false trails” and “games” evince narrative art’s potential to produce tension and doubt, 
and, consequently, reveal readers’ capacity for self-deception. McEwan knows how to ‘[play] 
havoc with the preconceived’ (K. Ryan 5), and Enduring Love and Atonement best exemplify 
McEwan’s skill in this regard. 
The following chapter aims to expand on these points, and to demonstrate that these 
novels synthesise many of the issues raised in Chapters One and Two, bringing together the 
precarious nature of knowledge, the tension between public and private narratives, the 
aesthetic power of intertextuality, and, most importantly, how these issues intertwine with 
ethics, both interpersonal ethics and the ethics of reading and writing. Most importantly, it 
details how McEwan addresses the notion of narrative responsibility, interrogating how we 
construct our own narratives (and the narratives of others), and what happens when we turn 
these narratives into “literature”. Through his narrators, Briony and Joe, he explores the 
ethical consequences of this process, arguing that a grave sense of responsibility accompanies 
the act of storytelling. Furthermore, he advocates the importance of taking on this 
responsibility, even when its weight proves nearly impossible to bear.  
 
The Dilemma of Metafiction 
 
Employing a term like “metafiction” to describe both Enduring Love and Atonement carries 
risk. Like many literary terms, its denotative parameters are fuzzy at best, especially because, 
in a sense, ‘metafiction is a tendency or function inherent in all novels’ (Waugh 5, italics in 
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original). Rather than running through a survey of “definitions”, I turn instead to Patricia 
Waugh’s exposition of the dilemma that faces the metafictionist, and contemporary novelists 
in general: 
[t]he metafictionist is highly conscious of a basic dilemma: if he or she sets out to 
‘represent’ the world, he or she realizes fairly soon that the world, as such, cannot be 
‘represented’. In literary fiction it is… possible only to ‘represent’ the discourses of 
that world. Yet, if one attempts to analyse a set of linguistic relationships using those 
same relationships as instruments of analysis, language soon becomes a ‘prisonhouse’ 
from which the possibility of escape is remote. (3-4, italics in original) 
McEwan responds to this dilemma through an approach that David James labels ‘self-
conscious traditionalism’ (182). Rather than trapping the reader in the stifling, recursive 
nightmare of a prisonhouse, McEwan, in James’ estimation, demonstrates that ‘[r]eflexivity 
cannot simply be dismissed or shed like a worn-out convention. It needs to be acknowledged 
and reincorporated… without compromising the novel’s solicitation and cultivation of the 
reader’s immersion’ (183). McEwan’s approach has ethical implications, as he encourages 
the reader to engage with the text without fleeing to an abstract world in which language 
reigns supreme. This, in turn, lends his metafictional texts a certain ‘moral intensity’ (Wells 
“Moral Dilemmas” 29) that they might not have if they relied solely on linguistic tricks and 
manipulation. As we shall see, Enduring Love and Atonement reflect McEwan’s pursuit of an 
ethical metafiction; he flaunts the texts’ fictionality without ever abandoning their realist 
framework, and thematises narrative while catering to readers’ ‘desire to be told a story’ 
(Atonement 314). Consequently, he creates his own brand of metafiction; one in which 




McEwan’s metafictional praxis complicates the role of the implied author in Enduring Love 
and Atonement. According to Wayne Booth’s formulation, outlined in Chapter One, we infer 
the implied author via our ‘intuitive apprehension of a completed artistic whole; the chief value 
to which [the] implied author is committed, regardless of what party his creator [i.e the FBP] 
belongs to in real life, is that which is expressed by the total form’ (Rhetoric 76). We encounter 
a problem when applying this definition to Enduring Love and Atonement, as McEwan asks us 
to read the texts two ways: one in which the implied author emerges from Briony’s / Joe’s 
rhetorical purposes, and another in which those same rhetorical purposes are subjected to 
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McEwan’s critique. Though we might see this dissonance as a more sophisticated example of 
the unreliable narrator device, this approach seems insufficient. It is more appropriate to see 
the texts as something akin to a commentary on the concept of the implied author; or, more 
specifically, the process by which readers construct this figure. Briony and Joe are, after all, 
highly aware of how they convey events to the reader, and, unlike some of McEwan’s other 
self-aware narrators—the narrator of “Homemade”, for example—do so for reasons beyond 
mere flamboyance or notoriety. For this reason, I refer to Briony and Joe as “author-characters” 
in various parts of this chapter. This term at once acknowledges their “authorial” role while 
acknowledging that they also play a role in McEwan’s broad rhetorical agenda.  
Atonement is perhaps the best place to start considering the concept of authorship, as 
the novel opens with the thirteen-year-old Briony Tallis preparing to produce her seven-page 
play, The Trials of Arabella, with her visiting cousins as fellow cast members. McEwan uses 
this brief episode to expose Briony’s high regard for narrative order, ‘possessed’, as she is 
‘by a desire to have the world just so’ (4). The play’s intended audience is her older brother 
Leon, who Briony hopes to ‘guide… [toward] the right form of wife’ (4). Her intentions are 
therefore primarily (and naïvely) didactic; fictional narrative becomes a means to impose 
order on the natural world. As David O’Hara notes, Briony believes that ‘art will act as a 
corrective for the untidiness of life’ (76). Yet, even before her cousins botch her dramatic 
vision, McEwan undercuts Briony’s faith in narrative as an ordering force. Firstly, her grip on 
language is flawed, as her uncritical use of her dictionary and thesaurus ‘[makes] for 
constructions that are inept’ (6). Hence the first lines of her play: ‘This is the tale of 
spontaneous Arabella, who ran off with an extrinsic fellow’ (16, my italics). Language here 
reveals its contingency, its resistance to order; Briony cannot schematise language the same 
way she does her bedroom (5). Furthermore, McEwan renders Briony’s situation ironic by 
the fact that she herself is hostage to a narrative trope. The Trials of Arabella calls to mind 
Charlotte Lennox’s eighteenth-century novel The Female Quixote; or, The Adventures of 
Arabella, which also features a heroine raised on a diet of Romances.24 Surprisingly, 
Kathleen D’Angelo is the only critic (to my knowledge) who has so far observed the rather 
explicit parallels between the two texts and the resulting ironies (91-92). As D’Angelo notes, 
McEwan underscores the connection by creating parallel plot points. Lennox and Briony, for 
example, both use the intervention of a doctor as a period of moral education for the reader 
 
24 The capital R here is meant to clarify that the word refers primarily to the literary genre / narrative form, not 
to any notions of “love”, though a dual meaning might well be applied. 
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(D’Angelo 92). Like Lennox’s Arabella, Briony finds herself ‘trapped within the [R]omance 
paradigm’ (Brantlinger 33), and unwittingly reveals this when she casts herself in the role of 
Arabella in the play. Briony’s cousin, Lola, objects, and steals the part from her (14), 
signalling the collapse of her artistic vision, which, in turn, causes her to realise ‘the chasm 
that [lies] between an idea and its execution’ (17). Instead of abandoning her belief in the 
efficacy of narrative art, however, Briony merely switches to the medium of prose fiction, 
where, according to her, ‘no intermediaries with… private ambition or incompetence’ can 
distort the author / reader relationship (37). As D’Angelo observes, however, the remainder 
of Atonement’s Part One consists of a series of misreadings on Briony’s part, jeopardising the 
integrity of her new artistic vision (94). Briony’s ethics of reading is, therefore, formed by a 
rigid and idealistic aesthetic doctrine of which she never truly wrestles free. 
She does, however, attempt to do so. Indeed, this struggle defines Briony as author-
character. The first challenge to her obsession with Romances occurs when she witnesses an 
encounter between Cecilia and Robbie from her bedroom window. The scene is narrated 
initially from a third person omniscient point of view, and the narrator—later revealed as the 
older Briony—conveys an underlying sexual tension between them, despite Cecilia’s 
frustration with Robbie’s ‘trying… manner’ (27). They spar over the respective virtues of 
Samuel Richardson and Henry Fielding, as well as Robbie’s plan to study medicine with the 
patronage of Cecilia’s father (25-27). The verbal duel comes to an end when Robbie insists 
on filling the vase that Cecilia is carrying—a precious family heirloom—and snaps off ‘a 
section of the lip’ accidentally (29). Cecilia, in a bold act of defiance, strips down to her 
underwear to fetch the vase’s shattered fragments, before dressing and walking back towards 
the house (30-31). Only in the next chapter do we access the child-Briony’s perception of 
events. At first, she attempts to overlay the encounter with her preconfigured Romantic 
narrative. Observing Robbie’s ‘formal’ posture, Briony meditates: 
[w]hat was presented here fitted well. Robbie Turner, only son of a humble cleaning 
lady and of no known father, Robbie who had been subsidised by Briony’s father 
through school and university…had the boldness of ambition to ask for Cecilia’s 
hand. It made perfect sense. Such leaps across boundaries were the stuff of daily 
romance. (38) 
Yet the events that follow do not “fit” well, as Briony sees Robbie raise his hand and 
misinterprets it as a demand for Cecilia to take off her clothes and plunge into the fountain 
(38). Indeed, the ‘sequence’ of the scene so offends Briony’s self-made narrative laws that 
she deems it not only ill-fitting but ‘illogical’ (39). The shock causes her to re-evaluate her 
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approach to writing. She decides to free herself from ‘the cumbrous struggle between good 
and bad, heroes and villains’ in favour of ‘[showing] separate minds, as alive as her own, 
struggling with the idea that other minds were equally alive’ (40). This ‘impartial 
psychological realism’ (41) becomes Briony’s new aesthetic approach. Yet what appears to 
be a release of the shackles leads Briony into a different type of bondage. As James Phelan 
notes, ethical and aesthetic judgements are always intertwined (“Narrative Judgements” 325). 
As I argue later in this chapter, Briony discovers this for herself many years down the line.  
The scene between Cecilia and Robbie forms the basis of Two Figures by a Fountain, 
a novella Briony writes in young adulthood, years after her false accusation of Robbie (which 
I discuss in detail below). We learn that the novella narrates the story from three points of 
view: Briony’s own, Cecilia’s and Robbie’s. She sends it into Horizon, the influential literary 
journal which was edited by Cyril Connnolly in the 1940’s. The fictionalised Connolly’s 
response is partly positive—he and his staff find it ‘arresting enough to read with dedicated 
attention’ (312)—but he rejects the piece, in large part due to its narrative stasis. Connolly 
points to what he suspects is a strong modernist influence, characterised by a focus on the 
‘crystalline present moment’ (314). Striking though its imagery may be, Two Figures by a 
Fountain lacks what Connolly calls ‘the backbone of a story’ (314). This echoes McEwan’s 
own views as outlined above; the modernist aesthetic lacks a certain ethical integrity because 
it ‘[compromises] the novel’s solicitation and cultivation of the reader’s immersion’ (James 
183). Indeed, the ethical ramifications of Briony’s approach reach into the realm of 
interpersonal ethics. Connolly’s words haunt Briony later on, as she realises her modernist 
style was not, in fact, motivated by the pure austerity of ‘impartial psychological realism’ 
(41), but was instead an attempt to conceal her sin against Robbie: ‘[e]verything she did not 
wish to confront was also missing from her novella – and was necessary to it’ (320). As 
Richard Robinson observes, Briony ‘evades the moral responsibility of telling stories’ (473). 
Ironically, Briony’s stylistic departure from the Romantic brand of storytelling in her youth 
serves not to correct her proclivity for escapism, but to exacerbate it; her “impartial” 
approach betrays her partiality. Herein lies the difficulty of establishing any grounds for 
reliability in Atonement; Briony is free to elide, conceal and embellish at will. As we shall 
see, she attempts to compensate for her evasions in Two Figures by a Fountain with the final 
draft of her novel, but this too raises further questions, which I shall address in a later section 
of this chapter. It will suffice to say for now that Briony’s discovery that ‘style… really does 
have ethical implications’ (Finney 72) causes her to re-evaluate her aesthetic practices once 
again; whether this causes her to arrive at an ethical equilibrium is another matter. 
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Even Briony’s claim to have shifted to a position of impartiality becomes highly 
questionable in light of the events which follow the fountain scene. Indeed, after witnessing 
the events, she starts to attribute ill-intentions to Robbie, mentally constructing a fantasy that 
results in her falsely accusing Robbie of rape. Two chance occurrences act as antecedents to 
the accusation, leading Briony to construct her image of Robbie as a ‘maniac’ (119). Firstly, 
she opens a letter that Robbie had instructed her to pass on to Cecilia, in which he confesses 
his desire to ‘kiss [Cecilia’s] sweet wet cunt’ (86). Though the letter is a discarded draft sent 
by mistake, Briony does not know; scandalised by the language, she ascribes sinister motives 
to Robbie. Her suspicions are “confirmed” when she walks in on Cecilia and Robbie having 
consensual sex, which she interprets as rape, in the library (123). Overwhelmed by these 
events, Briony relapses into her former ways of reading the world, one in which heroes and 
villains—dismissed by Briony earlier that same day as naïve literary constructs—very much 
exist. When her twin cousins go missing, Briony’s entire family and their dinner guests 
search the Tallis estate in hopes of finding them. Wandering alone, Briony sees a ‘vertical 
mass’ fleeing toward the house and discovers Lola on the ground in a state of distress (164-
165). Briony identifies the second figure as Robbie instantly, confident that ‘everything 
fitted; the terrible present fulfilled the recent past’ (168). This recapitulation of the word “fit” 
captures the tragedy of Briony’s reversal; the events at the fountain, as noted above, did not 
initially “fit”, but Briony builds them into her narrative retrospectively, returning Robbie and 
Cecilia’s relationship to the safe territory of a morality tale, albeit a different kind. She is so 
confident in her narrative’s integrity that even the sight of Robbie returning with the lost 
twins becomes not evidence of his virtue but ‘a cynical attempt to win forgiveness for what 
could never be forgiven’ (183). This confidence results in her testimony to the Police, which 
leads in turn to Robbie’s arrest and conviction (185-187). The ghost of Arabella, therefore, 
lives on in Briony long after she believes she has discarded it, and her crime intensifies her 
internal struggle with authorial responsibility. This struggle finds its discursive terminus in 
the novel’s epilogue, which I discuss towards the end of this chapter. 
At this point it is worth turning to the other author-character analysed in this chapter: 
Joe Rose of Enduring Love. Joe provides an interesting contrast to Briony in terms of 
narrative approach; as in Atonement, McEwan uses the opening pages of the novel to 
establish his author-character’s world view and narrative philosophy. In the vein of Henry 
Perowne and Michael Beard, Joe weds himself to the empirical methods of science, so much 
so that his wife, Clarissa, dubs him ‘rational Joe’ (83). He is also, however, a science writer, 
and therefore understands the power of compelling narratives. Furthermore, he shows a keen 
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awareness of his ability to mediate between the reader and the events which take place. The 
opening sentence announces Joe’s role as storyteller: ‘[t]he beginning is simple to mark’ (1). 
The “beginning” that Joe chooses turns out to be the moment he hears a cry for help and 
decides to intervene in a hot-air balloon accident (1). Yet, after offering a thrilling, extended 
account of this intervention, Joe concedes that his chosen beginning  
is as notional as a point in Euclidean geometry, and though it seems right, I could 
have proposed the moment Clarissa and I had planned the picnic… [t]here are always 
antecedent causes. A beginning is an artifice, and what recommends one over another 
is how much sense it makes of what follows. (17-18) 
Joe—and, by extension, McEwan— concedes that any narrative involves certain omissions 
and artificial constructs. As Susan Green notes, ‘[this] discourse provides a scaffold for the 
reader’s interpretation of the text as a reconstructed personal narrative’ (445); in other words, 
the role of “constructing” the story belongs to Joe. He acknowledges that narrative acts are 
always tainted with self-interest: not necessarily born out of malice but the need to interpret, 
to comprehend. For example, when Joe and Clarissa process the trauma of witnessing John 
Logan, the victim of the balloon accident, fall to his death, Joe views their discussion as a 
means to convert the apparently meaningless tragedy into narrative form: ‘we backed away 
from that moment again and again, circling it, stalking it, until we had it cornered and began 
to tame it with words’ (29). Another, more light-hearted example of Joe’s insight is his 
analysis of an anecdote submitted to the journal Nature in 1904, where the author claims he 
saw a dog deploy, with full self-awareness, a strategy to cheat his friend out of the dog’s 
favourite seat (41). The story fascinates Joe, who ‘[likes] how the power and attractions of 
narrative had clouded judgement’ (41). He goes on to give an alternative account of the dog’s 
actions that refutes the idea that the dog had any sort of plan or rational agency (41-42). The 
early stages of Enduring Love thus portray Joe as someone who, unlike the teenage Briony, 
fully comprehends the seductive, dangerous power of humans’ narrative impulse. They also 
show him advocating the primacy of a “rational” approach that avoids the “clouded 
judgement” displayed by the author of the Nature article. For Joe, an ethical approach to 
storytelling will be as dispassionate as possible. His and Clarissa’s reaction to the balloon 
accident, however, demonstrates that some events defy a “rational” framework and must 
instead be rationalised through narrative. As we shall see, the dramatic tension in Enduring 
Love’s originates from Joe’s fervent attempts to communicate his narrative to others using a 
scientific discourse in which “evidence”—as opposed to “emotion”— reigns supreme. Yet 
McEwan undercuts Joe’s proclaimed commitment to rationalism with a certain structural 
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irony; amongst the chaos, Joe possesses full authorial control in narrating his story, and 
therefore possesses the power to define what is “rational” and what is not. The way he frames 
events carries ethical consequences, for this framing contextualises our response as readers. 
Aware of this dilemma, Joe goes to great lengths to show he understands the limits of 
his own perception. Joe’s psychological torment at the hands of his stalker, Jed Parry, is the 
main narrative thread of Enduring Love. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the 
“facts” of their relationship are thick with ambiguity from a reader’s perspective, and Joe, as 
author-character, has a vested interest in persuading the reader to trust him. Joe’s 
aforementioned admission of his own self-interest constitutes a rhetorical strategy on his part, 
the formula being: I’m untrustworthy, but I know I’m untrustworthy, therefore you should 
trust me. He does not spell this out in such stark terms in the text, though at times he comes 
close. For example, during a writing session at the library, he realises slowly that a figure is 
lurking in his periphery. Unable to resist a curious glance, he looks up and catches ‘a flash of 
a white shoe and something red’ (42), which he later associates with the ‘white shoes… with 
red laces’ (44) that Parry was wearing the day of the balloon accident (24). The reader has 
reason to doubt this association, as Joe mentions in passing that the library stairs are ‘red-
carpeted’ (44). Yet, just as one gets ready to impute paranoia to Joe, he concedes that his 
perception of the shoes may have been a ‘visual [conflation]’ because [t]he library carpet… 
was red’ (46). Joe then makes a claim not dissimilar to the formula proposed above: ‘the 
habit of scepticism was proof of my sanity’ (47, my italics). Having made this concession, Joe 
reasserts his right to favour his own conclusion, telling the reader that ‘it was [Parry]’ (47). 
Whether Joe convinces the reader of his reliability is up for debate. The reader may intuit a 
hint of desperation when Joe insists his scepticism validates his sanity, particularly given the 
way he reverts suddenly to his initial conclusion. Joe’s success in convincing the reader, 
however, is not the crucial point here; what matters is the manner of his attempt, which 
reveals his desire to balance self-interest with “rational” detachment. 
Clarissa, Joe’s wife, provides an external check on his perception; in a sense, she 
stands in for any scepticism the reader may have about Joe’s psyche. Amused by Parry’s 
obsession with Joe, which she perceives as harmless, she fails to understand Joe’s emerging 
anxiety. When he relays to her the events of the previous day, she is incredulous: 
‘But you didn’t actually see him in the library.’  
‘I saw his shoe as he went out the door. White trainers, with red laces. It had to be 
him.’ 
‘But you didn’t see his face.’  
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‘Clarissa, it was him!’  
‘Don’t get angry with me, Joe. You didn’t see his face, and he wasn’t in the square.’ 
‘No. He’d gone.’ (57) 
With no access to Joe’s consciousness, Clarissa regards Joe’s claims as baseless and bizarre. 
This dialogue emphasises fragile nature of Joe’s interpretation and, consequently, 
demonstrates the extent to which Joe, up until this point, has co-opted the reader’s 
confidence. Clarissa, of course, has no access to Joe’s experience beyond what he has told 
her, and this detached perspective casts fresh doubt on Joe’s claims. Joe, who had been 
seeking external validation, finds himself unsettled by Clarissa’s blithe dismissal of his 
concerns. The conversation wrong-foots him to such an extent that when Clarissa leaves for 
work, Joe ‘[feels] like a mental patient at the end of visiting hours’ (58). Fresh doubts about 
Joe’s reliability, therefore, arise once again. 
His method of dealing with these doubts consists of yet another self-effacing act with 
a self-serving motive; he narrates an encounter with Clarissa from her point of view, or, in his 
own words ‘from that point as I later construed it’ (79). Ostensibly an empathetic gesture, 
Joe’s narrative choice seems more like a radical variation on the aforementioned “trust 
formula”. Not only does he wilfully expose his shortcomings: he also locates the sceptical 
voice outside of himself, freeing it from his own mental experience. Indeed, “Clarissa” 
subjects Joe’s psychological state to scrutiny from the beginning of their argument, 
intimating from the start that his demeanour indicates madness. She compares his manner to 
that of ‘a man who has seen no other human for a year’ and perceives him as 
‘conversationally deaf and blind’ (81). In Clarissa’s eyes, Joe’s claims about Parry appear 
strange, and lack compelling evidence; Joe refers to the thirty messages Parry left on the 
answering machine and, when pressed about why they are no longer there, confesses that he 
deleted them (83). The conversation ends when Clarissa makes a pointed remark about 
getting Joe ‘the support and help [he] need[s]’ (87). Clarissa’s judgement of the situation 
makes sense with the evidence at her disposal, and Joe seems to have given due credit to her 
voice. In the preceding chapters, however, Joe has provided the reader with compelling 
evidence of the reality—and intensity—of Parry’s obsession; Parry has made a habit of 
loitering outside his house, insisting repeatedly that Joe loves him (63). Joe’s narrative 
decision thus has two objectives. Firstly, to prove he has insight into his own behaviour and a 
consequent ability to empathise with Clarissa, albeit retrospectively. He also, however, seeks 
to establish that Clarissa was wrong about Parry, and, instead of taking his claims on trust, 
chose to imply he was psychologically disturbed. His narrative parameters allow him to have 
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it both ways, and they demonstrate his desire to control the reader’s judgements. The sting of 
Clarissa’s rebuff also functions as the rationale for his decision to open her mail. He 
interprets her response as an ‘exemplary case of unacknowledged self-persuasion’ (104) and 
feels compelled to hunt for evidence of an affair, or at least something which is ‘distorting 
[her] responses to Parry’ and ‘stopping her from being on his side’ (105). Even here he 
hedges his bets with the reader, confessing that opening the letters violates his conscience but 
claiming that the act remains necessary in order to ‘set [his suspicions] aside’ (105). He finds 
nothing. It becomes clear to him in retrospect that he had fallen victim to ‘the very self-
persuasion he ascribed to Clarissa’ (104). Once again, he acknowledges his own self-interest, 
but only after justifying his actions to the reader. McEwan gives Joe the luxury to indulge in 
wrongdoing, and pivot back to contrition to regain the readers’ trust: a luxury denied to 
Clarissa. I reiterate here that I am not yet assessing the merits, ethical or otherwise, of Joe’s 
storytelling, I am merely pointing to his method or, to put it another way, his narrative 
aesthetic. 
Joe’s account of Parry’s attempt to assassinate him during Clarissa’s birthday lunch 
evokes a similar kind of dissonance to the one demonstrated above. It confirms his conviction 
that he is correct about Parry’s intentions, while highlighting his limits as a perceiving 
subject. While he narrates the episode in the past tense, Joe does his best to remain faithful to 
his memory. He also, however, acknowledges that memory itself is sometimes a fickle 
servant, particularly in cases of trauma. He compares remembering the moments preceding 
the attack to ‘remembering an underwater event’, but believes also that the attack lent these 
memories, which he otherwise may have forgotten, an enduring intensity (163). Furthermore, 
he admits to finding it ‘difficult to disentangle what I discovered later to what I sensed at the 
time’ (166). This is unsurprising when we learn that Joe “discovered” a considerable amount 
after the event, such as extensive biographical information about Colin Tapp (the man who 
Parry’s hired assassin mistakenly shoots) and his family (166), and the fact that Parry and the 
assassin did not have ‘prosthetic pink’ skin but were in fact wearing ‘latex masks’ (171). Joe 
also learns that Clarissa and the other lunch guest, her godfather Jocelyn, gave conflicting 
accounts of the event during their police interviews (179-180). This causes Joe to reflect that 
‘pitiless objectivity, especially about ourselves is a doomed social strategy’ (180-181), given 
that humans ‘[live] in a mist of half-shared, unreliable perception, and our sense data [comes] 
warped by a prism of desire and belief’ (180). Thus, while he applauds the aspirations of 
science and metaphysics to establish ‘[d]isinterested truth’ he regards it as an impossible goal 
(181). Joe’s rhetoric is convincing, yet it is prudent here to recall once again Adam Zachary 
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Newton’s assertion that ‘narrators dictate conditions and, in so doing, reify their authority’ 
(58). No matter how nuanced Joe’s analysis of the subject/object dichotomy, an agenda 
necessarily lies behind his narrative. He may not believe in “disinterested truth”, but the way 
he flaunts his sceptical approach to his own “sense data” reflects an ardent desire to achieve, 
if not objectivity, something very close to it. This allows him to take a certain pride in 
assessing Parry’s intentions accurately, and place himself in contrast to Clarissa, who 
believes—according to Joe—‘that her emotions [are] the appropriate guide’ (150). There is, 
then, a paradox in Joe’s stance as a narrator; he prides himself on self-effacement while 
also—to borrow a phrase from Atonement—‘[setting] the limits and the terms’ (371). Yet 
McEwan does not let Joe have everything his own way, and in the last section of this chapter 
I will examine the ethical issues raised by Joe’s narrative approach, both within the world of 
the novel and on a metafictional level. 
 
Representing the Other 
 
Briony’s betrayal of Robbie in Part One of Atonement sets a fascinating platform for Part 
Two, an account of Robbie’s efforts to reach the Dunkirk evacuation during the Second 
World War. Unlike the fractured, multi-perspectival structure of Part One, Part Two consists 
of an extended narrative focalised through Robbie, albeit in third person. As is the case 
throughout Atonement, Briony’s authoring of the narrative raises important ethical questions. 
Firstly, does not witness the events first-hand. As we learn later, she instead reconstructs 
them from archived material at the Imperial War Museum in London and letters from 
Corporal Nettle (Robbie’s fellow soldier and a “character” in Part Two), and lends her 
transcript to ‘an obliging old colonel of the Buffs’, who makes sure she uses correct military 
parlance (359). Briony tells us this research enables her ‘pointillist approach to 
verisimilitude’ (359). This claim, however, may be a stretch too far. It not only ignores the 
fact that her research consists of a bricolage of evidence, but it seems to contradict her 
rhetorical approach in Part Two; as Lynn Wells argues, ‘the Dunkirk section of the novel 
avoids historical realism [but instead] presents a world in which, despite visceral horror, all 
turns out for the best’ (Ian McEwan 106). Mimesis and trauma do not harmonise because, in 
essence, trauma defies the grasp of language, or, at least, verbal language. Far from achieving  
“verisimilitude”, Briony emphasises the ‘oneiric confusion’ of war (Wells Ian McEwan 103). 
She achieves this effect straight away with the thematic bridge between the closing line of 
Part One and the opening line of Part Two; the arrested Robbie ‘[vanishes] into whiteness’ 
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(187) before rematerialising in the nightmarish war zone, where there are ‘horrors enough’ 
(191). Amongst the ubiquitous sights of desolation and dead bodies, the vocabulary of 
dreams permeates the chapter. Indeed, the deliberate blend of real and imagined phenomena 
becomes the means by which Briony attempts to capture Robbie’s sensory experience. When 
Robbie flees during an aerial attack, for example, the dreamworld is the only sufficient point 
of reference: ‘[t]he rich soil was clinging to his boots. Only in nightmares were feet so heavy’ 
(237, my italics). The language here echoes a poem, sent by Cecila, that Robbie keeps in his 
jacket: W.H Auden’s “In Memory of W.B. Yeats”. Not surprisingly, the two lines that lodge 
in Robbie’s psyche are ‘In the nightmare of the dark, All the dogs of Europe bark’ (203, 
italics in original). Even mundane images acquire a dreamlike quality and possess unlikely 
metonymic attributes, such as when ‘a haze of bluebells glimpsed through the woods [makes 
Robbie] feel the need for reconciliation and fresh beginnings’ (211). The phantasmagoric, 
therefore, becomes Briony’s main aesthetic channel; she cannot contain the chaos of war by 
claiming a fidelity to the truth.  
 Yet this gives rise to a second question: is Briony’s primary responsibility to the 
truth? Or does she, as part of her atonement, owe Robbie some form of redemption or 
rehabilitation after her act of betrayal? The questions bear asking because Part Two, such as it 
is, mythologises not only war but Robbie himself, transfiguring him into a near-heroic figure. 
Again, the final pages of Part One are significant, Robbie’s aforementioned rescue of the 
twins—notwithstanding its dismissal by the child-Briony—provides a typological image for 
Part Two. Unlike his fellow soldiers, Nettle and Mace, Robbie has the ability to read a map 
and follow the compass points, which to Nettle and Mace ‘mean nothing’ (193). This 
reference to Robbie’s map conjures images of a quest narrative, in this case Robbie’s single-
minded drive to survive and reunite with Cecilia. Briony laces this narrative with extra pathos 
by portraying Robbie as an innocent man wronged by her betrayal. Attempting to capture 
Robbie’s state of mind, she writes, 
[i]f Cecilia were to be reunited with her family… there would be no avoiding 
[Briony]. But could he accept her?... Here she was, offering a possibility of 
absolution. But it was not for him. He had done nothing wrong. It was for herself, for 
her own crime which her conscience could no longer bear. Was he supposed to feel 
grateful? (228) 
Following this meditation, Robbie ruminates on the memory of the child-Briony throwing 
herself into a deep pool so that Robbie will rescue her from drowning (229-234). The 
memory serves to re-emphasise Briony’s obsession with Romantic narrative arcs, and the 
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negative consequences that result from such an obsession. After the rescue, Briony, in rather 
affected fashion, tells Robbie that she will ‘be eternally grateful to him’, prompting Robbie to 
speculate that this line was ripped straight from one of her books that ‘she had read [or 
written] lately’ (232). The memory is juxtaposed a short time later with Robbie’s brave 
attempt to save a Flemish woman and her son from a Stuka attack (235-238). Despite his best 
efforts, he cannot convince the woman, who is concerned only for her son, to flee from the 
bombs, and they are eventually killed, leaving only a hollow ‘crater’ (238). This passage, 
visceral and detailed, thoroughly de-romanticises the heroic act, and thus exposes the 
selfishness of Briony’s provocative actions as a child. At the same time, however, it 
authenticates Robbie’s fortitude by showcasing his bold action in the face of chaotic violence. 
Though there is no way of knowing whether this episode is invented by Briony or extracted 
from the details of Corporal Nettle’s letters, it nonetheless offers a near-hagiographical 
account of Robbie’s virtue, to the point where he feels pangs of guilt for not rescuing them 
successfully (263). Excessive allegiance to the truth compromises Briony’s ability to atone; 
after previously casting Robbie as a villain, she fashions him as a hero. The tension between 
Briony telling the truth—insofar as she knows it—and restoring Robbie’s reputation through 
a Romantic aesthetic of ‘imagination, desire, and myth-making’ (Hogle 1) forms a dialectic 
lens through which we can assess the ethical implications of her narrative. The self-reflexive 
conclusion to Atonement contains Briony’s attempt to justify her aesthetic decisions, and 
provides the best context in which to discuss them; accordingly, I reserve my analysis of 
these questions for the final substantive section of this chapter. For now, it will suffice to say 
that Briony’s narrative treatment of Robbie derives from her desire to atone.  
 In Enduring Love, we see a reverse formulation of Briony’s tactics: Joe tries to 
portray the “true” Parry in order to demythologise him. As we have seen, the conflict 
between Joe and Clarissa stems from her impression that Joe has mythologised Parry and thus 
driven himself to insanity (86). Joe, believing the reverse is true, finds this view particularly 
inflammatory (86). His dilemma, of course, lies in the fact that Parry defends his actions with 
a ‘private narrative’, driven by ‘private’ logic (144) alongside a ‘private God’ (153). Parry’s 
“public” behaviour, at least when filtered through Joe’s frantic verbal accounts, seems fairly 
innocuous to everyone apart from Joe. In a way, this is not surprising, for Joe’s courting of 
the reader depends on a calculated accumulation of well-ordered, aestheticized detail—
something which the other characters cannot possibly access. Part of this narrative puzzle 
consists of Parry’s letters that Joe retains and inserts into the narrative. There is an interesting 
contrast with Atonement here. Like Briony, Joe has access to testamentary evidence; unlike 
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Briony, Joe’s narrative purpose relies on denuding, not mythologising, his chosen subject. 
Indeed, Parry’s letters appear to indicate that he wants to fashion a strange figure out of Joe, 
not the other way around. He writes: 
You were waiting for me. That’s why I had to phone you late that night, as soon as I 
realised what you had been telling me with your eyes. When you picked up the phone 
I heard the relief in your voice. You accepted my message in silence, but don’t think I 
wasn’t aware of your gratitude. (94) 
By including Parry’s letter in the narrative,25 Joe lays bare the depths of Parry’s obsession 
and thus makes a tacit appeal to the reader’s sympathy. The text also implies that Joe engaged 
in a complex editorial process before including the letters; at one point, we learn Parry was 
‘sending three to four letters a week’ (141). This perhaps accounts for the damning details in 
the selected letters, such as when Parry confesses to ‘[covering] five sheets of paper with 
[Joe’s] name’ (97). Aesthetic (and rhetorical) instincts, shaped by his experience of crafting 
compelling narratives, inform Joe’s selection of the letters. Parry’s private narrative becomes 
public property, and we as readers are left to judge who has the greater claim to truth. 
Joe adds further weight to his claims by inferring a mental illness—de Clérambault’s 
syndrome—from Parry’s behaviour. In similar fashion to Henry Perowne’s “reading” of 
Baxter in Saturday, Joe’s medicalised view of Parry’s actions provides him with an increased 
sense of control; as he puts it, the diagnosis offers ‘a framework of prediction [and a] kind of 
comfort’ (124). Parry acquires, in Joe’s eyes, a kind of essential, even archetypal, quality: his 
illness manifests as a ‘classic case’ (157). While Joe’s interpretation appears reductive, 
linking everything Parry says or does back to de Clérambault’s symptomology, it is in 
keeping with his admiration for scientific discourse, which provides him with an epistemic 
context in which he can decode Parry’s actions and render them understandable. As we have 
seen, this proclivity for ‘[stripping things] down’ (71) to the cellular level in pursuit of the 
truth lies at the heart of the conflict between him and Clarissa. Indeed, it is significant that 
Clarissa’s research involves a search for ‘three or four unpublished letters of [John] Keats’, at 
least one of which may have been sent to his muse, Fanny Brawne (6). The “three or four” 
echoes the number of letters Parry sends to Joe each week (141), and Clarissa possesses ‘a 
conviction that love that [does] not find its expression in a letter [is] not perfect’ (7). 
Accordingly, she interprets Parry’s letters not as evidence of a pathology but as ‘unfaked 
 
25 Further confirming Joe’s move as strategic, Joe inserts the letter almost immediately after his row with 
Clarissa. 
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narrative[s] of emotion’ (101) from ‘a pathetic and harmless crank’ (216). Joe encounters the 
same problem when he lodges a complaint with the police. After he shows Parry’s letters to 
the Duty Inspector in an effort to prove a pattern of harassment, the Inspector cannot 
comprehend why Joe would consider himself in any danger, telling Joe that ‘as stalkers go… 
[Parry’s] a pussycat’ who ‘loves his God [and] loves [Joe]’ (157). In the eyes of other 
characters, Parry’s love for Joe appears to cover a multitude of sins, while Joe’s obsession 
with digging out the root causes of this “love”, seems, ironically, to emanate from a paranoid 
mind. Joe cannot demythologise Parry’s love until Parry puts Clarissa in danger, and he 





What, then, are we to make of Briony’s and Joe’s conduct in terms of ethics and its relation to 
narrative technique? Their narratives display radically different aesthetic approaches. Briony 
places faith in romance, myth, and allegory; Joe upholds the scientific method as the ideal 
means of reading others’ behaviour. They do, however, share a belief that narrative can 
reframe trauma and, in a sense, redeem it; in other words, they ‘employ the conventions of 
narrative as a means for seizing hold of the shapelessness of life and endowing it with a sense 
of structure and meaning’ (Mathews 25). While only a cynic could view their narratives as 
entirely self-serving, McEwan encourages readers to scrutinise and evaluate the decisions 
made by Joe and Briony, as well as the motivations behind them. As we have seen, this is a 
perennial concern in McEwan’s work, but Atonement and Enduring Love differ from his early 
fiction, for his narrators display a greater awareness of their status as narrators by explicitly 
defending their narrative decisions. These defences also imply that the narrators are 
conscious of the ethical weight of such decisions, and thereby acknowledge the tacit link 
between narrative technique and ethics. This primes us, as readers, to observe this link and 
keep it in mind when making our own judgements. Such judgements require us to engage 
with Briony and Joe on their own terms before untangling any knots that arise. 
Yet this is a difficult task. Atonement’s closing section, in which Briony claims 
authorship of the rest of the novel, invites a radical re-evaluation of preceding events, all of 
which are narrated from a third-person point-of-view. My analysis has presupposed 
knowledge of Briony’s disclosure, but those reading the novel for the first time may be 
inclined to baulk at the jarring, perhaps even violent, switch of narrative perspective. Perhaps 
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most significantly, Briony reveals that her meeting with Cecilia and Robbie in Part Three, in 
which she agrees to retract her testimony against Robbie, and thus atone for her crime, never 
happened (345). Instead, the reader learns that ‘Robbie Turner died of septicaemia at Bray 
Dunes on 1 June 1940 [and] Cecilia was killed in September that same year by the bomb that 
destroyed Balham Underground station’ (370). The gravity of Briony’s omission casts doubt 
on the rest of the novel, and, inevitably, the reader is left asking ‘what really happened?’ 
(371). Peter Mathews contends that the omission compromises Briony’s reliability to such an 
extent that even her betrayal of Robbie is subject to question (13-14). While doubting the 
authenticity of Briony’s crime may seem a bridge too far, Briony’s belief that ‘[n]o one will 
care what events and which individuals were misrepresented’ (371) does leave the reader 
with the immensely difficult task of assessing the novel’s “truth”. Yet there exists a serious 
danger here of slipping into a hopeless relativism: the labyrinthine type of metafiction that 
McEwan consciously rejects. Doubt about what “really” happened does not dismantle the 
existence of “reality” per se. Atonement’s reality may ‘[exist] only within the pages of the 
novel’ (D’Angelo 89) but it exists nonetheless. As Alistair Cormack argues, 
McEwan suggests that there is an overarching thing called the ‘real’ beyond the 
narratives we construct about our lives, and that we are morally obliged to know that 
‘real’ so that we can distinguish it from our fantasies. If ‘we are all narrated’, there is 
no exterior reality which can be used to judge the inaccuracy of Briony’s literary 
imagination. (78) 
In other words, Atonement’s—and Briony’s—concern with the nature of fiction remains 
impotent without reference to fiction’s opposite. Briony’s passionate defence of her aesthetic 
approach (371) would make little sense if she did not feel a nagging sense of responsibility to 
the truth. To respond to Briony in ethical terms, we must place at least some trust in her, not 
so much in terms of her mimetic accuracy but her purpose in writing the novel. 
Briony desires, of course, to atone for her crime, and her success—or lack thereof—in 
doing so has received extensive treatment in the critical literature on Atonement. The question 
possesses ethical import precisely due to its difficulty. She seems to acknowledge that she 
will never achieve atonement because ‘there is… no entity or higher power that she can 
appeal to’; her authority as author forecloses any chance of forgiveness (371). Furthermore, 
she realises her aesthetic proclivities prevent her from telling the truth. By paving over 
Robbie and Cecilia’s deaths in favour of reuniting them, she regresses to her youthful desire 
for the sentimental (370). In a neat coincidence, The Trials of Arabella finally finds its ideal 
cast in the form of children from Briony’s extended family, and when she attends the 
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performance on her birthday, she realises her former self—‘that busy, priggish, conceited 
little girl’ —lives on (367). Her play provides the framework for her revised denouement in 
which ‘[her] spontaneous, fortuitous sister and her medical prince survive to love’ (371). She 
argues that most readers retain similar tastes and would therefore not appreciate Briony 
serving them with ‘the bleakest realism’ (371). If we view allegiance to truth as an ethical 
obligation, Briony falls well short, instead retreating to the warm cocoon of Romantic 
aesthetics. 
Perhaps, however, Briony’s embrace of Romantic narrative conventions possesses 
some ethical advantages. Certainly, her turn to Romanticism may well indicate cowardice on 
her part. If we give her the benefit of the doubt, however, we might view Robbie and 
Cecilia’s imagined reunion as her attempt to do them justice. In Briony’s view, their survival 
of the dual traumas of betrayal and war deserve reward, and anything less than this would 
constitute an ethical violation. Furthermore, they deserve Briony’s apology, and the right to 
withhold forgiveness. Briony acknowledges the impact of her crime when she has a 
fictionalised Robbie tell her ‘[he’s] torn between breaking [her] stupid neck… and taking 
[her] outside and throwing [her] down the stairs’ (341). Truth, for Briony, becomes a 
secondary factor, and even fades into complete irrelevance when the narrative takes the form 
of a novel. As Briony herself notes, once ‘the novel is finally published, [all the characters] 
will only exist as [her] inventions’; she has the power of ‘God’ and ‘set[s] the limits and the 
terms’ (371). While these God-like powers provide Briony with total control, they also carry 
a terrifying responsibility to the deceased Cecilia and Robbie. She refuses to write their 
deaths into the manuscript because she ‘couldn’t do it to them’ (371, my italics); she believes 
there is something essential in Robbie and Cecilia’s love that calls for fulfilment, and to omit 
the reunion would, in a sense, be akin to lying. To cross reference between the two texts once 
again, Clarissa’s words in Enduring Love—‘literature isn’t true, but it tells the truth’ (169)—
resound in this context. 
Should we, on these grounds, accept Briony’s plea that her revisionism ‘isn’t 
weakness or evasion, but a final act of kindness’ (372)? At the risk of sounding evasive 
myself, the answer to this question will depend on the reader. I can only offer my own 
suggestion. When Briony betrays Robbie, she incurs an ethical debt, and when Robbie and 
Cecilia die before reuniting, that debt becomes impossible to discharge. While Briony creates 
a brilliant work of art, which explores, amongst other things, the nature of guilt, war and love, 
the severity of her ethical transgression forecloses the possibility of atonement. While the 
Romantic mythology that she builds around ‘[Cecilia] and her medical prince’ (371) makes 
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for a compelling narrative, it cannot restore what they lost. But nor could a narrative in which 
Briony disclosed their deaths. Briony’s decades-long wrangling with numerous drafts (369) 
reflects the inadequacy of both options; neither Romanticism nor Realism provide a path to 
atonement. A pressing need to alleviate her guilt plagues her life; her conscience ‘[refines] 
the methods of self-torture’, providing ‘a rosary to be fingered for a lifetime’ (173). The 
cyclic imagery here suggest that she cannot expiate her guilt, for it has no end. None of this is 
to suggest that Briony’s novel lacks ethical value, or that she lacks sincerity. On the contrary, 
it is an incisive morality tale in which she shows her fictional persona little mercy and does 
her best to honour the memory of Cecilia and Robbie. As a standalone work of art, it 
succeeds; as atonement, however, it does not. As noted above, Briony realises that ‘[i]t was 
always an impossible task’ (371). Perhaps this accounts for her decision to opt for a polished, 
Romantic ending: with atonement out of the equation, she can cater to her readers ‘childlike 
desire to be told a story, to be held in suspense, to know what happens’ (314). Through 
Briony, McEwan acknowledges the limits of art, arguing that some ethical failures cause 
damage that art, however profound, cannot repair. We encounter this on a macroscopic level 
when we consider cultural-historical moments like the Holocaust or apartheid. They provide 
fertile ground for narrative art, and perhaps even demand an artistic response, but even the 
most profound, humane response cannot restore the victims to their previous dignity; the 
failure of the response is ‘ethically necessary’ (Worthington “Creative Confession” 167). 
Cormack’s point about the moral necessity of a commitment to the ‘real’ (78) once again 
becomes relevant here; we must realise that art, by its artificial nature, has its limits. Briony 
gains this reader’s sympathy not because she atones for her crime but because she realises she 
cannot, but makes the ‘attempt’ regardless (371). 
In Enduring Love, Joe faces a different kind of ethical problem. His preoccupation 
with Parry leads to an apparently irreparable rift in his relationship with Clarissa (149). Joe 
does not resolve but exacerbates the conflict when he rescues Clarissa from Parry, who has 
taken her hostage inside their apartment (208-213). His use of a gun, obtained the same day 
as a form of self-defence, shocks Clarissa, leading her to express ‘revulsion and surprise’ 
(214). The penultimate chapter consists solely of a letter from Clarissa in which she delivers 
an appraisal of Joe’s conduct. Though she repeatedly concedes he was right about Parry, and 
also concedes that he ‘saved [her] life’ (218), she nevertheless calls Joe’s conduct into 
question. She reiterates her view that Joe was ‘manic, and driven, and very lonely’ and 
attributes his behaviour to deep psychological conflicts: his frustration about his professional 
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life and residual guilt from the balloon accident (217). Initially, Joe presents Clarissa’s letter 
unmediated, but in the following chapter he cannot resist offering his own commentary: 
I disliked [the letter’s] wounded, self-righteous tone, its clammy emotional logic, its 
knowingness that hid behind a highly selective memory. A madman paid to have me 
slaughtered in a restaurant. What was ‘sharing’ one’s feelings compared to that? And 
driven, obsessed, undersexed? Who wouldn’t be? Here was a diseased consciousness 
clamouring to batten itself to mine. I didn’t ask to be lonely. No one would listen to 
me. She and the police forced my isolation. (222) 
As narrator, Joe attempts to persuade the reader that Clarissa’s “emotional logic” lacks ethical 
integrity, disregarding Joe’s significant distress, which, in his “logical” framework, followed 
necessarily from Parry’s behaviour. His appeal betrays a certain self-righteousness of its own; 
he remains burdened by a ‘flat and narrow sense of grievance’ and finds no solace in being 
right, for ‘being right in this case was also to be contaminated by the truth’ (214). This idea of 
truth as a “contaminant” has significant ethical implications, for it drags the concept of truth 
down from the realm of the abstract and mires it in the swamp of interpersonal relations. 
Joe’s “correct” perception of the world holds no inherent ethical value in Clarissa’s eyes; 
Instead, she believes Joe sacrificed all other ethical responsibilities on the altar of truth. Chief 
among these responsibilities was his responsibility to her, to whom he ‘became a stranger’ 
(218) during the course of his apparent obsession with Parry. In this sense, Clarissa mirrors 
Briony; she believes it is sometimes necessary to set truth aside in order to fulfil moral 
responsibilities. Yet Joe also has some overlap with Briony, in that he advocates a 
commitment to the “real”, albeit in strident fashion. Joe and Clarissa, we might say, typify the 
two strands of Briony’s moral dilemma; as is often the case in McEwan’s work, characters tie 
their ethics to competing epistemic outlooks. As Enduring Love draws to a close, Joe and 
Clarissa remain deadlocked,26 ‘the matter of their differences’, in Joe’s words, ‘[are] 
unbroachable’ (223). Neither of them wishes to concede the moral high ground. 
Again, McEwan invites his readers to adjudicate, but not before complicating matters 
by weighing in on the narrative himself. Just as he made his authorial presence felt with the 
metafictional twist at Atonement’s end, he intervenes explicitly in Enduring Love, this time 
by means of a fake academic article presented as an ‘Appendix’ to the novel (233-243). The 
article, titled ‘A homoerotic obsession, with religious overtones: a clinical variant of de 
Clérambault’s syndrome’ [sic] (233), purports to be an extract from the British Review of 
 
26 This recalls the extreme difficulty that Briony experiences in attempting to resolve her psychic conflicts. 
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Psychiatry. McEwan conceals his presence behind an anagram—the “authors” of the article 
are ‘Robert Wenn’ and ‘Antonio Camia’ (233, my italics)—and Joe’s narrative voice 
disappears. Instead, the authors discuss Joe’s experience from a medical perspective, utilising 
it as a case study in which ‘religious feeling, or a love of God, is… implicated’ (241). They 
claim that this “variant” of de Clérambault’s syndrome is novel, and therefore significant 
(241). The article seems to lend further support to Joe’s judgements in the main narrative. In 
the article’s introduction, the authors run through a list of symptoms that constitute de 
Clérambault’s proposed syndrome and conclude by its end that Parry’s behaviour shows a 
high ‘degree of diagnostic concurrence’ (241). Essentially, the case study briefly re-narrates 
the events of the novel with a focus on Parry’s pathological state, providing a kind of third-
party support of Joe’s convictions. Even the author’s tangential remarks line up with Joe’s; 
they too believe that Parry’s religious beliefs are private but ill-defined (241 cf. 152-153). 
Furthermore, the article contains an impressive list of secondary material, boasting twenty 
separate references to literature on the subject of de Clérambault’s syndrome / erotomania. 
With its systematic structure (Introduction / Case History / Discussion / Conclusion) and 
extensive coverage of scholarly discourse, the article seems to endorse Joe’s view that the 
scientific method provides the best insight into human behaviour (70). It also appears to 
justify Joe’s reaction to Parry’s behaviour throughout the main narrative; the authors describe 
Parry, along with other de Clérambault sufferers, as dangerous, unstable and ‘violent’ (240). 
Moreover, they conclude that Parry’s delusion is so pervasive that the state must confine him 
to a ‘secure [psychiatric] hospital’ in order to ensure Joe’s safety (240). The article appears to 
lend weight not only to Joe’s conduct, but to the legitimacy of his narrative, and his preferred 
epistemic outlook. 
Yet the very fact of the article’s fictitiousness complicates matters, especially given 
the real-world events happening at the time of the book’s publication. McEwan famously 
submitted the hoax article to the British Review of Psychiatry; though they did not accept it, 
the article managed to fool both a New York Times book reviewer and a consultant 
psychiatrist, both of whom believed that McEwan derived the main narrative of Enduring 
Love from the case study embedded within the article (Burkeman). Tempting as it is to see 
these readers as particularly gullible, McEwan’s article does use clinical vocabulary to great 
effect, drawing on concepts such as aetiology, pre-morbidity, and intrapsychic conflicts (239) 
to lend the article an air of legitimacy. Furthermore, the secondary material cited at the end of 
the article combines genuine and invented scholarly material. McEwan’s actions here bring to 
mind the Sokal affair, which took place in 1994, and was very much in the public 
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consciousness at the time McEwan was writing Enduring Love.27 In an attempt to expose a 
perceived lack of scholarly rigour in the humanities, Alan Sokal submitted a parodic, non-
sensical article—entitled “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative 
Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity”—to the journal Social Text, whose ‘editorial collective… 
failed to identify the article as a parody and published it’ (Hilgartner 506-507). Like 
McEwan, Sokal employed the fashionable argot of his targeted discipline—Cultural 
Studies—in order to deceive the editors (Hilgartner 506). Though the response to the affair 
was mixed, with Sokal’s ethical practice and intellectual honesty criticised (Horton 687), 
some saw it as a legitimate riposte to ‘those who would install cultural studies as the new 
queen of the sciences’ (Hirschkop 131). McEwan’s deliberate replication of Sokal’s methods 
seem to signify his interest in the cultural and intellectual debate that had sprung up around 
them. 
This contextual knowledge gives rise to a range of questions regarding McEwan’s 
motivations for including the Appendix, but, perhaps more importantly, puts the reader in a 
vexed position. The article straddles the boundaries between the storyworld and the real 
world; between genuine scientific material and bogus counterfeit; between the sardonic voice 
of McEwan and an “objective” voice of scholarly authority. Perhaps most importantly, it 
invites a radical reappraisal of Joe’s epistemological standpoint, leading us to wonder 
whether the article supports Joe’s worldview or in fact undermines it. After all, if scientific 
discourse can indeed be “faked” convincingly, Clarissa’s concerns about ‘rationalism gone 
berserk’ (70) are worth careful consideration. Yet McEwan’s own comments on the article 
suggest another critical angle. He displays a certain scepticism about the origins of de 
Clérambault’s syndrome, arguing that ‘[basing] a psychiatric theory on what one person says 
she or he discovered of another person is fantastically unscientific and owes much to a certain 
kind of literary interpolation’ (quoted in Burkeman, my italics). In other words, the article 
calls into question the degree to which certain types of psychiatric discourse can claim to be 
“scientific” at all, even if they are buttressed with the discursive practices of science. 
Consequently, McEwan scrutinises the terms upon which Joe defends his “rational” analysis 
of events. For McEwan, psychiatry as a domain remains vulnerable to “literary” 
encroachment, and the Appendix provocatively blurs the line between “scientific” and 
“literary” discourse. He does not attack the materialist worldview, but instead highlights how 
 
27 Stephen Hiltgartner notes that the hoax generated ‘a wave of media attention’ (507), during which it was 
covered in many major publications. 
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an engaging narrative can paper over the cracks in otherwise dubious “scientific” discourse. 
In other words, he once again stresses the importance of committing to some sort of “reality” 
while also acknowledging the seductive power of narrative. 
Where does this leave the reader in evaluating Joe’s judgement of the novel’s events? 
Certainly, the grounds upon which Joe justified his judgement now appear quite shaky. The 
fact remains, however, that Joe’s assessment of Parry was essentially correct, at least in the 
sense that Parry was obsessive, mentally unstable, and posed a clear threat to him (and, 
eventually, Clarissa). Jennifer Fleissner, responding to critics who believed Joe’s obsessive 
behaviour ‘discredit[ed] [his] entire worldview’, argues that ‘if we are to take the book’s brief 
for rationality seriously, as McEwan seems to want us to do, what we may really need to 
consider is that the scientist here may be obsessive, deaf to interpersonal nuances, and mostly 
right about things at the same time’ (115, italics in original). To put a new spin on Fleissner’s 
words, I would argue that Joe’s assessment of Parry might indeed be “unscientific” and right 
about things at the same time. For all the psychiatric window-dressing, Joe essentially makes 
sense of Parry by applying a literary-historical narrative to his own life. Viewed in this 
context, Clarissa’s statement about the truth-telling potential of literature (169) seems 
incisive. McEwan therefore critiques the epistemic dichotomy that drives the wedge between 
Joe and Clarissa, exposing the dangers of reductive thinking. At the same time, he refuses a 
neat synthesis of the scientific and the literary. Instead, he treats each of them as necessary, 
but insufficient. McEwan encourages an ethical response; one in which the reader shows a 
‘willingness to have the grounds of [their] thinking recast and renewed’ (Attridge 128). 
Indeed, the preceding analysis of McEwan’s Appendix refuses to endorse a specific side of 
the Two Cultures debate, instead revealing them as interdependent, but irreconcilable. Joe 
and Clarissa’s successful reconciliation and adoption of a child—briefly mentioned in the 
Appendix (242)—perhaps presents a challenge to this view. Rather than viewing this as some 
sort of epistemic synthesis, however, I believe it more appropriate to see their reconciliation 
as an ethical act—one of mutual humility—in which they at once hold fast to their epistemic 




In Enduring Love and Atonement, McEwan addresses the ethics of narrative from multiple 
angles. Narrative, he suggests, has the potential to intoxicate both readers and writers; to 
uncover or obfuscate the truth; to reconcile us with others or to alienate us from them. Briony 
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and Joe have radically different aesthetic philosophies. Briony embraces Romanticism as a 
means for transfiguring tragic circumstances, while Joe prizes truth as the highest narrative 
virtue. Yet McEwan demonstrates that their respective approaches do not liberate, but entrap 
them in interpersonal conflicts which prove difficult, or even impossible, to resolve; aesthetic 
choices, in other words, have grave ethical repercussions. This leads us to consider Briony’s 
questions: ‘[w]hat are novelists for?’ (370). In light of the texts discussed throughout this 
thesis, ‘bring[ing] down the fogs of imagination’ (370) seems an insufficient answer, as does 
‘tell[ing] the truth’ (Enduring Love 169). While McEwan views these functions as essential to 
his aims, I contend that his primary goal is to develop an ethical readership. Recalling his 
words in the introduction to this chapter, McEwan wants his readers to “toy” with ideas when 
reading his work. These ideas are not limited to plot, however, as his oeuvre touches on 
morality, politics, sociology, science, and myriad other issues relevant to our age. The strain 
of didacticism that runs through McEwan’s work teaches us not what to think, but how to 
think, or, more precisely, how to read. Like Briony and Joe, we are all fallible readers, 
hostage to the tricks and techniques of narrative art. Furthermore, as readers—particularly if 
we are students of literature—we find ourselves tempted to pin down the “meaning” of 
literary texts. McEwan counters this instinct with a sustained focus on epistemic prejudices, 
which he subjects to close scrutiny in his novels. In doing so, he calls for a deep humility 
from his readers, encouraging an ethical approach similar to that described by Attridge 
(Singularity 125). This entails neither passivity nor paralysis; McEwan does encourage 
judgements, even passionate judgements, but not without discerning how the narratives 
operate on us as we read. The proceeding conclusion, after a review of my arguments 
throughout the three chapters of this thesis, will propose an explanation of why McEwan’s 
desire to foster ethical reading is especially relevant in today’s cultural climate. 
 




This thesis has sought to demonstrate the way in which Ian McEwan employs narrative 
technique to facilitate ethical reading. In addition to staging unsettling moral dramas, 
McEwan attends to the ethical questions raised by the very act of narration itself. His 
character-narrators, shackled by various limitations, strive to find an authoritative voice; to 
narrate on their own terms. Meanwhile, his third-person narrators focalise events through 
their protagonists while laying bare those same protagonists’ shortcomings. Consequently, his 
fiction brings the reader-writer relationship into sharp focus. For McEwan, reading and 
writing are not merely means by which we receive and produce information, but creative acts, 
limned with ethical qualities. Not only does he ask readers to suspend, scrutinise and 
(re)evaluate their judgements of his texts and the characters within them, he thematises the 
process of reading consistently, connecting the way his characters read literature with the way 
they “read” the world around them. This connection bears closely on McEwan’s ethical 
project. His habit of discomfiting readers, present throughout his career, reveals a desire to 
develop an ethical readership, consisting of readers ‘willing to have the grounds of [their] 
thinking recast and renewed’ (Attridge Singularity 128). While Derek Attridge’s model of 
ethical reading plays down potential connections to interpersonal ethics (Singularity 130), 
McEwan’s fiction provides a promising bridge between the two domains. 
Such a declaration may have been surprising to those reading McEwan’s early fiction 
at the time of its release. As discussed in Chapter One, however, First Love, Last Rites and 
The Cement Garden reward a reading which eschews knee-jerk responses to the taboo 
content in favour of a careful analysis of how the texts operate. The narrators of these texts 
often betray their self-interest and naïveté, but McEwan also employs their voices to satirise 
certain modes of discourse and (crucially) literary interpretation. “Conversation With a 
Cupboard Man” and The Cement Garden satirise and subvert Freud’s Oedipal drama, while 
“Homemade” recapitulates the narrative trope of the hyper-articulate yet villainous narrator. 
“Solid Geometry” explores logical positivism within a fantastic context, setting the stage for 
McEwan’s later texts, where the real and the romantic often collide. By destabilising these 
various discourses in the context of shocking narratives, McEwan encourages readers to look 
beyond existing modes of interpretation in favour of a responsible [i.e. ethical] response: one 
that ‘refigure[s] the ways in which [they]… think and feel’ (Attridge Singularity 125). As I 
noted at the conclusion of Chapter One, this process of “responding” gave rise to many of 
McEwan’s early stories, as he grafted his literary influences into his own writing style. 
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Though McEwan has since secured a position as an heir to the Victorian novelists, 
characterised by a ‘lasting love for the heritage of literary realism’ (James 182), further 
research might explore McEwan’s earliest literary influences, both in terms of style and 
subject matter. Sustained intertextual analysis would be a fruitful way of assessing McEwan’s 
“response”, particularly the ways in which he both incorporated and repudiated his literary 
forebears in his early fiction. 
In Chapter Two, I explored how McEwan’s later fiction, while engaged in social and 
political issues, still fosters a degree of discomfort and uncertainty in the reader. Saturday and 
Solar do not defend the status quo, but instead showcase the ethical challenges posed by our 
current cultural contexts. Through Henry Perowne and Michael Beard, McEwan reveals that 
a deep grasp of the mechanics of the material world does not provide a sufficient ground for 
ethical conduct. Employing third-person narrators in these novels, McEwan showcases his 
protagonists’ considerable intellect while maintaining a degree of ironic distance, echoing the 
narrative technique of his early fiction. Furthermore, McEwan dramatises the process of 
ethical reading itself: the very process he encouraged in his early texts. Both Perowne and 
Beard underestimate the value of literature, lamenting its lack of utility and the elitism of its 
interpreters. Yet, in both texts, literature plots its revenge. Beard aligns himself with Milton’s 
Satan, unwittingly forecasting his fall, while Perowne’s daughter, Daisy—despite being 
naked, pregnant, and defenceless—thwarts violent tragedy with a rendition of Matthew 
Arnold’s famous poem, “Dover Beach”. McEwan associates Perowne’s and Beard’s austere, 
extractive methods of reading with a certain lack in their approach to interpersonal ethics, and 
though Perowne—thanks to Daisy’s intervention—gets the chance to redeem himself, 
Beard’s obstinate solipsism carries him all the way to the grave. Though the critical literature 
on Saturday is extensive, scholars often limit their analyses of Daisy’s character to her role in 
the novel’s climactic episode. A sustained discussion of her literary apprenticeship at the 
hands of John Grammaticus, which I briefly touched on during Chapter Two, could generate 
new insights, particularly in light of Daisy’s ethical perspectives.28 While Solar has generated 
much discussion among eco-critical scholars, intertextual analyses of the text alongside other 
climate change novels—such as that performed by Greg Garrard (“The Unbearable Lightness 
of Green”)—have so far been limited, and would be worth exploring further.  
 
28 I have in mind especially her stance against the Iraq War, which leads to a heated discussion with her father 
late in the novel. 
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Chapter Three brought the relationship between narrative and ethics into sharper 
focus with an analysis of Enduring Love and Atonement. McEwan brings Joe Rose and 
Briony Tallis to life firstly by revealing to us how they “read” the world; Briony through the 
lens of Romantic fiction, Joe on empirical grounds. These modes of interpretation prove vital 
to their narrative strategies and ethics of representation. Briony mythologises Robbie to atone 
for her betrayal, while Joe attempts to legitimise his fear of Jed Parry by applying a 
psychiatric diagnosis to him. McEwan concludes both novels with a meta-fictional twist, 
forcing his readers to re-evaluate the texts in a new light, and challenging them to take up an 
ethical stance towards his author-narrators. Though McEwan destabilises both narratives in 
this way, he also encourages a commitment to “reality” by highlighting the artificial 
mechanics of narrative art and asking us to assess the way they operate in the context of the 
“real” world, and to notice the ethical consequences of this interplay. McEwan challenges the 
reader to go beyond the types of reading employed by Briony and Joe—to eschew prejudicial 
interpretive frameworks, acknowledge the limitations of our understanding, and make room 
for a truly ethical reading of the text, and, by extension, an ethical mode of “reading” each 
other (“Ian McEwan Interview” 00:01:30–00:01:45). The academic landscape is littered with 
analyses of Enduring Love and (especially) Atonement; in order to explore the ethical 
perspective developed here, researchers might want to depart from a focus on Briony and Joe 
to some of the more minor characters. An analysis which privileged their experience as 
subjects, speculative as it may be, could provide an interesting counterpoint to the copious 
commentaries on Joe and Briony. The internal world of Jed Parry would be a particularly 
fascinating subject of discussion, especially if placed in comparison to Saturday’s Baxter in a 
critique of McEwan’s representation of madness and the ethical questions raised by this 
feature of his fiction. 
Indeed, in our schizoid world of image and hypertext, the mind of the madman may 
return to obsess McEwan once more. The narratives to which we subscribe are at once more 
fragmented and more entrenched. Emboldened by ever-more complex tools of 
communication, cynical parties can successfully mediate any evidence that challenges their 
favoured narrative. When we take an uncritical stance towards such confections, we run the 
risk of falling into apathy; McEwan highlights this risk in Enduring Love when Joe, watching 
the TV news, finds himself untouched by the tragedy and scandal before his eyes due to the 
‘format’s familiarity’ (46). Perhaps the alternative really is a collapse into madness; after all, 
none of us has the stamina to fully scrutinise the grotesque mosaic of events with which we 
contend every day. McEwan’s fiction offers us a third way. By exposing the mechanics of the 
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medium itself, he draws our attention to the ethical risks inherent in the narrative act. Yet 
while McEwan’s fiction shows us that narrative is artificial—and therefore prone to 
corruption—it also proves that narrative is indispensable, and we all have to contend with it. 
McEwan discomfits us in order to undercut our established modes of thinking, but he does 
not steer us towards nihilism or apathy. Instead, he calls for an ethical response, a new way of 
being in the world: one where we are weary of the dangers of narrative acts, but celebrate 
their capacity to delight, to transform, or renew. McEwan’s work does not have salvific 
power, and it certainly does not subscribe to any dogma or orthodoxy. On the contrary, it 
paves the way for us to change our minds, and it is these private revolutions—terrifying as 
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